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 This dissertation examines the poverty line, the levels and trends of income polarization, 
and the relationship between income polarization and economic growth in Indonesia. The first 
essay takes a close look at the data, methodology, and implications of the way in which the 
national poverty line and indices were calculated rather than simply accepting these figures as 
givens. Several key findings are as follows. First, the disclosure of two data sets from the Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and the significant differences between them in 2008 and 2009 
explain why attempts to replicate the official poverty figures often fail. Second, the number of 
food items in the food poverty basket is the most sensitive assumption affecting the poverty line. 
Finally, an alternative method used to estimate Indonesia’s poverty line shows not only a higher 
level but also a different trend than the official poverty line data for 2008 to 2010. 
 The second essay studies the level of national and regional polarization in Indonesia and 
its evolution from 2000 to 2010, and compares polarization measures with traditional inequality 
measures. Our results show that polarization and inequality generally move in the same 
direction; however, there are certain periods in which the two move in opposite directions. 
Another key finding is that, since 2000, Indonesia has rapidly become more polarized in terms of 
consumption expenditures at the national and regional levels. One possible explanation for this 
rapid increase in polarization is that the expenditures of the rich have risen much more quickly 
than those of the poor. We find that polarization was substantially high when fuel subsidy cuts 
occurred in 2002, 2005, and 2008. The compensation programs that followed fuel subsidy cuts 
 assisted the poor (and the non-poor due to large leakages) and reduced polarization, but only 
temporarily. Fuel subsidy cuts saved the government’s budget from deteriorating; however, they 
clearly exacerbated polarization indicating that maintaining the government’s fiscal position was 
prioritized over improving socioeconomic conditions.  
 Lastly, the third essay analyzes the link between income polarization and economic 
growth. Despite Indonesia’s rapid economic growth in the last decade, regional differences in 
growth remain substantial. It is shown that provinces with higher polarization tend to have lower 
subsequent growth, which exacerbates polarization further. Our findings also suggest that better 
institutions are associated with lower polarization; weak local institutions tend to favor large 
firms whose owners are politically and economically powerful. The collusions between local 
leaders and large firms often turn a blind eye to environmental degradation and other social 
issues. Institutional factors including legal certainty, regional finance, government services, and 
local regulations clearly play an important role in reducing polarization. To the extent that rising 
polarization could be harmful from the perspectives of socio-political and future growth 
prospect, the importance of countering this trend of rising polarization should be seriously 
considered in efforts to promote growth.
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CHAPTER 1 
RE-EXAMINING INDONESIA’S POVERTY LINE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In 2010, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the official statistical bureau of 
Indonesia, estimated that the poverty headcount had declined to 13.3% from 14.15% the previous 
year. In other words, more than 31 million out of 235 million people in Indonesia were poor 
according to the CBS. During the East Asian financial crisis in 1998, Indonesia’s poverty 
headcount reached an all-time record high of 24%, but subsequently, the poverty headcount has 
been declining slowly (except in 2006 when the fuel subsidy was cut in the previous year, 
resulting in high inflation). Despite a significant increase in the government’s poverty alleviation 
budget, the poverty headcount has decreased only slightly. In 2005, the poverty reduction budget 
was 23 trillion Rupiah. According to the Ministry of Finance, the budget increased significantly 
to more than 64 trillion Rupiah in 2010, reflecting the government’s significant effort to 
eradicate poverty in Indonesia. Nonetheless, instead of continuing to increase the poverty 
reduction budget, the Indonesian government reduced the budget to 45 trillion Rupiah in 2011, a 
decrease of almost 40%. The government likely made this decision based on the declining 
official poverty headcount estimated by the CBS.  
In general, policy makers have paid less attention to the methods of calculating the 
poverty line and have focused more on results such as the national and regional poverty 
headcount numbers. Based on the official poverty headcount number released by the CBS, the 
central government can determine the effectiveness of its national poverty reduction programs 
over time and can estimate a budget for poverty reduction programs. For example, regional 
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poverty indices such as the poverty headcount, poverty gap, and poverty severity provide 
valuable information that allows policy makers to prioritize regions with high poverty indices. 
Moreover, a reliable and accurate estimation of poverty indices results in better poverty 
targeting. Therefore, the method of calculating the poverty line is crucial for generating poverty 
indices that are useful for policy makers, and the method needs to be carefully constructed based 
on sound assumptions. 
In this study, we attempt to answer the following questions: Can we replicate Indonesia’s 
poverty line figures using the data acquired from the CBS? What assumptions does the CBS 
make when estimating the poverty line? How do these assumptions affect poverty line figures? 
Does the methodology need to be revised since it was last updated in 1998?  
The objective of this paper is twofold: First, this study will attempt to estimate the official 
poverty line numbers with data available for public users (i.e., from the CBS’s Dissemination 
Unit). In addition, the study will attempt to replicate the official poverty line figures with data 
from the CBS’s Poverty Unit. Second, this study will systematically examine the CBS’s poverty 
line calculation method and will propose an alternative method.  
The CBS has used the same methodology since 1998 with no updates, despite critiques 
from scholars such as Pradhan et al. (2000, 2001). The CBS argues that it wants to maintain 
consistency so that the poverty lines and poverty indices are comparable over time. However, 
this study will show that the methodology requires major revision and some updates regarding its 
assumptions. The debate over updating the poverty line methodology has been active among 
stakeholders such as the Indonesian government and the CBS for quite some time. Updating the 
methodology will most likely lead to a higher poverty line, a higher number of poor people, and 
thus a higher budget allocation for poverty reduction programs. Therefore, strong political 
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volition will be necessary to revise and update the outdated methodology. One possible reason 
for maintaining the current methodology is that a higher number of poor people in the country is 
likely to be viewed as a sign of failure in the current government. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Prior to 1998, the CBS used the food energy intake method (FEI) to calculate Indonesia’s 
poverty lines. This method requires no price data, which might primarily explain why the CBS 
used this method at that time. The poverty line is measured by determining the expenditure 
necessary for a household to obtain a standard energy requirement. According to the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO), the minimum energy requirement per person per day is 2100 
kilocalories. The poverty line (z) is simply an inverse function of the minimum energy intake, 
2100 kilocalories per day. Indonesia used 2100 kilocalories per day, whereas other countries 
employed different figures. Haughton and Khanker (2000) argue that “…the food energy intake 
method is seriously flawed, and should not be used for comparisons across time, or across 
regions, or between urban and rural areas, unless the alternatives are infeasible” (p.56). 
Examining the Indonesian case, Ravallion and Bidani (1994) assert that the FEI method 
has serious flaws. Using the SUSENAS (Indonesia’s National Economic Survey) data for 1990 
and both the food energy intake and cost of basic needs (CBN) approaches, the researchers 
calculated Indonesia’s headcount poverty measures and compared the results. Their results show 
that although there are small differences between their overall poverty headcounts using the 
CBN approach and the official headcounts using the FEI method, the urban and rural poverty 
headcounts are significantly different. The FEI method indicates that the poverty headcounts are 
higher in urban than in rural areas (16.8% vs 14.3%), whereas the CBN approach shows that 
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rural poverty is more than two times higher than the rate of urban poverty (23.6% vs 10.7%). 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the calorie income functions for urban and rural Indonesia estimated by 
Ravallion and Bidani: 
 
Source: Haughton and Khanker (2002, p.58) 
 
Figure 1.1. Calorie Income Function for Urban and Rural Indonesia 
 
The problem with the FEI method is that food energy intake is assumed to depend only 
on expenditure. However, many factors influence food energy intake. First, different households 
have different tastes. For example, urban households tend to consume more expensive food that 
tastes good, given relative prices and real total expenditures. Second, the level of activity 
between urban and rural areas differs. Urban workers may require fewer calories than rural 
workers because activities in urban jobs require less physical exertion compared with those in 
rural jobs (for example, people working in an urban office versus those working on a farm). 
Finally, prices in urban and rural areas are different. Relative prices and food prices relative to 
non-food prices also differ, which will influence the demand for food and non-food items. For 
instance, some non-food items in urban areas are priced lower than food items and are easy to 
access through large and small retail outlets across urban areas. This fact may lead to lower food 
demand and thus lower food energy intake in urban than in rural areas. All these factors suggest 
that the calorie income function is higher in rural than in urban areas. As a result, for a given 
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level of food energy intake, the urban poverty line will be higher than the rural poverty line. Due 
to these problems, the FEI is not a reliable approach for measuring the poverty line.  
Another approach for calculating the poverty line is the cost of basic needs (CBN). The 
CBN approach begins by specifying a consumption bundle that is considered to be adequate for 
essential consumption needs. Then, the poverty line is obtained by costing out this consumption 
bundle. Two elements of the poverty line are food and non-food components. The overall 
poverty line is the combination of these components. The food component of the food poverty 
line is calculated by estimating the cost of meeting the food energy requirement (e.g., 2100 
calories per day). There are various ways to calculate the non-food poverty line, and there is 
disagreement about this. In the US, the overall poverty line is obtained by multiplying the food 
poverty line by three. According to this formula, the poor in the US spend one third of their 
expenditures on food items and the rest on non-food items. In contrast, Indonesia’s poverty line 
is determined by adding the food poverty line and the non-food poverty line, which is the mean 
non-food expenditure of the reference population adjusted with some parameters. Ravallion and 
Bidani (1994) discuss some problems with the CBN method. First, defining basic needs involves 
an inevitable degree of arbitrariness. Second, regional price data are unavailable and unreliable, 
especially for non-food items.      
Furthermore, Pradhan et al. (2000, 2001) discuss the importance of choosing the 
reference population. They consider the choice of the reference population to be an arbitrary yet 
important decision. They find that researchers who already believe that the poverty rate is high 
will tend to choose higher percentiles as their reference group. For example, one researcher 
believes that the poverty rate is 20% and thus chooses a 20th percentile reference group, whereas 
another researcher believes that the poverty rate is 30% and thus chooses a 30th percentile group. 
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It follows that these two researchers, using the same method and data but with different prior 
beliefs about the poverty rate, would generate different poverty rates. Pradhan et al. propose a 
solution to overcome the reference population issue by using an iterative method. This approach 
uses an initial reference group to estimate the poverty line. Initial steps taken will yield the 
poverty line that serves as the center of the reference group for the next step. The reference group 
in the next step is defined as households with per capita expenditures of 20% above and below 
the poverty line obtained in the previous step. This iteration continues until it converges to an 
intersection point between two curves, as shown in Figure 1.2: 
 
Source: Pradhan et al. (2001) 
Figure 1.2. Expenditure Level of Reference Group, Poverty Line, and the Iterated Poverty Line 
 
Asra (2000) shows the significance of urban-rural price differences and inflation numbers in 
the poverty line calculation. Based on his food poverty line calculation, he reports that the food 
price difference between urban and rural regions was 13-16%, whereas the official urban-rural 
food price differential was 28-52% during the period 1987-1996, indicating that the CBS 
overestimated the urban-rural food price differential. In addition, Asra shows that trends of 
national poverty headcounts based on his poverty line estimation were similar to those of official 
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national poverty headcounts between 1987 and 1996. However, Asra’s national poverty 
headcounts were significantly higher than the official ones, with the differences somewhere 
between 3 and 14 percentage points, demonstrating the sensitivity of poverty line measures to 
urban-rural price differences.  
This literature discussion highlights certain issues concerning Indonesia’s poverty line 
calculation method. The CBS adopted a cost of basic needs approach since 1998, whereas the 
poverty rates prior to 1998 were estimated using the food energy intake method. Despite the 
weaknesses of the CBN method, the CBS still currently uses this approach. This study examines 
closely all the assumptions made by the CBS to estimate the poverty line, conducts sensitivity 
analysis on several parameters, and proposes an alternative approach, which arguably represents 
a refinement of the existing approach.  
 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
1.3.1  SUSENAS 
The main source of data for poverty and inequality measures in Indonesia is the 
SUSENAS (National Socioeconomic Survey), which is collected annually by Indonesia’s 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Figure 1.3 illustrates the SUSENAS classification. Two types 
are the SUSENAS Core and the SUSENAS Module. The SUSENAS Core consists of 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of households and individuals, including age, 
gender, health, education level, employment, and fertility. This type of SUSENAS has been 
collected every year since 1992 in all provinces in Indonesia. Households and individuals are the 
observation units and are interviewed directly by surveyors of the CBS. Examples of the use of 
the SUSENAS Core are the Human Development Index (HDI), the poverty headcount, the Gini 
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ratio, and the Regional Gross Domestic Product (RGDP).  
 
Figure 1.3. SUSENAS Classification 
The SUSENAS Module is differentiated into three types, the first being the SUSENAS 
Consumption Module (SCM), which consists of detailed information about households’ income 
and total consumption/expenditures on food and non-food items. First collected in 1993, the 
SCM has been collected every three years in all provinces in Indonesia. Observation units are 
households and individuals, and the survey method is direct interviews. Like the SUSENAS 
Core, the SCM is also used for calculating welfare indicators. In 2002, the CBS took a subset of 
the SUSENAS consumption module of approximately 10,000 households and called it the 
SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module (SPCM). These households are followed over time, and 
their detailed consumption/expenditures are recorded every year. However, the CBS changed the 
sample households every three years. Before the SPCM existed, the poverty line was calculated 
by adjusting the previous year’s poverty line for inflation, and the result was applied to the 
SUSENAS Core to determine the poverty headcount. Since 2003, the poverty line calculation 
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has been based solely on the SPCM, and the poverty headcounts for urban and rural provinces 
are generated from this calculation. However, from 2003 to 2006, the sample size was only 
10,000 households, resulting in a potential small-sample problem. Fortunately, from 2007 to 
2010, the sample size had increased to approximately 65,000 households, and the CBS plans to 
further increase the sample size in the future.  
In accordance with the CBS, this study employs the SUSENAS Panel Consumption 
Module of 2008, 2009, and 2010 for poverty line calculations. All data were collected from 
February to March for each year. I obtained the data from the Central Bureau of Statistics’ 
Dissemination Unit (i.e., data sales and customer service) in September 2010. For each year of 
the SUSENAS, there are three parts: food expenditures, non-food expenditures, and a summary 
of food and non-food expenditures. The food expenditure part records household consumption of 
215 types of food, whereas the non-food expenditure part surveys household expenses for 93 
types of non-food, including health, education, and housing expenses. Total expenditures are the 
sum of food and non-food expenditures. Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics of monthly per 
capita expenditures (PCE) for all the data: 
Table 1.1. Summary Statistics of PCE of the SUSENAS from the Dissemination Unit 
 
 
 Table 1.2 shows the percentages of food and non-food expenditures for average-income 
and poor people. Whereas the poor spend most of their income on food, approximately 65%, 
average people spend 50% of their income on food. As households become richer, they spend 
less of their income on food and more on non-food items: 
Year Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
2008 PCE 66,724 386,382 382,937 41,350 30,800,000 
2009 PCE 67,173 491,698 951,559 50,642 176,000,000 
2010 PCE 66,516 494,845 495,007 42,742 27,500,000 
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Table 1.2. Food and Non-food Expenditure Shares of Average and Poor People 
2008 2009 2010 
Average Poor Average Poor Average Poor 
Food share expenditure 0.50 0.66 0.50 0.65 0.51 0.66 
Non-food share expenditure 0.50 0.34 0.50 0.35 0.49 0.34 
 
 
1.3.2 The Official Poverty Line Methodology 
The CBS adopted the cost of basic needs approach to calculate the poverty line in 1998 
and still applies the same method as of the writing of this paper. The cost of basis needs 
approach basically calculates the cost of a consumption bundle consisting of basic food and non-
food items. To calculate the food poverty line, the cost of food items in the bundle is adjusted 
according to the nutritional requirement for good health, usually 2,100 kilocalories per person 
per day:  
 
Source: The CBS 
Figure 1.4. The Official Poverty Line Computation  
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The non-food poverty line is added to the food poverty line to obtain the total poverty 
line. In Indonesia, poverty lines are computed for urban and rural provinces, and the national 
poverty lines are the weighted average of the urban and rural provincial poverty lines. Figure 1.4 
above summarizes the step-by-step method to calculate the poverty line.  
The official procedure for calculating Indonesia’s poverty line is explained in the 
following steps: 
1. Set a reference population, which is 20% of the population whose incomes are above the 
temporary poverty line. The temporary poverty line is defined as the previous year’s 
poverty line that has been increased with general inflation in urban (CPI). Analyzing the 
consumption of this reference population, we calculate the food and non-food poverty line. 
2. Obtain the food poverty line (FPL), which is the sum average of expenditures on 52 basic 
food commodities consumed by the reference population. 
The basic formula for the food poverty line is as follows: 
ܨܲܮ௝௣ ൌ 	෍ ௝ܲ௞௣ܳ௝௞௣
ହଶ
௞ୀଵ
ൌ ෍ ௝ܸ௞௣
ହଶ
௞ୀଵ
 
 Where, 
ܨܲܮ௝௣
ൌ ݂݋݋݀	݌݋ݒ݁ݎݐݕ	݈݅݊݁	ݎ݁݃݅݋݊	݆	݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁	݌	ܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁	݅ݐ	݅ݏ	݁ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݖ݁݀	ݐ݋	2100	݈݇݅݋݈ܿܽ݋ݎ݅݁ݏ 
௝ܲ௞௣ ൌ ܽݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁	݋݂	ܿ݋݉݉݋݀݅ݐݕ	݇	݅݊	ݎ݁݃݅݋݊	݆	ܽ݊݀	݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁	݌ 
ܳ௝௞௣ ൌ ܽݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	ݍݑܽ݊ݐ݅ݐݕ	݋݂	ܿ݋݉݉݋݀݅ݐݕ	݇	ܿ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁݀	݅݊	ݎ݁݃݅݋݊	݆	ܽ݊݀	݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁	݌ 
௝ܸ௞௣
ൌ ܽݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	݁ݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁	ݒ݈ܽݑ݁	݋ݎ	ܿ݋݊ݏݑ݉݌ݐ݅݋݊	݋݂	ܿ݋݉݉݋݀݅ݐݕ	݇	݅݊	ݎ݁݃݅݋݊	݆, ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁	݌ 
J ൌ 	region	ሺurban	or	ruralሻ 
݌ ൌ ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ݏ 
 
3. Equalize FPL with 2100 kilocalories by multiplying 2100 by the implicit price average 
calories based on region j from the reference population: 
ܪܭതതതത௝௣ ൌ
∑ ௝ܸ௞௣ହଶ௞ୀଵ
∑ ܭ௝௞௣ହଶ௞ୀଵ
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Where, 
ܭ௝௞௣ ൌ ܽݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	݈ܿܽ݋ݎ݅݁ݏ	݋݂	ܿ݋݉݉݋݀݅ݐݕ	݇	݅݊	ݎ݁݃݅݋݊	݆	݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁	݌ 
ܪܭതതതത௝௣ ൌ ܽݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	݈ܿܽ݋ݎ݅݁	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁ݏ	݅݊	ݎ݁݃݅݋݊	݆	݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁	݌ 
ܨܲܮ௝௣ ൌ ܪܭതതതത௜௣	ݔ	2100 
 Where, 
ܨܲܮ௝௣ ൌ ݂݋݋݀	݉݅݊݅݉ݑ݉	݊݁݁݀ݏ	݅݊	ݎ݁݃݅݋݊	݆	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݕ݈݅݁݀ݏ	݁݊݁ݎ݃ݕ	݁ݍݑ݈ܽ	
2100 ݈ܿܽ݋ݎ݅݁ݏܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ
݀ܽݕ 	 
 
4. Calculate the non-food poverty line (NFPL) using the following formula: 
ܰܨܲܮ௝௣ ൌ ෍ݎ௞௝
ହଵ
௞ୀଵ
௞ܸ௝௣ 
Where ܰܨܲܮ௝௣ is the non-food poverty line in region j and province p; ௞ܸ௝௣ is the 
consumption value per commodity/non-food subgroup in region j and province p based 
on the SUSENAS consumption module;	ݎ௞௝ is the commodity/non-food subgroup 
consumption ratio according to region adopted from the SPKKD 2004 and region j 
(urban or rural); k is a selective type of commodity. 
5. Sum the food poverty line and the non-food poverty line to obtain the total poverty line: 
ܲܮ ൌ ܨܲܮ ൅ ܰܨܲܮ 
 
The method seems very straightforward. However, it has certain drawbacks in setting the 
reference population, applying the urban CPI for both the urban and rural provincial poverty 
lines, and using average instead of median prices. These issues will be discussed later in this 
study. 
 
1.3.3 Two Different Data Sets 
Few people who have attempted to replicate the national poverty line are aware that there 
are in fact two different SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module data sets. One data set is used by 
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the CBS’s Poverty Unit (PU) to calculate Indonesia’s official poverty line, whereas the CBS’s 
Dissemination Unit (DU) sells a different data set to public users. As a result, users outside of the 
CBS may face difficulties in replicating the official poverty line even though they employ the 
exact same official method and assumptions as those used by the CBS. In this paper, I show that 
this difficulty in fact occurs. I was able to obtain both data sets and thus could apply the same 
official method to both sets to demonstrate how significant the differences are: 
Table 1.3. Comparison of Summary Statistics of the PU and the DU Data Sets   
 
Table 1.3 shows a summary of the statistical comparisons between data sets from the 
CBS’s DU and the data set from the CBS’s PU. There are slight differences between the 2008 
DU data set and the 2008 PU data set. The mean, standard deviation, and minimum per capita 
expenditures are evidently not the same for both data sets. However, the 2009 DU data set and 
the 2009 PU data set show higher discrepancies, with the former having larger values of mean, 
standard deviation, and minimum and maximum than the latter. However, the 2010 data set 
shows no differences between the DU and PU data sets.  
The 2009 DU data set has a high standard deviation due to possible outliers. Because we 
can see that the 2009 PU data set also has a high standard deviation compared to the 2008 and 
the 2010 data sets, it is safe to conclude that both the 2009 data sets might have an outlier 
Year Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
2008 PCE 66,724 386,382 382,937 41,350 30,800,000
2009 PCE 67,174 491,698 951,559 50,642 176,000,000
2010 PCE 66,516 494,845 495,007 42,742 27,500,000
Poverty Unit (PU)
Year Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
2008 PCE 66,724 386,379 382,933 41,378 30,800,000
2009 PCE 67,174 430,065 829,597 43,914 153,000,000
2010 PCE 66,516 494,845 495,007 42,742 27,500,000
Dissemination Unit (DU)
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problem. Compared to the 2008 and 2010 SUSENAS from the PU, the maximum per capita 
expenditure in the 2009 SUSENAS is Rp 153,000,000, which is surprisingly high. Like other 
statistical offices in developing countries conducting household surveys, the CBS may also face 
obstacles to surveying the wealthy due to limited access to these income groups. 
To further demonstrate the differences between the two data sets, the poverty headcount 
or P0s from 2008 to 2010 are calculated using both data sets shown in Table 1.4 below. 
Compared to the CBS’s official poverty headcount (P0), our P0s using the SUSENAS data set 
from the PU are slightly different. The difference is quite significant for the 2008 P0. However, 
for the 2009 and 2010 P0s, the difference is 0.01 percentage point, which is likely due to 
rounding errors. Furthermore, using the data set from the DU, we estimated the P0 for three 
years and found a large difference in trend between the official P0 and the P0 calculated with the 
DU data set. Whereas the official P0 declined smoothly between 2008 and 2010, our P0 shows a 
substantial decline from 2008 to 2009, and it increased slightly between 2009 and 2010. It is not 
clear what factors contribute to this significant difference in trend. One can speculate that 
individual weight in the data indicating how many each individual represents in one survey area 
might be different. Regardless of the difference, the question is, if we think the DU data set is 
true, meaning it is free from any intentional adjustments, then why did the CBS not disclose to 
the public that the poverty rate had declined substantially between 2008 and 2009 and slightly 
increased from 2009 to 2010? In other words, the poverty rate trend should not always decline. 
Furthermore, high variations of level and of trends are evident when we observe provincial 
poverty lines and poverty rates. Again, official figures show smooth trends at provincial levels. 
A complete comparison between the DU and PU poverty lines is shown in Appendix A.1, and a 
comparison between the DU and PU P-α is in Appendix A.2. 
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Table 1.4. Comparison of the Poverty Headcount (P0) for Two Data Sets 
SUSENAS Poverty Unit  
Data Set 
SUSENAS Dissemination Unit  
Data Set 
2008 (P0) 2009 (P0) 2010 (P0) 2008 (P0) 2009 (P0) 2010 (P0) 
Author’s 
Calculation 15.30% 14.14% 13.32% 15.23% 13.31% 13.32% 
CBS’s 
Calculation 15.42% 14.15% 13.33% N/A N/A N/A 
 
Table 1.5 below shows the provincial poverty headcount (P0) rank comparison between 
the CBS’s calculation using the PU SUSENAS data and our calculation using the DU SUSENAS 
data for 2008 and 2009. The provincial P0 rankings clearly differ between these two calculations 
in 2008 and 2009. For the 2008 P0 ranking, both calculations show that most provinces with the 
highest P0 are located in the eastern part of Indonesia. Our calculation shows that only two 
provinces in western Indonesia (i.e., Dista Yogyakarta and Nangroe Aceh Darussalam) have high 
poverty headcounts, whereas the CBS’s calculation shows three provinces in western Indonesia 
that are included in the top ten list (i.e., Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, Lampung, and Bengkulu). 
Moreover, two provinces, Dista Yogyakarta and Sulawesi Barat, are not even in the CBS’s P0 
top ten list. Therefore, if one considers the DU SUSENAS and the PU SUSENAS, the PU data 
result in the exclusion of some provinces with the highest P0 (in this case, Dista Yogyakarta and 
Sulawesi Barat). This problem is known as exclusion error. The policy implication is that those 
excluded regions may not be prioritized in terms of poverty reduction budgets and national 
programs. 
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Table 1.5. The P0 Top Ten List for Two Data Sets 2008 and 2009 
 
For the 2009 P0 ranking, our calculation shows that two provinces that were on the 2008 
P0 top ten list were not on the 2009 list. The remainder of the list shows the same provinces with 
different rankings. However, the CBS’s calculation shows that only one province (i.e., 
Bengkulu) that was on the 2008 P0 top ten list was not on the 2009 list. The same nine provinces 
on the 2008 list were still on the 2009 list but with slightly different rankings. 
Ideally, there should be only one data set to calculate the poverty line in Indonesia, and 
public users outside the CBS should be able to easily replicate the official poverty number and 
poverty indices. With this practice, the CBS could maintain its credibility as an objective data 
provider in Indonesia. Therefore, the CBS should be more transparent in informing the public 
about its poverty line calculations so that the public can perform collective “checks and 
balances” and monitor the CBS’s method for poverty line calculations.  
However, two questions arise from these findings: why are there two different data sets, 
Rank Province 2008 P0  Rank Province 2008 P0 
1 PAPUA 42.66 1 PAPUA 37.08
2 PAPUA BARAT 37.31 2 PAPUA BARAT 35.12
3 MALUKU 31.28 3 MALUKU 29.66
4 GORONTALO 24.55 4 NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR 25.65
5 NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR 22.01 5 GORONTALO 24.88
6 DISTA YOGYAKARTA 21.87 6 NUSA TENGGARA BARAT 23.81
7 NUSA TENGGARA BARAT 20.52 7 NANGROE ACEH DARUSSALAM 23.53
8 SULAWESI TENGAH 20.31 8 LAMPUNG 20.98
9 NANGROE ACEH DARUSSALAM 19.92 9 SULAWESI TENGAH 20.75
10 SULAWESI BARAT 18.71 10 BENGKULU 20.64
(a) Author's Calculation (b) The CBS's Official P0
Rank Province 2009 P0  Rank Province 2009 P0
1 PAPUA BARAT 43.93 1 PAPUA 37.53
2 MALUKU UTARA 30.95 2 PAPUA BARAT 35.71
3 PAPUA 24.24 3 MALUKU 28.23
4 SULAWESI BARAT 20.89 4 GORONTALO 25.01
5 NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR 19.72 5 NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR 23.31
6 NANGROE ACEH DARUSSALAM 19.52 6 NUSA TENGGARA BARAT 22.78
7 SULAWESI TENGAH 19.06 7 NANGROE ACEH DARUSSALAM 21.8
8 GORONTALO 17.50 8 LAMPUNG 20.22
9 SULAWESI TENGGARA 17.09 9 SULAWESI TENGAH 18.98
10 MALUKU 16.75 10 SULAWESI TENGGARA 18.93
(a) Author's Calculation (b) The CBS's Official P0
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and more important, which data set is better and should be used? To answer the first question, we 
rely on the explanation of a researcher who works closely with the CBS and is well familiar with 
how the official poverty line is estimated. As mentioned, the SUSENAS Panel Consumption 
Module is collected annually between February and March across 33 provinces in Indonesia, and 
the number of households surveyed is more than sixty-six thousand. The CBS releases poverty 
statistics each July, and these numbers are mentioned in the annual presidential speech on 
August 17. Therefore, the period is relatively short between the time required to process the data 
from the field across Indonesia and the date of the publicly released official poverty figures, 
approximately five months. 
According to the Pedoman Pengolahan SUSENAS 2006 (SUSENAS’s data management 
guideline), the CBS’s process of estimating Indonesia’s poverty line is as follows (see Figure 1.5 
for the flowchart). First, field surveys are conducted across Indonesia, and the CBS offices at the 
district level organize these surveys. All survey results are collected by the district offices, which 
receive and batch these data and send the data to the province offices that also perform receiving 
and batching. Next, the province offices send the data to the central office in Jakarta. The 
SUSENAS Unit at the central office conducts data entry, combines data from province offices, 
and performs statistical procedures, such as cleaning and “smoothing” to treat outliers in the 
data. The final data are sent to the Dissemination Unit to officially sell to the public in 
September. However, according to the researcher I spoke to1, the data used by the Poverty Unit 
to estimate the poverty line is incomplete. That is, the SUSENAS unit has not finished finalizing 
the data, but because the Poverty Unit works within a tight deadline to release the poverty figures 
in July, the PU obtains the incomplete data from the SUSENAS unit, performs their own 
statistical process, and estimates the official poverty figures based on this data. In other words, 
                                                 
1 The researcher requested not to disclose his name. 
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two different working units (i.e., the Poverty Unit and the SUSENAS Unit) conduct different 
data processing, resulting in two different data sets. 
I personally asked a central employee of the CBS to verify this process. Until 2009, he 
was the head of the department that supervised the Poverty Unit. He explained that after the 
SUSENAS Unit finishes processing the data, it sends the final data to the Poverty Unit, which 
uses the data to estimate the poverty line. In the process, the Poverty Unit adjusts and modifies 
the data. However, the Poverty Unit does not send the adjusted data back to the SUSENAS Unit. 
As a result, two different data sets exist:  
 
Source: SUSENAS’s Data Management Guideline and Author’s modification 
Figure 1.5. Data flow of SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module 
 
Although these statements are difficult to validate, they provide possible explanations for 
why two different data sets exist. If it is true that the poverty data compiled at the time of 
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announcement is incomplete, then it is clear that the data set sold to the public by the 
Dissemination Unit in September is probably better than the data set used by the Poverty Unit 
because the data in September are clean, final, and complete. Fortunately, this study’s findings 
has helped the CBS to acknowledge the existence of two data sets, and the CBS had reconciled 
the 2010 SUSENAS data sets in the Poverty Unit and in the Dissemination Unit. 
 
1.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
The objective of a sensitivity analysis in this study is to determine how altered parameters 
in the poverty line calculation affect the poverty lines and poverty indices. The parameters in 
Indonesia’s poverty line calculation include the reference population, inflation in the temporary 
poverty line computation, and the number of food and non-food items in the poverty basket. This 
paper systematically examines three parameters (i.e., the reference population, inflation, and the 
food poverty basket) and analyzes their effects on the poverty lines and the poverty indices. The 
data used for this sensitivity analysis is the SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module from the DU. 
The benchmark for the sensitivity analysis is the poverty lines and the poverty indices that are 
calculated using the same methodology and assumptions that the CBS uses in the DU’s 
SUSENAS Consumption Module. 
 
1.3.4.1 Reference Population 
According to the CBS, the first step in calculating the poverty line is to set a reference 
population. A reference population is defined as 20% of the population that has per capita 
expenditures (PCE) above the temporary poverty line (Zt-1), which is the previous year’s poverty 
line adjusted for inflation, as shown in Figure 1.6. The CBS calculates this reference 
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population’s mean expenditures on a predetermined food and non-food basket, which will result 
in the current year’s poverty line. Therefore, a reference population plays an important role in 
determining the poverty line: 
Figure 1.6. The Official Method of the Reference Population 
 
One might ask why the CBS chose 20% above the temporary poverty line as the 
reference population. Why not 10%, 15%, or 25% above the temporary poverty line? Pradhan 
(2001) states that the decision to choose a reference population is subjective yet important. The 
CBS argues that its intention is to capture the near-poor population and examine their 
expenditures to determine the new poverty line. However, this near-poor population is not 
considered poor if measured by the temporary poverty line, Zt-1. Therefore, instead of employing 
the poor as a reference population, the CBS employs the near-poor, who may have different 
consumption patterns than the poor. Choosing a reference population that is centered on the 
temporary poverty line is preferable to the official choice of reference population. This method 
ensures that the reference population represents both the poor and the near-poor.  
Two types of sensitivity analysis on the reference population are as follows: First, instead 
of 20% of the population whose expenditures are greater than the temporary poverty line, 
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different numbers above the temporary poverty line are simulated. Second, instead of a fraction 
of the population above the temporary poverty line, the reference population is now x percent 
above and x percent below the temporary poverty line. Both types of sensitivity analysis still 
utilize the same food and non-food basket as the current CBS method (i.e., 52 types of food and 
51 types of non-food commodities) and other assumptions used by the CBS. 
 
1.3.4.2 Inflation in the Temporary Poverty Line 
The CBS derives the urban inflation rate from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of 66 
cities in Indonesia to calculate the temporary urban and rural provincial poverty lines. To obtain 
the urban provincial inflation rate, the CBS averages the inflation rates of cities within that 
province. For example, if the CBS publishes the CPI for two cities in one province, then the 
average of these two cities’ CPI must be calculated to obtain the urban provincial inflation rate.   
According to the CBS, the March CPI is chosen based on similar timing with the 
SUSENAS survey conducted between February and March every year. Although the poverty 
lines are calculated for urban and rural provinces, the CBS uses only the urban inflation rates to 
calculate the urban and rural provincial temporary poverty lines, instead of using the urban and 
rural inflation rates, resulting in an urban bias. An urban bias occurs when one assumes that 
urban and rural areas have the same inflation rate. The higher the urban inflation, the higher the 
poverty line in urban and rural areas. This assumption is a major flaw in the official poverty line 
calculation. Table 1.6 shows the inflation numbers by province for the poverty line computation 
calculated by the CBS: 
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Province 2008 2009 2010
Aceh  1.09 1.09 1.04
Sumatera Utara  1.07 1.07 1.04
Sumatera Barat  1.08 1.09 1.04
Riau  1.07 1.09 1.03
Jambi  1.06 1.09 1.05
Sumatera Selatan  1.11 1.07 1.03
Bengkulu  1.08 1.11 1.05
Lampung  1.09 1.12 1.05
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung  1.07 1.11 1.05
Kepulauan Riau  1.07 1.08 1.03
Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta  1.08 1.07 1.04
Jawa Barat  1.07 1.08 1.03
Jawa Tengah  1.08 1.07 1.04
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta  1.09 1.08 1.04
Jawa Timur  1.09 1.08 1.04
Banten  1.09 1.09 1.04
Bali  1.07 1.09 1.04
Nusa Tenggara Barat  1.08 1.12 1.04
Nusa Tenggara Timur  1.06 1.09 1.07
Kalimantan Barat  1.10 1.09 1.05
Kalimantan Tengah  1.11 1.08 1.04
Kalimantan Selatan  1.09 1.08 1.05
Kalimantan Timur  1.11 1.09 1.07
Sulawesi Utara  1.08 1.09 1.03
Sulawesi Tengah  1.09 1.11 1.04
Sulawesi Selatan  1.08 1.10 1.04
Sulawesi Tenggara  1.08 1.16 1.01
Gorontalo  1.08 1.11 1.04
Sulawesi Barat  1.08 1.09 1.03
Maluku  1.07 1.06 1.07
Maluku Utara  1.13 1.08 1.04
Papua Barat  1.12 1.20 1.04
Papua  1.12 1.10 1.03
Table 1.6. Inflation by Province Used in the Official Method 
Source: The CBS 
 
This paper uses the urban and rural inflation rates to investigate how this assumption affects the 
poverty headcount, the poverty gap, and poverty severity. Rural inflation rates are assumed to be 
1 percentage point higher than urban inflation rates. The reason for this assumption is that the 
distance between rural areas and production centers is likely to be far, leading to higher prices of 
goods in rural than in urban areas. Table 1.7 shows the assumptions regarding urban and rural 
inflation rates used for the sensitivity analysis: 
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Table 1.7. Urban and Rural Inflation Rates  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3.4.3.   Number of Food Items in the Food Poverty Basket 
The number of food items in the official food poverty basket is 52. The CBS selected 
these items in 1998 to represent the consumption pattern of the poor at that time. However, 
critics state that most food items in the basket are consumed by the urban poor, implying urban 
bias in the food item selection for this basket. Moreover, critics argue that this food poverty 
basket does not reflect different regional consumption patterns in Indonesia. For example, people 
in the eastern part of Indonesia consume more fish than those in the western region. 
To select food items for a food poverty basket, a specific criterion is employed. Food 
items consumed by 20% of the lowest quintile of the population in urban and rural province are 
Province Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Aceh  1.091 1.101 1.093 1.103 1.043 1.053
Sumatera Utara  1.073 1.083 1.071 1.081 1.042 1.052
Sumatera Barat  1.076 1.086 1.094 1.104 1.038 1.048
Riau  1.073 1.083 1.085 1.095 1.027 1.037
Jambi  1.064 1.074 1.087 1.097 1.051 1.061
Sumatera Selatan  1.109 1.119 1.075 1.085 1.028 1.038
Bengkulu  1.078 1.088 1.105 1.115 1.050 1.060
Lampung  1.093 1.103 1.122 1.132 1.047 1.057
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung  1.066 1.076 1.107 1.117 1.053 1.063
Kepulauan Riau  1.073 1.083 1.077 1.087 1.031 1.041
Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta  1.077 1.066 1.036
Jawa Barat  1.071 1.081 1.081 1.091 1.032 1.042
Jawa Tengah  1.080 1.090 1.073 1.083 1.037 1.047
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta  1.090 1.100 1.081 1.091 1.037 1.047
Jawa Timur  1.088 1.098 1.076 1.086 1.037 1.047
Banten  1.090 1.100 1.093 1.103 1.036 1.046
Bali  1.071 1.081 1.093 1.103 1.043 1.053
2008 2009 2010
Nusa Tenggara Barat  1.084 1.094 1.124 1.134 1.041 1.051
Nusa Tenggara Timur  1.064 1.074 1.095 1.105 1.075 1.085
Kalimantan Barat  1.103 1.113 1.087 1.097 1.053 1.063
Kalimantan Tengah  1.109 1.119 1.080 1.090 1.037 1.047
Kalimantan Selatan  1.086 1.096 1.078 1.088 1.053 1.063
Kalimantan Timur  1.111 1.121 1.095 1.105 1.067 1.077
Sulawesi Utara  1.077 1.087 1.089 1.099 1.032 1.042
Sulawesi Tengah  1.091 1.101 1.108 1.118 1.041 1.051
Sulawesi Selatan  1.080 1.090 1.103 1.113 1.037 1.047
Sulawesi Tenggara  1.084 1.094 1.162 1.172 1.014 1.024
Gorontalo  1.083 1.093 1.110 1.120 1.036 1.046
Sulawesi Barat  1.080 1.090 1.092 1.102 1.029 1.039
Maluku  1.071 1.081 1.064 1.074 1.067 1.077
Maluku Utara  1.129 1.139 1.082 1.092 1.035 1.045
Papua Barat  1.120 1.130 1.200 1.210 1.037 1.047
Papua  1.120 1.130 1.097 1.107 1.034 1.044
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selected. With this practice, an urban bias is minimized, and the food poverty basket reflects 
different regional consumption patterns. The number of food items selected according to this 
criterion is 103, compared to 52 items in the official food poverty basket. By comparing the 
differences in the poverty lines and indices, one might recognize the sensitivity of food poverty 
basket in measuring the poverty line. 
 
1.3.5 Alternative Method for Calculating Indonesia’s Poverty Lines 
 Having conducted the sensitivity analysis, we propose an alternative method that 
modifies the CBS’s methodology. Table 1.8 shows a summary comparison between the CBS’s 
method and the alternative method. The justifications for the use of the different assumptions 
follow: 
Table 1.8. Comparison of the CBS’s Official Method with an Alternative Method 
No Comparison Factor  The 1998 CBS Official Method  Alternative Method 
1 Reference population 20% population above urban rural province TPL 
15% population above and 
below urban rural province TPL
2 Temporary poverty line (TPL) 
Last year's poverty line 
adjusted by this year's 
urban inflation calculated 
from CPI 
Last year's poverty line 
adjusted by this year's urban 
and rural inflation calculated 
from CPI 
3 Food basket 52 items 
103 items capturing higher 
share of ready-to-eat food and 
regional consumption patterns 
4 Food poverty line 
Average expenditure per 
average calorie multiplied 
by 2100 kilocalories 
Average expenditure using 
median price per average 
calorie multiplied by 2100 
kilocalories.  
5 Non-food poverty line 
Average price adjusted by 
parameters from other 
survey 
Ravallion Bidani’s (1993) 
method to obtain total poverty 
line. Total poverty line is a 
scaled-up food poverty line. 
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Methodology Discussion: 
1. The main intention of setting a reference population is to capture the poor and the near-
poor consumption patterns. Therefore, an alternative method uses as a reference 
population 15% of the population whose expenditures are above and below the temporary 
poverty line. Although this choice is subjective, the sensitivity analysis indicated that a 
wealthier reference population of above and below a certain percentage will better 
capture the poor and near-poor. 
2. Unlike the CBS method that employs only urban inflation to obtain the urban and rural 
temporary poverty lines, the alternative method differentiates urban and rural inflation to 
calculate the urban and rural temporary poverty lines, reducing the urban bias problem.  
3. The food basket in the CBS method consists of 52 items set in 1998, whereas the food 
basket in the alternative method consists of 103 items. Consumption patterns have 
dramatically changed since 1998, mostly regarding the following items: 
 Currently, people tend to consume more ready-to-eat foods, such as instant noodles, 
due to limited time to cook and cheap prices. Table 9 shows a comparison between 
the number of food items in the CBS food basket and those in the alternative food 
basket. As shown, the alternative food basket contains two times more ready-to-eat 
food items than the 1998 food basket, suggesting that poor people currently consume 
more ready-to-eat foods. 
 Because the alternative food basket represents regional consumption patterns, more 
types of fish are included in the food basket. Fourteen types of fish are in the 
alternative poverty basket, whereas only five types of fish are included in the 1998 
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food basket. Hence, the alternative food basket takes into consideration better than the 
existing food basket the consumption patterns of the population in eastern Indonesia.  
 Most poor people rarely eat meat. They eat meat only on special occasions, such as 
Islamic holidays (i.e., Ied Adha) and weddings. Nevertheless, five types of meat are 
in the 1998 food basket, indicating an incorrect assumption about the poor’s meat 
consumption pattern. In the alternative food basket, only one type of meat is included.   
 The poor in Indonesia spend a large share of their money on cigarettes. 
Approximately 6% of their expenditures are spent on cigarettes, according to the 
World Bank’s publication,” Making the New Indonesia Work for the Poor” (2004). 
The CBS only considers one type of cigarettes in the food basket, whereas there are 
five types of cigarettes in the alternative food basket.   
This side-by-side comparison clearly shows that the CBS food basket might 
misrepresent the poor’s consumption patterns. As a consequence, the poverty line might 
be too low, and the national poverty headcount might be underestimated. The alternative 
basket, however, is more likely to better represent the poor’s consumption patterns. This 
basket illustrates that the poor consume mostly fish, vegetables, and ready-to-eat food.   
As discussed in the sensitivity analysis section, the food items in the alternative 
food basket are determined by examining the consumption patterns of the lowest quintile 
of the population. The items selected are consumed by more than 20% of the lowest 
quintile in all urban and rural provinces. Based on this criterion, 103 out of 292 food 
items in the SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module are selected. The CBS does not 
provide an explanation to justify the 52 food items in the 1998 food basket. The food 
items selected seem to represent foods that were most consumed by the poor people 
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living in Java Island during that time. Therefore, a revision of the assumptions made in 
selecting items for the food basket is necessary and crucial. 
Table 1.9. Comparison of the Number of Food Items in the CBS Food Basket 
and in the Alternative Food Basket 
Food Type Food 
Basket 1998
Food Basket 
Alternative 
1998 
Percentage 
Alternative 
Percentage 
Cereals  4 4 7.69 3.88 
Tubers 3 5 5.77 4.85 
Fish 5 14 9.62 13.59 
Meat  5 1 9.62 0.97 
Eggs and Milk  4 3 7.69 2.91 
Vegetables 9 22 17.31 21.36 
Legumes  3 4 5.77 3.88 
Fruits 4 6 7.69 5.83 
Oil and Fats  2 7 3.85 6.80 
Spices 3 11 5.77 10.68 
Miscellaneous items 2 2 3.85 1.94 
Ready-to-eat food and Beverages 7 19 13.46 18.45 
Tobacco & Betel 1 5 1.92 4.85 
Total 52 103 100 100 
Source: The CBS and Author’s calculation 
4. In the CBS’s poverty method, the average prices of 52 food items are used to calculate 
the food poverty line. In comparison, the alternative method calculates the food poverty 
line by using the median prices of 103 food items. Median prices are more independent of 
a distribution shape compared with average prices and are also more stable because they 
are not affected by outliers. 
5. The CBS chose 51 non-food items for the urban PL and 47 non-food items for the rural 
PL in its calculation of the non-food poverty line. Again, no clear justification for 
choosing those items is offered by the CBS. Furthermore, the reference population’s 
expenditures on those items are adjusted with parameters from a different survey called 
the SPKKD (Survey Paket Komoditi Kebutuhan Dasar), which is updated every four 
years. The alternative method employs the Ravallion and Bidani (1994) poverty line 
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calculation approach using only the food poverty line. The total poverty line is simply the 
food poverty line scaled up with parameters from a regression in the SUSENAS rather 
than from an outside survey. This model is based on the notion that poor people spend 
most of their income on food and the remainder on non-food items.  
The regression formula is as follows: 
௜ܵ௝ ൌ ߙ௝ ൅	ߚ௝ log ൭ݕ௜௝ݖ௝௙
൱ ൅ ɛ௜௝ 
 Where, 
௜ܵ௝ ൌ ݐ݄݁	݂݋݋݀	ݏ݄ܽݎ݁	݋݂	ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	݁ݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁	݋݂	݄݋ݑݏ݄݁݋݈݀	݅	݅݊	ݎ݁݃݅݋݊	݆		 
ݕ௜௝ ൌ ݌݁ݎ	ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ	݁ݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁	݋݂	݄݋ݑݏ݄݁݋݈݀	݅	݅݊	ݎ݁݃݅݋݊	݆ 
ݖ௝௙ ൌ ݐ݄݁	݂݋݋݀	݌݋ݒ݁ݎݐݕ	݈݅݊݁ 
ߙ௝&	ߚ௝ ൌ ݌ܽݎܽ݉݁ݐ݁ݎݏ	ݐ݋	ܾ݁	݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀ 
ɛ௜௝ ൌ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ	ݐ݁ݎ݉ 
After obtaining the estimated parameters, the poverty line is obtained as follows: 
௝ܼ ൌ ݖ௝௙ሺ2 െ ߙ௝ሻ 
1.4 Results and Analysis 
1.4.1 Results of Reference Population Sensitivity Analysis 
1.4.1.1 The First Type of Reference Population: Share of Population With Expenditures Above 
the Temporary Poverty Line 
 
Table 1.10. Poverty Index Results from the First Type of Reference Population Simulation  
 
Table 1.10 presents the poverty index results of the first type of sensitivity analysis based 
on the SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module from 2008-2010. In all years, it is clear that 
P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2
> 5% Population 12.49 2.13 0.57 9.32 1.47 0.37 11.26 1.84 0.48
> 10% Population 13.44 2.33 0.63 10.67 1.75 0.45 12.00 1.98 0.52
> 15% Population 14.29 2.51 0.68 11.89 2.00 0.52 12.65 2.10 0.55
> 20% Population 15.23 2.71 0.75 13.31 2.29 0.61 13.32 2.21 0.58
> 25% Population 16.35 2.95 0.82 14.63 2.57 0.70 14.47 2.46 0.66
> 30% Population 17.62 3.25 0.92 15.92 2.86 0.79 16.32 2.90 0.79
2008 2009 2010Reference 
Population
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wealthier reference groups with expenditures greater than the temporary poverty line result in 
higher poverty lines and thus higher headcounts (P0), poverty gaps (P1), and poverty severity 
indexes (P2). The P0 gradually increases for a higher percentage of the reference population. 
Compared to the P1 and the P2, the P0 has the highest elasticity, meaning a significant increase 
in the percentage of the reference population results in a substantial rise in the P0:  
 
Figure 1.7.  The P0 Simulation Results for Various Reference Populations 2008-2010 
Figure 1.7 depicts the P0 simulation results for different percentages of the first type of 
reference population. Regardless of which reference population is used, the trends are all the 
same in the period of study. That is, the poverty headcount moderately improved from 2008 to 
2009, but it increased slightly from 2009 to 2010. The magnitude of changes is different for each 
percentage of the reference population. Furthermore, the P1 and the P2 also indicate the same 
trend as the P0 but with different magnitudes of changes, as shown in Figure 1.8: 
 
    Figure 1.8. The P1 and P2 Simulation Results for Various Reference Populations 2008-2010 
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The first type of reference population considers that population whose expenditure is 
above the temporary poverty line or the near-poor. Changing the percentage of the reference 
population to above the temporary poverty line gradually makes the upper boundary larger, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.9. As a result, the poverty line, which is the mean food and non-food 
expenditures of the reference population, becomes much higher, causing P-α to be higher as 
well: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.9. Illustration of the First Type of Reference Population Sensitivity Analysis 
The SUSENAS’s total number of observations is approximately 66,000 households, as 
indicated above in Table 1.2. Most likely, the CBS chose 20% as the reference population to 
avoid a small sample problem. As shown in Table 1.11, some provinces such as Maluku Utara 
and Papua Barat have samples below 500 observations, whereas other provinces have samples 
ranging from above 500 to 7,000 households. Small numbers of observations in some provinces 
are likely caused by lack of access to regions in those provinces and budget constraints. Hence, 
choosing a reference population that is less than 20% might be problematic because the samples 
per province would be small. For example, if a 5% reference population were chosen, then the 
reference population for Maluku Utara province would contain only 99 households. These small 
samples may underrepresent the population in that area and may result in inaccurate estimation 
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of the poverty line. 
Table 1.11. SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module Total Number of Samples by Province 
 
 
Although the small sample problem has been avoided by choosing 20% of the population 
whose expenditures are above the temporary poverty line, the reference group chosen still does 
not represent the poor. The next sensitivity analysis considers the shares of the population with 
expenditures above and below the temporary poverty line, capturing the poor and the near-poor’s 
consumption patterns. 
 
  
Province 2008 2009 2010
Aceh  1,955 1,933 1,904
Sumatera Utara  2,869 2,860 2,745
Sumatera Barat  1,745 1,762 1,674
Riau  1,527 1,623 1,588
Jambi  1,132 1,108 1,100
Sumatera Selatan  1,733 1,816 1,759
Bengkulu  1,007 965 996
Lampung  2,102 2,131 2,123
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung  788 795 793
Kepulauan Riau  762 778 723
Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta  2,985 3,012 2,918
Jawa Barat  7,030 7,102 7,145
Jawa Tengah  7,441 7,428 7,463
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta  2,250 2,250 2,239
Jawa Timur  8,607 8,679 8,619
Banten  1,896 1,905 1,884
Bali  1,893 1,890 1,877
Nusa Tenggara Barat  2,144 2,132 2,149
Nusa Tenggara Timur  1,656 1,674 1,740
Kalimantan Barat  1,880 1,873 1,869
Kalimantan Tengah  1,103 1,126 1,102
Kalimantan Selatan  1,755 1,761 1,713
Kalimantan Timur  1,112 1,139 1,085
Sulawesi Utara  1,130 1,126 1,137
Sulawesi Tengah  1,113 1,144 1,108
Sulawesi Selatan  2,024 2,031 2,007
Sulawesi Tenggara  1,085 1,098 1,087
Gorontalo  782 751 779
Sulawesi Barat  556 566 558
Maluku  750 746 692
Maluku Utara  494 510 471
Papua Barat  416 478 437
Papua  1,002 982 1,032
Total 66,724 67,174 66,516
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1.4.2.2 The Second Type of Reference Population: Share of Population With Expenditures 
Above and Below the Temporary Poverty Line 
Table 1.12. P-α Results from the Second Type of Reference Population Simulation 
Reference 
Population 
2008 2009 2010 
P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2 
± 5% TPL 10.54 1.76 0.46 7.51 1.14 0.28 9.94 1.57 0.40 
± 10% TPL 10.31 1.71 0.44 7.90 1.21 0.29 9.70 1.51 0.38 
± 15% TPL 10.39 1.72 0.44 8.99 1.42 0.35 9.72 1.52 0.38 
± 20% TPL 10.97 1.83 0.47 10.23 1.65 0.42 10.17 1.60 0.40 
± 25% TPL 11.87 1.98 0.52 11.38 1.90 0.49 10.90 1.73 0.44 
± 30% TPL 13.00 2.22 0.59 15.92 2.86 0.79 12.44 2.01 0.52 
Table 1.12 displays the second type of reference population simulation results and shows 
that in 2008 and 2010, as the reference population changes from plus/minus 5% of the temporary 
poverty line (TPL) to plus/minus 10% of the TPL, the P-α indices decline slightly. However, 
after that initial reference population change, the P-α indices increase as the reference population 
becomes larger. Furthermore, compared to the first type of sensitivity analysis, this second type 
of sensitivity analysis is less sensitive. That is, an increase in the size of the reference population 
results in a smaller change in the P-α, thus having lower elasticity than the first type.  
Figure 1.10 shows that unlike the first type of reference population that shows the same 
trends of the P-α for all the various reference populations, the second type of reference 
population shows different trends of the P-α for different reference populations. One particular 
reference population, plus/minus 30% of the TPL, shows a different trend of the P-α compared to 
the rest of the reference populations in all years. That is, the P-α indices increased significantly 
from 2008 to 2009. Nevertheless, the P-α indices dropped substantially between 2009 and 2010. 
A possible explanation is that 30% above and below the temporary poverty line means that 60% 
of the population is the reference population. This group clearly is too large and does not 
represent the poor and the near-poor’s consumption patterns: 
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Figure 1.10. P0, P1, and P2 Simulation Results for Various Reference Populations 2008-2010 
In sum, the second type of reference population is less sensitive than the first. That is, 
varying the percentage of the reference population with expenditures above and below the 
temporary poverty line results in a lower percentage point change of the P-α than is obtained by 
varying the percentage of the reference group with expenditures above the temporary poverty 
line. The decision of which reference population to use is undoubtedly imperative because it will 
largely determine the level of the poverty line and, thus, the official poverty number. Although 
the second type of reference population is less sensitive, we think it is more appropriate because 
it takes into account not only the near-poor but also the poor.  
 
1.4.2 Urban and Rural Inflation Sensitivity Analysis Results 
The benchmark poverty lines and poverty indices used for comparison are calculated using 
the SUSENAS Consumption Module from the DU and only the urban inflation rates used for the 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
2008 2009 2010
Simulation Results, P0
± 5% TPL
± 10% TPL
± 15% TPL
± 20% TPL
± 25% TPL
± 30% TPL
 34 
 
urban and rural temporary poverty lines: 
Table 1.13. Comparison Between Poverty Lines Using Urban & Rural Inflation  
and Poverty Lines Using Urban Inflation Only 
Year   Urban and Rural Inflations  Urban Inflation Only 
Urban  Rural Total Urban  Rural Total 
2008 211,406 159,197 184,420 211,406 158,890 184,261 
2009 265,388 199,632 231,395 265,388 199,632 231,395 
2010 233,047 192,266 211,964 233,047 191,789 211,717 
         
With other criteria constant, applying the urban and rural inflation rates to obtain the 
temporary poverty lines used to determine the reference populations leads to a slightly higher 
rural poverty line than that obtained by applying only the urban inflation rate, as shown in Table 
1.13. Higher rural inflation leads to a higher rural temporary poverty line, resulting in a wealthier 
reference population in the rural areas. As a consequence, the rural poverty line becomes higher, 
and the total or national poverty line increases as well. There are no changes in the urban poverty 
line as the urban inflation rate is assumed to be the same. In addition, the trends of all poverty 
lines for both assumptions are exactly the same; that is, all poverty lines increased from 2008 to 
2009, and they declined between 2009 and 2010.  
As expected, the effect of higher poverty lines is clearly higher poverty headcounts, 
poverty gaps, and poverty severity, which imply an indirect positive effect of higher inflation on 
poverty indices, as shown in Table 1.14. Similar patterns in poverty lines are evident in this 
comparison. Specifically, the rural poverty indices obtained by incorporating the urban and rural 
inflation assumptions are marginally higher than those obtained by including urban inflation 
only. Additionally, the trends of all poverty indices are the same with and without the rural 
inflation assumption. 
Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, I assumed that rural inflation is a function of 
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urban inflation. In reality, this might not be the case. Rural inflation can be a function of other 
factors such as natural disasters, weather, and crop harvests. In addition, to calculate inflation, 
our assumption still relies on the CBS’s Consumer Price Index (CPI), an index that represents the 
price of goods and services consumed by average people in major cities in Indonesia. Therefore, 
a price index that takes into account the price of goods and services consumed by only the poor 
needs to be constructed to calculate price changes faced by the poor in urban and rural areas. 
This step will ensure that inflation specific to the poor, not average-income people, is used in the 
poverty line calculation.  
Table 1.14. P-α Comparison Between Urban and Rural Inflation Assumptions  
and the Urban Inflation Assumption 
(a) Using Urban and Rural Inflation 
Year Urban Rural Total 
P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2 
2008 12.70 2.28 0.62 17.66 3.15 0.87 15.26 2.73 0.75 
2009 11.51 2.04 0.55 15.16 2.57 0.68 13.40 2.32 0.62 
2010 9.87 1.57 0.40 16.72 2.84 0.77 13.41 2.23 0.59 
                    
(b) Using Urban Inflation Only 
Year Urban Rural Total 
P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2 
2008 12.70 2.28 0.62 17.60 3.12 0.86 15.23 2.71 0.75 
2009 11.51 2.04 0.55 14.99 2.53 0.67 13.31 2.29 0.61 
2010 9.87 1.57 0.40 16.54 2.80 0.75 13.32 2.21 0.58 
 
The sensitivity analysis results of the reference population and rural inflation have 
previously shown that these parameters have positive effects on poverty line levels. Nonetheless, 
there are no clear justifications for why the CBS sets the near-poor instead of the poor as the 
reference population and why the CBS employs only urban inflation for both the urban and rural 
temporary poverty lines. The CBS should carefully reexamine its assumptions because those 
assumptions will significantly impact the poverty line and thus the poverty indices.  
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One interesting feature of Table 1.14 is the trend of the urban and rural poverty figures. 
The trend clearly shows that in rural areas, the poverty indices show a significant decline from 
2008 to 2009 but a slight increase from 2009 to 2010, whereas in urban areas, the poverty indices 
show a smooth decline from 2008 to 2010, approximately 1 percentage point decrease per year. 
The trend of poverty indices in rural areas is exactly the same as that at the national level, 
highlighting the importance of population weight in estimating poverty figures. 
 
1.4.3 Food Poverty Basket Sensitivity Analysis 
Expanding the food poverty basket leads to an increase in the food poverty line because 
expenditures of the reference population on food items that are not in the official food poverty 
basket are now counted. Table 1.15 presents the total poverty lines generated from 103 food 
items and from 52 food items in the food poverty basket:  
Table 1.15. Poverty Lines From 103 and 52 Food Items in Food Poverty Basket 
Year 
103 Food Items 52 Food Items 
Urban Rural National Urban Rural National 
2008 242,767 178,636 209,617 211,406 159,197 184,420 
2009 301,921 226,653 263,011 265,388 199,632 231,395 
2010 288,008 224,874 255,369 233,047 192,266 211,964 
  
As expected, all poverty lines generated using the larger number of food items in the food 
poverty basket are higher than those calculated using the official food poverty basket. The 
differences are significantly large for all poverty lines, suggesting that the number of food items 
included in the food poverty basket positively influences the poverty lines. In other words, the 
larger the food poverty basket, the higher the poverty line. Furthermore, the trends of the urban, 
rural, and national poverty lines are similar between the two different food poverty baskets. 
However, the magnitude of the poverty-line changes varies for both food poverty baskets. In 
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addition, the cost of living difference between urban and rural areas, a ratio of the urban poverty 
line to the rural poverty line, shows a slight difference for both food poverty baskets, as shown in 
Table 1.16. Basic food prices are more or less between 21% and 36% higher in urban than in 
rural areas: 
Table 1.16. Ratio of Urban Poverty Line to Rural Poverty Line 
103 Food Items 52 Food Items 
2008 1.36 1.33 
2009 1.33 1.33 
2010 1.28 1.21 
The 103 food-item poverty basket leads to higher poverty lines than the 52 food-item 
poverty basket. As a result, the poverty incidences (P0) are also significantly higher, as shown in 
Figure 1.11. Moreover, the trends of the P0 are the opposite of those of the poverty lines for both 
food poverty baskets. Nonetheless, changes of the P0 using 103 food items are much larger than 
those of the P0 using 52 food items. In sum, a larger number of food items in the food poverty 
basket is highly sensitive to the poverty line calculation because the addition of more food items 
in the basket accounts for a significant increase in the food poverty line and thus in the total 
poverty line:  
 
 
Figure 1.11. P0 for Two Different Food Poverty Baskets 
 
 Based on the exercise above, we conclude that compared with other assumptions, the 
number of food items in the food poverty basket has the most significant impact on estimating 
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the poverty line. More food items in the food poverty baskets lead to a higher poverty line and 
thus a higher poverty rate. The differences between the poverty rate of the official food basket 
and of the modified food basket are quite large. This finding suggests that the official poverty 
rate may underminestimate regional consumption patterns and changing food consumptions of 
the poor. It should be noted that the CBS established the 52 food-item basket in 1998 when 
Indonesia’s economy was contracting due to the Asian Financial Crisis. Moreover, it is likely 
that the 52 food items represent the consumption patterns of people living in urban areas and in 
the western part of Indonesia. As a result, the existing food basket may not represent the actual 
expenditures of the poor then and now. In contrast, the food items in our food basket are selected 
based on a criterion in which only items consumed by at least 20% of the population of the 
bottom 20% are selected. We feel this criterion is sensible and helps to capture the changing food 
consumption patterns of the poor. Therefore, in our opinion, if the CBS, due to a limited budget, 
were to change only one assumption in its methodology, the number of food items in the food 
basket should be prioritized.  
 
1.4.4 Alternative Method for Calculating Indonesia’s Poverty Lines 
 
Figure 1.12. The CBS’s Official Headcount and the Alternative Method Headcount 
Taking into account the results of the sensitivity analysis, I develop an alternative 
poverty line calculation using different assumptions that might work better for counting the poor. 
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Figure 1.12 shows that the difference in the poverty headcount between the official and 
alternative methods is substantially large in 2008. The alternative headcount is 24.4%, whereas 
the official headcount is only 15.4%, implying a possible underestimation of the poor by 9 
percentage points. The headcount differences in 2009 and 2010 are not as high as in 2008, with a 
3.5 percentage point difference in 2009 and a 5.4 percentage point difference in 2010. The 
poverty headcount difference between the two methods represents poor people who might not be 
included in poverty reduction programs and thus might not receive necessary assistance from the 
government. 
The headcount of the alternative method shows a very different trend compared to the 
official poverty headcount. The official poverty headcount illustrates a smooth decreasing trend, 
whereas the alternative headcount shows a significant drop from 2008 to 2009 but an increase 
from 2009 to 2010. The difference in trends between the official and the alternative methods 
might be problematic. Because the official poverty headcount shows a declining trend, policy 
makers might cut the poverty reduction budget and reallocate the funds to other objectives. 
However, the alternative method shows an increasing number of poor people. Therefore, instead 
of cutting the budget, policy makers should allocate more to poverty alleviation programs to 
anticipate an increase in poverty. 
Figure 1.13 shows the differences in the number of poor people between the CBS and the 
alternative method for urban, rural, and national categories. As shown in Figure 1.13, there are 
significant differences between the CBS and the alternative method in the number of poor people 
nationally. The difference was much higher in 2008 than in both 2009 and 2010. In 2008, the 
difference shows that 20 million more people were poor according to the alternative method. The 
differences in 2009 and 2010 were more than 8 million and 12 million people, respectively. 
 40 
 
Compared to the differences in the urban number of poor people, those differences in the rural 
number of the poor are higher in the period of study. However, clearly the differences in the 
national number of the poor are driven by the differences in the rural number of poor people:  
 
Figure 1.13. Differences in CBS and Alternative Method for Numbers of the Poor 
Using the alternative method explained previously, Table 1.17 below shows that the rural 
poverty headcount is higher than the urban poverty headcount in most provinces in the period of 
study. The difference between the urban and rural headcounts varies across regions. For 
example, in 2010, the difference in Papua is extremely high, approximately 37 percentage points, 
whereas the difference in Sumatera Barat is only 0.4 percentage point. Some provinces with high 
population density, such as East Java and DI Yogyakarta, tend to have a wide disparity between 
the urban and rural headcounts. Moreover, the headcount differences between urban and rural 
areas in many provinces in the eastern part of Indonesia are considerably large, more than a 10-
percentage point difference. A wide gap between the urban and rural poverty headcounts in 
Indonesia clearly shows that poverty reduction strategies are ineffective in reaching rural areas. 
Based on the data available, we can conclude that the poor are more concentrated in rural than in 
urban areas. Table 1.17 also shows that a majority of provinces in the eastern part of Indonesia 
have extremely high poverty incidences, which is not a surprising finding. Almost 30 to 40% of 
the population is poor in Maluku, Maluku Utara, Papua Barat, and Papua. However, the poverty 
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line is calculated based on expenditures on a predetermined set of goods. Most of the population 
in those regions lives in remote areas that have very limited access to markets, public health 
centers, and education facilities, and they depend heavily on nature for their food consumption 
(i.e., by hunting animals or by producing their own food). This population most likely has low 
income/expenditures, but they are self-sufficient and do not consider themselves poor. 
Nevertheless, these people will be considered poor by any monetary poverty measures: 
Table 1.17. Alternative Method Poverty Headcount by Provinces 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Province Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
ACEH                         16.7 33.7 28.8 13.6 24.7 21.5 12.9 21.6 19.1
SUMATERA UTARA               19.6 19.4 19.5 15.0 21.1 18.3 14.5 19.1 17.0
SUMATERA BARAT               17.7 20.3 19.4 8.4 12.5 11.1 14.0 14.4 14.2
R I A U                      12.0 20.4 16.2 14.8 20.9 17.8 11.3 19.2 15.2
J A M B I                    15.3 20.7 18.9 14.6 14.0 14.2 18.4 15.2 16.3
SUMATERA SELATAN             22.1 29.2 26.4 15.5 19.0 17.7 14.1 23.3 19.8
BENGKULU                     27.3 28.9 28.3 10.3 14.7 13.1 13.5 20.6 18.1
LAMPUNG                      25.3 32.2 30.3 14.5 20.5 18.9 20.5 27.7 25.8
BANGKA BELITUNG              14.4 15.3 14.9 11.1 12.7 12.0 9.2 14.8 12.1
KEPULAUAN RIAU               8.3 11.2 9.7 6.3 9.0 7.6 7.9 16.8 12.1
DKI JAKARTA                  9.4               . 9.4 7.4               . 7.4 9.3               . 9.3
JAWA BARAT                   16.2 25.1 19.9 12.1 14.7 13.2 13.1 19.0 15.5
JAWA TENGAH                  25.9 33.2 29.7 17.3 20.0 18.7 18.0 24.2 21.2
DI YOGYAKARTA                24.4 43.3 31.2 45.0 59.9 50.3 13.7 26.3 18.2
JAWA TIMUR                   18.8 38.3 28.7 13.7 23.6 18.7 15.0 27.9 21.6
BANTEN                       9.4 17.7 12.7 7.0 11.7 8.8 9.0 16.6 12.0
B A L I                      5.0 9.5 6.9 2.1 5.3 3.5 3.6 7.8 5.3
NUSA TENGGARA BARAT          34.3 43.2 39.5 54.8 62.7 59.4 24.1 22.0 22.9
NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR          16.1 52.0 45.5 15.5 25.3 23.5 13.6 35.8 31.8
KALIMANTAN BARAT             26.1 25.0 25.3 15.7 22.8 20.8 16.3 26.5 23.6
KALIMANTAN TENGAH            17.9 16.8 17.2 10.4 13.5 12.4 9.1 23.4 18.6
KALIMANTAN SELATAN           14.3 21.5 18.5 14.7 14.3 14.5 9.2 14.7 12.4
KALIMANTAN TIMUR             13.7 27.9 19.1 12.1 16.0 13.5 13.5 19.9 15.9
SULAWESI UTARA               14.3 22.5 18.9 7.3 19.0 13.9 10.4 21.1 16.4
SULAWESI TENGAH              12.1 35.0 30.2 12.0 21.4 19.4 14.6 25.2 23.0
SULAWESI SELATAN             12.7 28.2 23.2 12.0 15.5 14.3 8.2 20.2 16.4
SULAWESI TENGGARA            12.8 38.5 32.6 17.4 40.8 35.4 7.2 32.8 26.9
GORONTALO                    29.6 50.4 43.9 20.3 28.0 25.6 22.8 32.5 29.5
SULAWESI BARAT               17.1 39.9 32.3 11.4 32.9 25.7 12.7 23.4 19.8
M A L U K U                  19.5 52.9 44.2 12.5 20.5 18.4 24.4 36.3 33.2
MALUKU UTARA                 16.2 36.6 30.5 19.6 39.3 33.4 12.2 27.4 22.9
PAPUA BARAT                  16.0 64.3 53.3 13.5 53.6 44.4 21.1 49.0 42.6
PAPUA                        14.8 58.6 48.6 12.3 25.4 22.5 9.7 47.2 38.7
NASIONAL                     17.7 30.7 24.4 14.0 21.0 17.6 13.7 23.4 18.7
2008 2009 2010
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1.5 Conclusion 
Accurate and reliable poverty data support sound and effective policies for poverty 
alleviation efforts. This paper emphasizes the importance of examining more closely the data, 
methodology, and implications of the national poverty line and indices rather than simply 
accepting these figures as a given. A key finding of this study is the revelation of the two data 
sets from the CBS and their significant differences in 2008 and 2009. This finding explains why 
those outside of the CBS who attempt to replicate the official poverty figures often fail. There 
are two possible explanations for why two different data sets for estimating the poverty line 
exist. One explanation suggests that the data used for estimating the poverty indices announced 
in July are incomplete, but the Poverty Unit still uses the incomplete data and then adjusts or 
modifies the data to produce the official poverty lines and figures. However, a central employee 
of the CBS explains that the Poverty Unit uses the final data from the SUSENAS Unit and 
further processes the data to estimate the official figures. However, the Poverty Unit does not 
send back the data to the SUSENAS Unit. As a result, two different data sets exist. Fortunately, 
it is likely that this study encouraged the CBS to change or unify the data. The CBS has 
acknowledged the existence of two data sets and has unified the 2010 SUSENAS data set in the 
Poverty Unit and in the Dissemination Unit, as shown in this study. 
The sensitivity analysis exercises in this study underline the importance of reexamining 
the setting of the reference population, the use of urban and rural inflation in determining the 
temporary poverty lines, and the number of food items in the poverty basket. Simulations of two 
types of reference population reveal that the first type (x% above the temporary poverty line) is 
more sensitive than the second type (x% above and below the temporary poverty line). However, 
we argue that the second type is more appropriate because it accounts for those below and above 
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or around the temporary poverty line. Moreover, with other criteria constant, applying the rural 
inflation rate to obtain the rural temporary poverty line leads to a slightly higher rural poverty 
line and poverty indices than that obtained in the benchmark. However, the assumption of rural 
inflation in this study is very conservative. In reality, rural inflation is likely to be much higher 
and thus has a positive and large impact on the rural poverty line. Therefore, the current official 
method that does not take into account rural inflation is severely flawed and should be revised 
immediately. 
 In addition, a larger number of food items in the poverty basket results in higher food 
poverty lines and thus higher total poverty lines. The number of food items in the food poverty 
basket was set in 1998 when Indonesia’s economy was contracting due to the Asian Financial 
Crisis. Moreover, this food poverty basket likely represents the consumption patterns of people 
living in urban areas and in the western part of Indonesia. Alternatively, we introduce a different 
food poverty basket consisting of food items consumed by at least 20% of the bottom 20% of the 
income distribution across Indonesia, which may represent the current consumption patterns of 
poor people. We believe that this criterion is sensible and helps to capture changing food 
consumption patterns of the poor. Therefore, in our opinion, if the CBS, due to a limited budget, 
were to change only one assumption in its methodology, the number of food items in the food 
basket should be prioritized.  
Furthermore, an alternative method was employed using different assumptions regarding 
the reference population, inflation, and the poverty basket. The resulting poverty line and indices 
for the period of 2008-2010 were not only higher but also showed a different trend than the 
official poverty line, suggesting an increase in poverty from 2009-2010, rather than the steady 
decline indicated by the official numbers.  
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Failure to properly calculate the poverty line and indices may lead to an inaccurate and 
misleading representation of the poor, which in turn may result in unwarranted policy 
interventions. Misguided policies from imprecise data, as perhaps can be seen in the recent 
government decisions to cut government expenditures and the poverty reduction budget in 2011, 
may end up exacerbating rather than alleviating poverty in Indonesia. Therefore, stakeholders in 
poverty figures, including the Indonesian government, researchers, and non-government 
institutions should actively and continuously perform “checks and balances” on the methodology 
used for poverty line calculations. The official poverty line figures should be easily replicated by 
those outside of the CBS so that the CBS does not lose its credibility, and, most importantly, so 
that the public can monitor the methodology.  
 Findings from this study also suggest that the methodology urgently requires an update to 
capture the changing consumption patterns of the poor. However, changing the methodology is 
likely to lead to a higher poverty line and thus a higher number of poor people. This could be 
viewed as a sign of failure in the current government and could lead to political turmoil. 
Changing the methodology requires not only strong political will on the part of the Indonesian 
government but also a careful and thoughtful plan to handle the effects of drastic change in the 
poverty figures. This reality might not be attractive to the current Indonesian government, but 
perhaps the next government will have the political will to update the methodology. In the 
transition period, the government may wish to have two different poverty lines in which one 
poverty line still uses the old methodology, whereas another poverty line employs new 
methodology as part of the socializing process. Acclimating stakeholders to the new updated 
methodology will likely be a great challenge but is essential for generating accurate poverty 
indices that are useful not only for policy makers but also for Indonesian society.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1 Comparison between the DU and PU Poverty Lines by province 
 
Table A.1. Comparison between the DU and PU Poverty Lines 
 
Urban Rural Urban+ Urban Rural Urban+ Urban Rural Urban+ Urban Rural Urban+ Urban Rural Urban+ Urban Rural Urban+
PL PL Rural PL PL Rural PL PL Rural PL PL Rural PL PL Rural PL PL Rural
Aceh 253,151 216,130 226,792 266,168 226,423 237,870 310,260 245,010 263,804 292,428 249,546 261,898 308,306 266,261 278,372 308,306 266,285 278,389
Sumatera Utara 221,786 167,381 192,465 218,333 170,829 192,732 284,624 203,227 240,756 234,712 189,306 210,241 247,547 201,795 222,889 247,547 201,810 222,898
Sumatera Barat 231,915 178,754 196,987 226,343 179,745 195,727 334,878 234,483 268,915 248,525 201,257 217,469 262,173 214,444 230,814 262,173 214,458 230,823
Riau 255,478 209,803 232,824 247,923 210,519 229,371 325,330 258,009 291,937 265,707 226,945 246,481 276,627 235,238 256,097 276,627 235,267 256,112
Jambi 224,566 162,298 182,474 223,527 162,525 182,291 297,476 231,811 253,086 244,516 178,107 199,623 262,826 193,816 216,175 262,826 193,834 216,187
Sumatera Selatan 224,908 170,677 191,664 229,552 176,181 196,835 274,477 199,349 228,423 247,661 190,109 212,381 258,304 198,550 221,674 258,304 198,572 221,687
Bengkulu 217,727 163,221 182,408 224,081 168,930 188,344 293,092 206,804 237,173 242,735 192,351 210,084 255,762 209,598 225,846 255,762 209,616 225,857
Lampung 201,763 154,006 166,902 203,685 160,549 172,197 284,729 191,558 216,717 224,168 175,734 188,812 236,098 189,936 202,401 236,098 189,954 202,414
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung 253,122 245,451 249,118 250,240 241,741 245,803 317,412 290,313 303,269 272,809 261,378 266,843 289,644 283,259 286,312 289,644 283,302 286,334
Kepulauan Riau 294,749 225,079 261,924 289,541 231,580 262,232 417,506 276,778 351,213 308,210 256,742 283,965 321,668 265,218 295,076 321,668 265,258 295,095
DKI Jakarta 312,270 0 312,270 290,268 . 290,268 390,262 0 390,262 316,936 . 316,936 331,169 . 331,169 331,169 0 331,169
Jawa Barat 198,729 152,727 179,777 190,824 155,384 176,223 232,442 183,313 212,201 203,751 175,193 191,985 212,210 185,310 201,127 212,210 185,335 201,138
Jawa Tengah 185,302 149,829 167,071 184,704 151,367 167,571 223,139 187,790 204,970 196,478 169,312 182,515 205,606 179,962 192,425 205,606 179,982 192,435
DI Yogyakarta 226,022 173,696 207,339 208,655 169,922 194,826 263,992 206,326 243,401 228,236 182,706 211,978 240,282 195,385 224,251 240,282 195,406 224,258
Jawa Timur 184,013 150,998 167,142 183,408 154,674 168,724 226,300 185,285 205,339 202,624 174,628 188,317 213,383 185,860 199,317 213,383 185,879 199,327
Banten 208,985 157,214 188,381 197,328 157,466 181,463 282,995 193,127 247,228 212,310 178,238 198,750 220,771 188,715 208,013 220,771 188,741 208,023
Bali 193,708 160,744 179,767 190,026 158,072 176,512 293,036 223,967 263,827 211,461 176,003 196,466 222,868 188,045 208,141 222,868 188,071 208,152
Nusa Tenggara Barat 189,301 140,493 160,944 193,241 147,451 166,638 215,606 178,122 193,828 213,450 164,526 185,025 223,784 176,261 196,173 223,784 176,283 196,185
Nusa Tenggara Timur 191,535 119,242 132,233 199,006 126,403 139,449 241,701 148,495 165,242 218,796 142,478 156,191 241,807 160,724 175,293 241,807 160,743 175,308
Kalimantan Barat 192,035 153,224 164,014 179,261 151,478 159,202 263,463 193,155 212,701 194,881 166,815 174,617 207,884 182,273 189,393 207,884 182,293 189,407
Kalimantan Tengah 213,325 173,396 186,972 196,354 176,059 182,959 284,406 215,217 238,745 209,317 199,157 202,612 220,658 212,764 215,448 220,658 212,790 215,466
Kalimantan Selatan 206,566 166,130 182,911 199,416 165,808 179,756 272,447 207,926 234,710 216,538 181,059 195,787 230,712 196,727 210,835 230,712 196,753 210,850
Kalimantan Timur 287,176 217,299 260,767 257,862 205,098 237,920 373,889 297,227 344,914 283,472 224,506 261,185 307,479 248,529 285,198 307,479 248,583 285,218
Sulawesi Utara 184,980 166,241 174,373 175,628 162,192 168,023 289,234 234,406 258,201 193,251 178,271 184,772 202,469 188,080 194,325 202,469 188,096 194,334
Sulawesi Tengah 205,505 157,715 167,752 196,229 159,882 167,516 275,032 209,213 223,038 217,529 182,241 189,653 231,225 195,774 203,220 231,225 195,795 203,237
Sulawesi Selatan 173,952 124,245 140,251 160,220 126,133 137,109 243,906 180,293 200,777 177,872 142,241 153,715 186,693 151,865 163,080 186,693 151,879 163,089
Sulawesi Tenggara 163,106 133,861 140,588 151,471 136,072 139,614 291,197 204,392 224,358 175,070 157,554 161,583 177,787 161,786 165,467 177,787 161,451 165,208
Gorontalo 170,735 140,026 149,639 154,987 143,235 146,914 263,711 210,120 226,900 173,850 156,873 162,189 180,606 167,144 171,359 180,606 167,162 171,371
Sulawesi Barat 159,726 146,431 150,873 156,041 143,071 147,404 226,928 190,448 202,634 175,901 156,866 163,224 182,206 165,902 171,348 182,206 165,914 171,356
Maluku 229,101 182,067 194,345 213,969 179,288 188,341 282,590 232,229 245,375 230,913 198,969 207,308 249,895 217,562 226,002 249,895 217,599 226,030
Maluku Utara 249,664 179,819 200,562 213,505 174,301 185,944 313,639 261,093 276,702 226,732 190,838 201,500 238,533 202,156 212,961 238,533 202,185 212,982
Papua Barat 254,896 233,219 238,159 244,807 231,254 234,343 385,968 300,679 320,117 304,730 269,354 277,416 319,170 287,469 294,694 319,170 287,512 294,727
Papua 298,281 227,609 243,723 264,625 220,171 230,307 368,741 267,962 290,940 285,158 234,727 246,225 298,285 247,522 259,096 298,285 247,563 259,128
Indonesia 211,406 158,890 184,261 204,896 161,273 182,348 265,388 199,007 231,072 222,123 179,829 200,259 233,047 191,789 211,717 232,989 192,354 211,726
Notes: *Calculation using Dissemination Unit data set
             **Calculation using Poverty Unit data set
Province
2010 DU* 2010 PU**2008 DU* 2008 PU** 2009 DU* 2009 PU**
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A.2. Comparison between the DU and PU P-Alphas by province 
 
Table A.2 Comparison between the DU and PU P-Alphas 
p0 p1 p2 p0 p1 p2 p0 p1 p2 p0 p1 p2 p0 p1 p2 p0 p1 p2
Aceh 19.92 3.93 1.15 22.97 4.74 1.43 19.52 3.75 1.09 21.80 4.46 1.34 20.98 4.11 1.26 20.98 4.11 1.26
Sumatera Utara 12.04 2.11 0.56 12.43 2.14 0.57 14.21 2.58 0.70 11.51 1.92 0.50 11.31 2.04 0.57 11.31 2.04 0.57
Sumatera Barat 10.85 1.63 0.40 10.67 1.60 0.39 10.68 1.69 0.42 9.54 1.41 0.32 9.50 1.49 0.35 9.50 1.49 0.35
Riau 11.02 1.73 0.43 10.63 1.63 0.40 14.82 2.50 0.61 9.48 1.25 0.25 8.65 1.38 0.37 8.65 1.38 0.37
Jambi 9.32 1.57 0.42 9.32 1.56 0.41 11.37 1.99 0.53 8.77 1.38 0.36 8.34 1.05 0.23 8.34 1.05 0.23
Sumatera Selatan 15.95 2.80 0.75 17.85 3.19 0.86 13.24 2.34 0.64 16.28 3.06 0.86 15.35 2.63 0.71 15.47 2.63 0.71
Bengkulu 18.37 3.09 0.88 20.37 3.62 1.03 9.50 1.48 0.34 18.59 2.98 0.77 18.16 2.75 0.69 18.30 2.75 0.69
Lampung 18.07 3.27 0.85 20.93 3.81 1.02 16.49 2.88 0.78 20.22 3.94 1.12 18.94 2.98 0.72 18.94 2.98 0.72
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung 9.43 1.37 0.34 8.58 1.27 0.31 9.74 1.47 0.39 7.46 1.20 0.31 6.51 0.93 0.23 6.51 0.93 0.23
Kepulauan Riau 8.37 2.05 0.71 9.18 2.07 0.72 8.18 1.47 0.49 8.27 2.02 0.77 8.05 1.05 0.25 8.05 1.05 0.25
DKI Jakarta 6.08 1.03 0.28 4.29 0.72 0.19 6.07 0.98 0.25 3.62 0.57 0.14 3.48 0.45 0.11 3.48 0.45 0.11
Jawa Barat 13.82 2.31 0.62 13.03 2.17 0.58 10.31 1.66 0.42 11.96 1.95 0.50 11.27 1.93 0.52 11.27 1.93 0.52
Jawa Tengah 18.47 3.25 0.86 18.91 3.32 0.88 15.51 2.50 0.60 17.72 2.96 0.74 16.54 2.49 0.60 16.56 2.49 0.60
DI Yogyakarta 21.87 4.24 1.22 18.32 3.35 0.92 13.89 2.63 0.73 17.23 3.52 1.04 16.83 2.85 0.73 16.83 2.85 0.73
Jawa Timur 17.52 3.13 0.85 18.33 3.33 0.91 15.07 2.50 0.65 16.68 2.88 0.76 15.25 2.38 0.59 15.26 2.38 0.59
Banten 9.26 1.34 0.34 8.29 1.15 0.29 8.13 1.49 0.38 7.64 1.32 0.33 7.16 0.99 0.24 7.16 1.00 0.24
Bali 6.53 0.94 0.20 6.17 0.84 0.18 5.38 0.77 0.18 5.13 0.74 0.17 4.88 0.71 0.14 4.88 0.71 0.14
Nusa Tenggara Barat 20.52 3.79 1.06 23.32 4.39 1.25 15.86 3.02 0.84 22.78 5.15 1.68 21.55 3.77 1.01 21.55 3.77 1.01
Nusa Tenggara Timur 22.01 3.73 0.99 25.63 4.82 1.33 19.72 3.41 0.92 23.31 4.14 1.14 23.03 4.73 1.43 23.03 4.74 1.43
Kalimantan Barat 12.52 1.95 0.50 11.29 1.68 0.42 14.58 2.53 0.69 9.30 1.55 0.40 9.02 1.18 0.24 9.02 1.18 0.24
Kalimantan Tengah 9.24 1.46 0.36 8.27 1.33 0.33 6.89 1.08 0.25 7.02 1.03 0.22 6.77 1.02 0.24 6.77 1.02 0.24
Kalimantan Selatan 6.81 1.10 0.28 6.48 1.01 0.26 7.92 1.10 0.26 5.12 0.73 0.17 5.21 0.69 0.18 5.21 0.69 0.18
Kalimantan Timur 12.35 2.32 0.62 9.51 1.61 0.39 15.22 3.12 0.97 7.73 1.51 0.43 7.66 1.27 0.34 7.66 1.27 0.34
Sulawesi Utara 11.84 1.83 0.46 9.83 1.52 0.38 15.00 2.62 0.69 9.79 1.55 0.36 9.10 1.14 0.24 9.10 1.14 0.24
Sulawesi Tengah 20.31 4.19 1.36 20.35 4.27 1.39 19.06 4.24 1.41 18.98 4.09 1.37 18.07 3.09 0.80 18.07 3.09 0.80
Sulawesi Selatan 12.87 2.32 0.64 12.73 2.31 0.62 10.63 1.74 0.45 12.31 2.08 0.55 11.60 1.91 0.49 11.60 1.91 0.49
Sulawesi Tenggara 18.08 3.31 0.93 17.80 3.44 0.97 17.09 3.04 0.88 18.93 3.44 0.98 17.15 3.20 0.90 17.05 3.18 0.89
Gorontalo 24.55 4.51 1.21 24.33 4.55 1.26 17.50 2.93 0.72 25.01 4.59 1.27 23.19 4.14 1.00 23.19 4.14 1.00
Sulawesi Barat 18.71 3.07 0.78 17.54 2.72 0.68 20.89 4.12 1.08 15.29 2.47 0.60 13.58 1.55 0.35 13.58 1.55 0.35
Maluku 31.28 6.34 1.90 29.44 5.79 1.72 16.75 2.91 0.76 28.00 5.52 1.65 27.74 5.22 1.47 27.74 5.23 1.47
Maluku Utara 14.00 2.04 0.49 9.86 1.54 0.36 30.95 7.15 2.38 10.36 1.44 0.36 9.42 1.47 0.33 9.42 1.47 0.33
Papua Barat 37.31 9.56 3.66 35.12 9.29 3.55 43.93 13.99 5.70 35.71 9.75 3.57 34.88 10.47 4.30 34.88 10.47 4.30
Papua 42.66 12.77 4.98 40.20 11.70 4.43 24.24 4.15 1.06 37.41 9.07 2.98 36.80 9.35 3.37 36.80 9.36 3.37
Indonesia 15.23 2.71 0.75 15.30 2.74 0.76 13.31 2.29 0.61 14.14 2.50 0.67 13.32 2.21 0.58 13.33 2.21 0.58
Notes: *Calculated using Dissemination Unit data set
             **Calculated using Poverty Unit data set
Province
2010 DU* 2010 PU**
Urban + Rural Urban + Rural Urban + Rural Urban + Rural Urban + Rural Urban + Rural
2008 DU* 2008 PU** 2009 DU* 2009 PU**
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CHAPTER 2 
AN EVOLUTION OF INCOME POLARIZATION IN INDONESIA FROM 2000 TO 2010 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The differences between inequality and polarization have been discussed frequently in 
recent years. Although some polarization measures are derived from traditional inequality 
measures, these polarization measures capture different characteristics of income distribution and 
may not be consistent with the directions of the inequality measures. Esteban and Ray (1994), 
Foster and Wolfson (1992), and Tsui and Wang (1998) pioneered measures of polarization that 
attempted to capture clustering along income groups. These researchers developed polarization 
measures based on a set of axioms and have applied these measures to several countries. 
Furthermore, these income polarization measures serve as a basis for the development of social 
polarization measures (see Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2002, Permanyer 2000, 2008). An 
important similarity among these polarization measures is that they emphasize on well-defined 
groups in a society. These measures concern an individual’s interactions not only with other 
individuals in the same group but also with other individuals in other groups. Given 
heterogeneity among groups, higher homogeneity within groups may lead to higher polarization. 
However, given homogeneity within groups, higher heterogeneity across groups may result in 
higher polarization. At the same time, it could be the case that inequality is low. 
According to Esteban and Ray (1994), there is a close link between “the phenomenon of 
polarization” and “the generation of tensions, the possibilities of articulated rebellion and revolt 
and the existence of social unrest in general” (p.820). This statement is consistent with the 
Marxian theory that addresses the formation of two well-defined and hostile groups in a society, 
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the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and how this class struggle results in a proletarian revolution 
(Marx, 1977). Unfortunately, conventional inequality measures fail to capture polarization 
because inequality and polarization measures focus on different features of distribution. 
However, this fact does not mean that inequality and polarization always move in the opposite 
direction. In some cases, they could move in the same direction. 
No studies on polarization in Indonesia have been found in the literature. This gap is 
understandable because the concept of polarization is relatively new in the literature. Serving as 
a complimentary measure rather than as a substitute for traditional inequality measures, 
polarization measures help to identify which regional dimensions have become more polarized or 
clustered over time. The key challenge is to convince stakeholders such as policy makers of the 
importance of these measures and how they differ from traditional inequality measures. By 
continuously monitoring the degree and trends of regional polarization, policy makers are more 
likely to detect early on the possibilities of social unrest, conflicts, and disintegration threats. As 
a result, policy makers can act accordingly to prevent these problems immediately. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the level and evolution of national, and 
regional polarization in Indonesia during 2000-10. In this study, we attempt to answer the 
following questions: What are the trends of national and regional inequality and polarization? 
Has Indonesian society become more polarized and more unequal over time nationally or 
regionally? How do trends of inequality indices compare to those of polarization indices? Are 
polarization and inequality consistent in their trends? What factors drive changes in polarization?  
The following section will review polarization indices. The third section will discuss the 
sources of data and methodology. The fourth and fifth sections will present and discuss our 
empirical estimations at the national and regional levels, respectively. Finally, the last section 
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will conclude.    
 
2.2 Measures of Polarization: A Literature Review 
2.2.1  Income Polarization 
Most studies agree that polarization and inequality are two different concepts.2 Inequality 
measures the variance of an income distribution, whereas polarization measures “(income) 
clustering around local means.” To better understand the difference between inequality and 
polarization, consider the following examples: Suppose a population is divided into four income 
levels, x1, x3, x4, and x6, with exactly the same population shares, p1, p3, p4, and p6, respectively 
(see Figure 2.1a). Now, consider a redistribution of income between x1 and x3 and between x4 
and x6, which results in only two income levels, x2 and x5, with larger population shares than 
those prior to the income redistribution, p2 and p5 (see Figure 2.1b). Apparently, inequality has 
decreased, but polarization has increased. The society is now more polarized or more “clustered” 
because it is now divided into only two income levels -“poor” and “rich”- compared to the 
previous condition in which there were four income levels with similar population shares. This 
example illustrates that inequality decreases as polarization increases. Note that the population 
share or the weight of a group matters in this case: 
Figure 2.1. An Increase in Polarization yet a Decrease in Inequality  
                                                 
2 See Esteban and Ray (1991,1994), Foster and Wolfson (1992), Wang and Tsui (2000), Esteban, Gradin, and Ray 
(2005), Kanbur and Zhang (2001). 
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However, polarization and inequality do not always move in opposite directions. Consider a 
society in which there are only two income levels with the same number of people in each level, 
as shown in Figure 2.2a. Suppose x2 moves to the left to x1, whereas x5 moves to the right to x6 
(see Figure 2.2b). Clearly, inequality has increased. Nevertheless, polarization has also increased 
because the two different groups with different income levels have moved farther away from 
each other:  
Figure 2.2. Increase in Inequality and Polarization 
According to Esteban and Ray (2005), “In a very broad sense, there is agreement that 
polarization is designed to capture the appearance (or disappearance) of groups in a distribution” 
(p.2). Based on their observations, polarization measures are categorized into two broad families. 
The first family of polarization measures attempts to capture “the formation of any arbitrary 
number of groups.” Examples of measures belonging to this family are those of Esteban and Ray 
(1991,1994), Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004), and Esteban, Gradin, and Ray (1999). However, 
the second broad family of measures examines “the existence of two groups only with the 
median income as the divide” (p.2). Foster and Wolfson (1992), Wolfson (1994), and Wang and 
Tsui (2000) provide examples of this family of measures. The first broad family is called 
“measures of polarization,” and the second family is called “measures of bi-polarization.” These 
two families of polarization measures are income polarization measures, and they capture the 
appearance (or disappearance) of income groups in a distribution of income. In contrast to these 
measures, social polarization measures require one to specify social groups such as regional, 
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ethnic, and religious groups before one can estimate these measures. Examples of social 
polarization measures are those of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002, 2005a, 2005b), 
Permanyer (2008), and Permanyer and Ambrosio (2009). Figure 2.3 presents the classification of 
these polarization measures. More detailed notes on different polarization measures can be found 
in Appendix B.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.Classification of Polarization Measures 
Both types of polarization measures consider three important properties according to 
Esteban and Ray (2005): 
1. Polarization concerns groups so that when only one group is considered, polarization is 
small. 
2. Polarization increases whenever “within-group” inequality declines. 
3. Polarization rises when “between/across-group” inequality increases. 
 
2.2.1.1 Measures of Income Polarization 
In 1994, Esteban and Ray proposed an income polarization index based on an 
identification and alienation framework. An individual’s feeling of identification is an increasing 
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function of the number of individuals with a similar level of income. The more people with the 
same level of income, the stronger an individual’s feeling of identification. However, two 
individuals belonging to two different groups can feel very different from each other, and the 
greater the difference/distance, the greater the polarization that leads to social tension. The 
absolute income differences between individuals measures the alienation component. Therefore, 
the ER polarization index measures “the sum of all possible effective antagonisms between 
individuals” (Esteban & Ray 1994, p.831). 
Four axioms must be satisfied for the ER polarization index to hold. A polarization index 
L is a real valued function defined on S, that is, L:SR.1 S is the set of income distributions. So, 
for a population of size n, an income distribution is given by a pair (p,x), where x=(x1,…,xk) and 
p=(p1,…..,pk). Different income levels are denoted by xi, whereas the number of individuals with 
income exactly similar to xi is denoted by pi and n=∑ ݌௜௞௜ୀଵ . For all (p,x) in S, the functional 
value L(p,x) indicates the level of polarization with the distribution (p,x). An income distribution 
is constituted by three distinct values x1=0, x2, and x3 and the corresponding population masses 
p1, p2, and p3, respectively, where x1<x2<x3. 
Axiom 1: Let p0>p2=p3>0. Fix p0>0 and x2>0. There exist c1>0 and c2>0 (possibly 
depending on p1 and x2) such that if |x2-x3|< c1 and p2<c2p1, then joining of the masses p2 and p3 
at their mid-point, (x2+x3)/2 increases polarization (see Figure 2.4): 
Figure 2.4. Axiom 1 Illustration 
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This axiom basically says that lower variation within groups and larger sizes of groups should 
increase polarization. 
Axiom 2: Let p0,p2,p3>0; p0>p3 and |x2-x3|<x2. There exists c3>0 such that if p2 is moved 
to the right toward p3 by an amount not exceeding c3, polarization increases (see Figure 2.5). If 
heterogeneity among the groups increases, which is showed by the movement of one mass 
towards another mass, polarization is higher: 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Axiom 2 Illustration  
Axiom 3: Let p1,p2,p3>0; p1=p3; and x2=x3-x2=c4. Any new distribution formed by 
shifting population mass from the central mass p2 equally to the two lateral masses p1 and p3, 
each c4 units of distance away, must increase polarization (see Figure 2.6). This axiom illustrates 
the disappearance of the middle class. That is, the middle class moves into the lower and upper 
tail of the distribution. As a result, polarization increases:    
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Axiom 3 Illustration 
Axiom 4: if P(F) ≥ P(G) and p > 0, then P(pF) > P(pG), where pFand pG represent 
population scalings of F and G, respectively. This axiom basically states that if one distribution 
has higher polarization than the other, then it will remain so even if we scale up or down the 
populations by the same amount (i.e., population-invariance principle). 
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Theorem 1: A polarization measure ܮாோ satisfies Axioms 1,2,3, and 4 if and only if it is 
in the following form: 
ܮாோ ൌ ܣ෍෍݌௜ଵାఈ
௞
௝ୀଵ
௞
௜ୀଵ
݌௝หݔ௜ െ ݔ௝ห 
The value of α must be bounded from 0 to 1.6 for all axioms to be satisfied. Moreover, if 
α were equal to zero, then this measure would be the Gini index. In fact, the main purpose of 
raising the population weight to a power exceeding unity in the formula above is to differentiate 
this polarization measure from inequality measures such as the Gini index. The value of α can be 
treated as the degree of the “polarization sensitivity” of the measure. The larger the value of α, 
the greater the difference from inequality measures. A is a scalar equal to 100/µ, making the 
measure comparable to the Gini index ranging from 0 to 1.   
Following their ER (1994) polarization measure, Esteban and Ray collaborated with 
Duclos to propose a new measure in which the relevant distributions can be described by density 
function instead of a “discrete, finite set of income groupings located in a continuous ambient 
space of possible income values.” (Duclos, Esteban, Ray 2005, p.1739). The difference between 
Duclos, Esteban, Ray (DER) and the ER measure is that the DER index overcomes two major 
problems - conceptual and practical - in the ER (1994) measure. The conceptual problem is that 
the measure shows an “unpleasant discontinuity” caused by the use of the distribution of 
population on a discrete and distinct number of points. Furthermore, the practical difficulty is 
that the population is exogenously divided into k number of clusters to operate the measure. As a 
consequence, this feature limits the measure from being used for other interesting problems. 
Based on a new set of axioms, the DER index characterizes a measure of polarization, which is 
an extension and a refinement of the ER index applied to the case of continuous distributions. 
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Like the ER index, the DER index still measures the sum of all effective antagonisms in a 
population, and the index is written as follows: 
ఈܲሺ݂ሻ ൌ ඵ݂ሺݔሻଵାఈ݂ሺݕሻ|ݕ െ ݔ| ݀ݕ݀ݔ 
where α is in [0.25,1]. 
In their paper, DER also state that their measure could be extended to quantify social 
(non-income) polarization relying on identification and alienation frameworks. A hybrid 
polarization measure, which is a combination of the pure income polarization and the pure social 
polarization, is discussed. However, the researchers directly developed their income polarization 
measure into a hybrid measure without any axiomatic reasoning and called for further research 
on this issue. 
 
2.2.1.2 Measures of Bipolarization 
The measure of income bipolarization by Foster and Wolfson (1994) attempts to measure 
the disappearance of the middle class. Many studies, they argue, define the middle class based on 
an arbitrary range. Foster and Wolfson (FW) offer a range-free approach to measuring the 
middle class and polarization based on partial orderings. Their polarization index emphasizes 
two groups that are below and above the median income, and their index is based on two 
important features. First, “increased spread” leads to a higher degree of polarization. This feature 
characterizes a situation in which a distribution is more divergent from the middle position to the 
tails. That is, the distance between income groups below and above the median becomes greater. 
The common example of this feature is that the gap between the poor and the rich is greater as 
the poor get poorer and the rich get richer.  
The second feature of the FW indices is “increased bipolarity,” a situation in which 
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individuals with incomes below or above the median group become tighter or more concentrated. 
Like “increased spread,” “increased bipolarity” leads to a higher degree of polarization as well. 
Furthermore, FW employed the Gini coefficient in their polarization indices and provided 
rigorous axiomatic characterizations for their indices.3 Based on income data from the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), and the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), Foster and Wolfson illustrated the application of their indices and 
found that both inequality and polarization declined in Canada in the period of study (1981, 
1987, 1988), whereas both inequality and polarization increased significantly in the U.S during 
that period of time, suggesting a disappearance of the middle class in the U.S. 
A few years later, Tsui and Wang (2000) extended the work of Foster and Wolfson and 
proposed their own indices based on two features discussed in FW above. However, they critique 
the FW index because those measures employ an inequality index, the Gini coefficient, to 
measure polarization, which is a concept distinct from inequality. Through a set of axioms, Tsui 
and Wang prove that their bipolarization index is independent of the Gini index, unlike the FW 
index, and their index estimates the degree of “increased spread” and “increased bipolarity” to 
determine the level of polarization.  
  
2.2.2 Social and Ethnic Polarization 
The papers discussed above focus mainly on the measurement of income polarization. 
Nevertheless, income polarization is not the only cause of social conflicts. Thus, the notion of 
polarization must be extended to a broader context. An interesting extension might be social 
polarization in which social conflicts in a given population are determined by social factors and 
may be independent of the distribution of income. Although Kanbur and Zhang (2001) still focus 
                                                 
3See Foster and Wolfson (1994) for details. 
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on income distribution across social groups such as regional dimensions, they propose social 
polarization measures based on the decomposition of the Generalized Entropy inequality index. 
Including group homogeneity in their measure, Kanbur and Zhang (2001) propose a polarization 
index that incorporates both between-group and within-group inequality. The Kanbur Zhang 
index is the ratio of between-group and within-group inequality, which is estimated by 
decomposing the GE inequality index. In this measure, polarization is captured by comparing the 
average distance between the groups’ income means and the income differences within groups.  
Adopting the work of ER for a social context, Montalvo and Reynal Querol (2005a and 
2005b) introduced a social polarization index with several limitations. First, the Reynal-Querrol 
index (RQ) is not derived from a set of axioms. Second, the index only considers the size of 
different groups (i.e., the identification component) but fails to take into account the role of the 
alienation component, an essential part of polarization. Montalvo and Querol faced the difficult 
problem of defining and measuring a distance function of alienation between groups. As a result, 
the researchers assume that all groups feel equally alienated from each other. Despite these 
limitations, the RQ index is applied to predict the occurrence of civil wars and to predict the 
growth rate of GDP per capita. In one paper, Montalvo and Querol (2007) conclude, “ethnically 
polarized countries have to endure longer civil wars than ethnically less polarized societies.” 
Permanyer (2008) presented his axiomatic social polarization indices, which overcome 
the problems in the RQ index and provide an empirical application of the Permanyer index and 
the RQ index for several countries. Using data from the World Value Surveys (WVS), 
Permanyer shows that the ranking of 79 countries in terms of religious polarization altered 
considerably when he included the alienation/distance between-individuals component in his 
index and compared it to the RQ index. This finding suggests that the alienation component is 
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indeed a crucial part that must be included in analyzing social polarization. The exclusion of the 
alienation component in the RQ index clearly undermines the true measure of social polarization 
in a society. Unfortunately, Permanyer does not show ethnic polarization in that study due to a 
lack of ethnic distribution data.  
In 2009, Permanyer and Ambrosio extended Permanyer’s work to social polarization 
indices that can be applied to categorical or ordinal data. The researchers claim that these indices 
are useful when cardinal data are not available to compute social polarization. In addition, the 
advantage of these new indices compared to other indices is that the values are decomposable, 
thus identifying the specific contribution of each social group to the level of polarization. 
Furthermore, an axiomatic characterization of the indices is presented in the paper, and the 
indices are used to compute social polarization in Chile based on an ordinal individuals’ self-
assessed health (SAH) variable measured on a 1 to 5 scale. One denotes the best possible health 
condition (“Excellent”), and five denotes the worst (“Very Poor”). It appears that the ranking 
between their new polarization indices and other polarization and inequality indices are 
substantially different, suggesting the overlapping of polarization and the difference between 
polarization and inequality measures.  
A study by Gudrun (2008) applies the RQ index and the ER index to explain violent civil 
conflict. The data used in that study are derived from the Demographic and Health Survey 
between 1996 and 2004, and the number of countries used is 39 out of 86 countries. Based on 
data on the respondents’ ethnic affinity in the DHS surveys, Gudrun calculates the RQ index of 
ethnic polarization in a given country and year. The socio-economic polarization is calculated by 
applying the ER index to household assets and education years due to the unavailability of 
income or consumption expenditure data. That study shows that there are significant positive 
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links between socio-economic polarization and violent civil conflict. However, the ethnic 
polarization and the combined ethnic and socioeconomic polarization are insignificant for 
explaining violent civil conflict. Because the ethnic polarization is measured by the RQ index, 
disregarding the alienation component, it is highly likely that the result is less accurate. The 
Permanyer index of social polarization, which considers the alienation component, is likely a 
better estimator than the RQ index.  
Although many polarization studies focus on proposing new polarization measures and 
provide theoretical foundations, some studies apply those measures directly to data from several 
countries. Most studies are interested in examining how polarization and inequality behave. In 
some cases, polarization and inequality move in the same direction. However, other cases show 
that polarization and inequality move in the opposite direction. In the case of India, Noorbakhsh 
(2003) found that spatial inequality in production and consumption increased considerably in the 
period of study, suggesting a regional divergence instead of convergence. At the same time, ER 
and Wolfson indices showed an increasing trend as well. Fedorov (2002) showed that Russia 
experienced a rise in income inequality based on the Gini index and the GE(0), and income 
polarization also increased significantly from 1990 to 1999. Chakravaty and Majumder (2001) 
show that inequality increased slightly between 1987-88 and 1993-94, but polarization showed a 
decline in the state of Kerala in India, based on the Wolfson index and the Chakravaty-Majumder 
index, illustrating an opposite direction between inequality and polarization. A study by 
Makdissi et al. (2008) employs their own version of an ethnic polarization index based on 
income and ethnicity. The researchers’ hypothesis is that these two dimensions may contribute to 
ethnic conflict in Ivory Coast. Their ethnic polarization measure is a ratio between the ER (1994) 
and the DER (2004) polarization indexes. The researchers applied their index to expenditure data 
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and decomposed the level of the polarization index to between- and within-group alienation. 
Based on their calculation, polarization decreased in the two-year periods of study, 1993 and 
1998. Although they expected an increase in ethnic polarization due to the elimination of income 
redistribution across ethnic programs, they found that ethnic polarization significantly declined. 
The researchers concluded that minorities experienced a decline in polarization, whereas the 
politically dominant ethnic groups faced an increase in polarization, leading to the occurrence of 
conflict in 1999. Furthermore, religious polarization between Catholics and Muslims declined 
based on their index and might not contribute to conflict. 
A rapid increase of the literature on polarization in recent years indicates scholars’ 
growing interest in studying this phenomenon. Many studies of polarization attempt to offer 
axiomatic or non-axiomatic measures of either income or social polarization in a society, 
whereas numerous studies apply these measures directly to data from certain countries. 
Nevertheless, scholars agree that these polarization measures are different from inequality 
measures and that those measures are useful for detecting the degree of polarization in a society. 
In addition, scholars seem to agree that a higher level of either income or social polarization 
might contribute to the occurrence of social conflict. Therefore, by assessing the levels of both 
inequality and polarization, policy makers can design and implement policies that might decrease 
polarization and thus reduce or prevent future social conflicts in a society. Ideally, both 
polarization and inequality measures should be computed because they are likely to complement 
each other, meaning that one measure might capture what another measure cannot.  
 
2.2.3 Inequality in Indonesia 
 To our best knowledge, there has been no study regarding income polarization in 
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Indonesia. In this section, we review several studies examining income inequality in Indonesia. 
In general, income inequality is not as popular as poverty issues in the literature on Indonesia. 
One reason is that there has been consensus that income inequality in Indonesia has been stable 
and constant based on consumption expenditures from the SUSENAS. Mishra (2009) points out 
that the constancy of income inequality was largely caused by the data quality and the reliability 
of the estimations.  
 However, a recent development is that income inequality has been rising substantially, 
and the Gini coefficient of 0.41 in 2011, according to Indonesia’s statistical office, was the 
highest in history. A current perception is that unlike prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1998, 
Indonesia has experienced rapid growth with worsening income inequality in recent years. It is 
widely known that poverty has been declining, and the middle class in Indonesia has been 
growing rapidly. However, there is a question of why the decline in poverty has been very slow 
in spite of high economic growth. Answering this important question is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Nonetheless, we think that although the average expenditure has been steadily increasing, 
those at the top of the income distribution have experienced a much more rapid increase than 
those at the bottom. A standard policy response for rising income inequality is income 
redistribution, such as increasing taxes applied to the rich or to large corporations and assisting 
the poor via government transfers. Increasing taxes is less likely to be popular and will be 
opposed by those in power, who are mostly rich or close to the rich. The current government 
chooses the latter policy as indicated by the implementation of many anti-poverty programs. 
Nevertheless, issues with the implementation of these programs are recognizable, and the 
impacts of these programs are thus questionable.  
 At the regional level, many studies address not only the level and changes of inequality 
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but also which inequality, within- or between-inequality, contributes the most to overall 
inequality. Examining regional and ethnic inequality in Indonesia, Suryadarma et al. (2006) 
show that based on the Gini ratio of income and consumption, inequality in urban areas was 
much higher than that in rural areas in 2002 and 2004. Inequality in both urban and rural areas 
increased, yet the increase was much higher in urban areas in 2002 and 2004. The study finds no 
systematic inequality between ethnicities in Indonesia and concludes that ethnic inequality is not 
evident based on four indicators: access to education and health facilities, education outcomes, 
health outcomes, and income and consumption. In other words, ethnic disparity across four 
ethnic groups is not significant. Another important finding is that regional income and 
consumption inequality were relatively low across regions, suggesting more equal income 
distribution in those regions.  
Akita et al. (1999) apply the Theil decomposition technique using the SUSENAS 
household expenditure data from 1987, 1990, and 1993 and find that within-province inequality 
contributed most to national inequality prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1998. Unlike most 
other studies that use expenditure per capita as a proxy for income, Akita et al. (1999) utilize 
household expenditure as a proxy for income. This paper suggests that within-group inequality 
was much higher than the between-group inequality for the urban-rural category. That is, within-
group inequality made up more than 70% of the national Theil index. 
Using deflated real expenditures that take into account regional price disparities, 
Suryadarma et al. (2005) estimate the Gini ratio and GE index from real expenditure data and 
show that intra-group inequality (i.e., within-group inequality) contributes most to rural-urban 
inequality from 1984 to 2002. The paper also suggests that in 1999, immediately following the 
Asian financial crisis, inequality between urban and rural groups narrowed, whereas in 2002, the 
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income gap between urban and rural groups increased by more than 50%.  
Akita and Alisjahbana (2002) argue that in the pre-crisis period, regional income 
inequality sharply increased due to a significant increase in within-province inequality. 
Consistent with previous studies mentioned, this study shows that in 1998, regional income 
inequality dropped to its 1993-1994 level, and the decrease was mainly due to a change in 
between-province inequality. The study concludes that the Asian financial crisis affected urban 
Java and urban Sumatra the most. 
   
2.3 Data And Methodology 
2.3.1 Source: SUSENAS 2000 – 2010 
In general, there are two types of SUSENAS: the SUSENAS Core and the SUSENAS 
Module (see Figure 2.7). The CBS conducts the SUSENAS Core annually, and it gathers 
socioeconomic information such as education, health, and expenditures from households and 
individuals. The number of households interviewed is more than 200,000, whereas the number of 
individuals is approximately 800,000: 
 
Source: CBSFigure 
2.7.SUSENAS Classification 
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There are three types of SUSENAS Module conducted alternately every three years. The 
first type is the SUSENAS Consumption Module (SCM), consisting of detailed information 
about households’ total consumption/expenditures on food and non-food items. First collected in 
1993, the SCM has been collected every three years in all provinces in Indonesia. Observation 
units are households and individuals, and the survey method is direct interview. Like the 
SUSENAS Core, the SCM is also used to calculate welfare indicators. In 2002, the CBS took a 
subset of the SUSENAS consumption module of approximately 10,000 households and called it 
the SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module (SPCM). These households are followed over time, 
and their detailed consumption/expenditures are recorded every year until the present.  
The second and third types of SUSENAS Modules are the SUSENAS Sociocultural and 
Education Module (SCEM) and the SUSENAS Housing and Health Module (SHHM), 
respectively. The SCEM consists of detailed information ranging from household and society 
welfare, disability, individual socio-cultural and education characteristics, and social capital. 
This data is used to calculate education indicators and the Human Development Index (HDI). 
Moreover, the SHHM consists of detailed information regarding housing, public health, sources 
and amounts of household health expenses, children’s health, smoking habits, and health history.  
The following section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the SUSENAS. 
Generally, in developing countries like Indonesia, household expenditures are employed to 
measure welfare and poverty because household income data are likely to be less reliable. Large 
samples and wide coverage are the key advantages of the SUSENAS. With more than 200,000 
households sampled from across Indonesia, the SUSENAS is a good representation of the 
socioeconomic conditions of Indonesia’s population. In addition, because the SUSENAS is 
conducted regularly, it can be used to examine changes in welfare over time, although it is 
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generally not designed for panel data. Usually, researchers prefer the Indonesia Family Life 
Survey (IFLS) if they want to use panel data at the household level.   
 An important caveat is that one must be very careful with the quality and the reliability of 
the data, especially data regarding poverty and income distribution in Indonesia. Several issues 
are well recognized in the literature. First, inconsistency is evident between total household 
consumption in the national account and total household expenditures. For instance, Yusuf 
(2007) finds that total household final consumption from the Input-Output Tables representing 
the supply side of the economy does not match the total household expenditures from the 
SUSENAS representing the demand side of the economy. The mismatch is very severe 
particularly for non-food expenditures. Reconciling the mismatch between data from the national 
accounts and those from SUSENAS, Yusuf (2007) estimates standard inequality measures with 
sampling weights accounting for the differences between the two sets of data and reports that 
expenditure inequality is highly underestimated, especially in urban regions.    
Second, per capita expenditures in the SUSENAS may not reflect the “true” income 
distribution in Indonesia. It is highly likely that any income inequality measures are 
underestimated. This issue is associated with using expenditures as a proxy for income because 
rich households are likely to spend a small portion of their income and save most of the rest. In 
addition, the CBS surveyors’ lack of access to rich households leads to scant numbers regarding 
the richest of the rich represented in the data. Third, although expenditure data are more reliable 
than income data in Indonesia, expenditure data may not be reliable due to certain assumptions. 
For instance, total household expenditures are estimated from food and non-food expenditures. 
For food expenditures, the CBS does not differentiate between purchased, home produced, and 
gifted food items. As a result, there is only one aggregate monetary value for each food item. 
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This might not be a good practice because in many parts of Indonesia, many households rely on 
their own food production and rarely or never purchase food at market prices. Thus, they might 
not know the monetary value of their home-produced food and thus provide inaccurate answers 
to the survey questions. Moreover, the CBS asks about prior month and prior year expenditures 
on several non-food items. However, the CBS uses the prior year’s expenditures to estimate 
monthly non-food expenditures. This might be problematic because respondents tend to forget 
what they purchased in the prior year. Respondents are likely to remember what they paid for a 
car or a house in the prior year, yet they might not remember the price they paid for small 
inexpensive non-food items. As a consequence, survey respondents are likely to provide 
unreliable answers. Additionally, because the CBS’s surveyors ask about the prior month’s 
purchases of non-food items followed by the prior year’s purchases, there might be a tendency to 
multiply the prior month’s purchases to compute the prior year’s purchases. Conversely, 
surveyors might ask about the prior year’s purchases and divide it to obtain the prior month’s 
purchases. These surveyors might also ask both questions and choose the highest amount. 
Regardless of which approach the surveyors adopt, there are potential biases in the non-food 
expenditure data. 
 Finally, inconsistency in the SUSENAS might be an issue. Variable names and 
definitions keep changing over time. Difficulties arise when data users examine the changes over 
time. The SUSENAS’s questioners should be carefully monitored to search for changes. For 
example, in 2001 and 2002, one question was asked regarding expenditures on rent, utilities, and 
house maintenance, whereas beyond 2002, three questions were asked regarding expenditures on 
rent, utilities, and house maintenance. Therefore, if one wants to compare these expenditures 
over time, he or she should sum up all three variables to obtain the total. Despite its weaknesses, 
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the SUSENAS is still the most widely used household survey to represent Indonesia’s population 
for the purpose of examining socioeconomic conditions.  
 In this study, we use both the SUSENAS Core and the Module to estimate national 
polarization and inequality, but we use only the SUSENAS Core to estimate regional 
polarization and inequality. The SUSENAS Core includes more observations than the SUSENAS 
Module (approximately 200,000 versus 60,000 households). Statistically speaking, compared 
with the Module, the Core might provide information closer to the true distribution of income 
due to its large sample. In addition, the Core is conducted every year, whereas the Module was 
conducted every three years prior to 2007. Therefore, using the Core, we can determine the 
annual levels and trends of polarization from 2000 to 2010. However, the Module is far more 
detailed than the Core. That is, the Module comprises a long list of questions regarding food and 
non-food items to obtain total expenditures, whereas the Core inquires about limited items and 
relies on aggregation. For instance, for the category of cereal, the Core inquires about household 
consumption of only two items: rice and others (corn, flour, etc.), whereas the Module inquires 
about consumption of eight items. Moreover, the Core inquires about household expenditures on 
certain items without considering quantity. 
 
2.3.2 Methodology 
Because this study concerns income polarization and inequality, it relies heavily on a per 
capita expenditure variable as a proxy for income and its distribution. National and regional 
polarization and inequality measures are estimated to examine patterns and differences in the 
behavior of polarization and inequality measures. Two popular and widely used inequality 
measures, the Gini and the GE index, are estimated (see Appendix B.2 for a discussion of these 
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inequality indices). Two income polarization measures that represent a different type of 
polarization, the Foster Wolfson (1992) and the Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2005), are estimated 
for the sample period spanning 2000 to 2010. Additional income polarization indices are also 
calculated and are shown in Appendix B.10. Most polarization indices in this study are estimated 
using the Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP) in STATA 10. As discussed in the 
literature review, there are at least two types of polarization measure: income and social 
polarization. In this study, we focus only on income polarization measures, which are 
represented by the Foster-Wolfson index as an example of a bipolarization measure and by the 
Duclos-Esteban-Ray index as an example of a pure income polarization measure. However, we 
also estimate some social polarization measures: the Kanbur-Zhang index (see Appendix B.5 and 
B.7) and the Permanyer index (see Appendix B.6). 
 
2.3.2.1 The Foster and Wolfson (1992) Polarization Index 
Like the Gini index, the Foster Wolfson (FW) index, which falls into the category of 
bipolarization measures, is based on the Lorenz curve, and its value can take any real number 
between 0 and 1. The FW index is twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the tangent line 
at the median point. The formula is as follows: 
ܨܹ ൌ 2ሾ2ሾ0.5 െ ܮ݋ݎ݁݊ݖሺ݌ ൌ 0.5ሻሿ െ ܩ݅݊݅ሿ µ݉݁݀݅ܽ݊ 
where Lorenz(p=0.5) is the income share of the bottom half of the population; µ is the 
mean income, and Gini is the Gini index. According to Foster & Wolfson (2010), the FW 
formula above has two attractive interpretations. First, using the Lorenz curve, the formula 
represents the area underneath the curve and above the tangents to the curve at the median 
family. The median is used for normalization instead of the mean. Second, the index can be 
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expressed as a function of the “between-group” inequality minus the “within-group” inequality 
as measured by the Gini index, where the two groups are defined as groups above and below the 
median income. As a result, inequality and polarization move in the same direction when the 
inequality between these groups increases, holding the within-group constant. However, 
inequality and polarization move in opposite directions when within-group inequality rises 
(Foster & Wolfson 2010, p.250). 
  
2.3.2.2 The Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2005) Polarization Index 
Overcoming the conceptual and practical problems with the ER (1994) polarization 
measure, Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (DER) propose an extension and a refinement of the ER 
index applied to the continuous distributions. The DER index measures the sum of all effective 
antagonisms in a population, and the index is written as follows: 
ఈܲሺ݂ሻ ൌ ඵ݂ሺݔሻଵାఈ݂ሺݕሻ|ݕ െ ݔ| ݀ݕ݀ݔ 
where α is in [0.25,1]; f(y) and f(x) denote the income density function. This formula can 
be written as 
ఈܲሺܨሻ ൌ න݂ሺݕሻఈ݃ሺݕሻ ݀ܨሺݕሻ 
where y denotes income and F(y) its distribution. The alienation effect is captured by the 
function g(y), whereas the identification effect is captured by the function	݂ሺݕሻఈ. Higher values 
of α mean that a larger weight is assigned to identification in the polarization index. The value of 
α requires a value judgment from the user of the DER polarization index. In this paper, the value 
of α is set to 1. 
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2.4.  National Inequality and Polarization 
Two inequality measures, the GE(0) and the Gini, and two polarization indices, Foster 
and Wolfson (1992) and Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2005), are estimated from 2000 to 2010. The 
Foster and Wolfson (1992) polarization index represents a bipolarization measure, whereas the 
Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2005) index represents a pure income polarization measure. Unlike 
social polarization indices, no social groups (such as regional or ethnic groups) were specified 
before applying these income and bipolarization measures. As mentioned above, this 
specification is the major difference between income and social polarization. The variable used is 
per capita real consumption expenditure, which is derived from per capita nominal consumption 
expenditure deflated by inflation. The step-by-step calculation of the deflators is presented in 
Appendix B.3.  
Table 2.1 reports the overall inequality and polarization measures for Indonesia during 
the period 2000-10. Figure 2.8 shows the evolution of these measures relative to their 2000 
values: 
Table 2.1. Inequality and Polarization (National) 
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Figure 2.8. Inequality and Polarization (National) 
 
Four features are evident in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.8. First, the overall trend for both inequality 
and polarization measures fluctuate similarly but at substantially different rates between 2000 
and 2010. Three major spikes in 2002, 2005, and 2008 are evident for all measures. However, 
since 2000, all measures have increased significantly, with the GE showing the highest increase.  
Second, in certain periods of study, polarization and inequality indices move in opposite 
directions, suggesting that they are indeed different indices measuring different features of 
distribution. For instance, between 2000 and 2001, polarization indices increased, whereas 
inequality indices declined. This occurred because inequality in different income groups (i.e., 
“within-group inequality”) had risen in this period.   
Third, although the DER and FW indices are two different types of polarization measure, 
in general, they exhibit similar patterns with different rates of change. The changes of the FW 
index were considerably larger than those of the DER index in this period of study because the 
FW is more sensitive to changes in several features of a distribution, such as the bottom half of 
the population’s income shares, inequality within distribution, and median and mean values. 
However, the DER is a polarization index that applies to a continuous distribution and is 
estimated using nonparametric distribution for more than two income groups, resulting in less 
Year GE(0) Gini FW DER 
2000 0.165 0.317 0.120 0.177 
2001 0.156 0.310 0.123 0.180 
2002 0.195 0.345 0.131 0.192 
2003 0.163 0.316 0.124 0.181 
2004 0.177 0.328 0.129 0.182 
2005 0.232 0.376 0.147 0.198 
2006 0.197 0.348 0.137 0.189 
2007 0.166 0.321 0.129 0.177 
2008 0.219 0.362 0.140 0.179 
2009 0.193 0.345 0.138 0.187 
2010 0.230 0.375 0.143 0.193 
Growth 39.52 18.16 19.67 8.65 
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major changes. In other words, the DER index is smoother than the FW index. Furthermore, both 
polarization indices (DER and FW) also show different directions in certain periods. For 
example, between 2008 and 2009, the DER showed an increase, whereas the FW exhibited a 
decrease.  
Fourth, because the GE is very sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the distribution, its 
changes are larger than those of the Gini, implying substantial changes in the incomes of the 
poor relative to other income groups. The GE reached its highest value in 2005 compared to its 
value in 2000. The GE has risen by nearly 40%, whereas the Gini has grown by only 18% since 
2000. 
Regarding the Foster-Wolfson polarization index, Wang and Tsui (2000) criticize the FW 
index as another inequality index rather than a polarization index because to calculate the FW 
index, the Gini index is used. Wang and Tsui produce their own polarization index, which does 
not involve an inequality index. Our estimation of the Wang-Tsui (WT) polarization index is 
shown in Appendix B.4. Compared with the FW index, the WT index shows a slightly different 
trend. From 2000 to 2005, the WT index indicated an increasing trend and reached its highest 
peak in 2005. Between 2005 and 2007, the WT index declined considerably, whereas it steadily 
increased from 2007 to 2010. Similar to the FW index, the peaks of the WT index coincided with 
the fuel subsidy cuts in 2002, 2005, and 2008.  
 
2.4.1 Expenditure Component Analysis 
Despite differences between the FW and the DER indexes, their patterns of change are 
quite similar, with some exceptions in certain periods of study. However, it is more important to 
examine why the polarization indices show a substantial increase during this time period. One 
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possible explanation is that the expenditures of the rich have positively grown much faster than 
those of the poor since 2000. Table 2.2 shows the breakdown of total expenditures for the bottom 
40% and the top 10% of the population. As shown in Table 2.2, the top 10% have experienced an 
86% increase in their total real expenditures, whereas the bottom 40% have seen only a 49% 
increase, indicating considerably faster expenditure growth for the top 10% compared with the 
bottom 40%:  
Table 2.2. Top 10% and Bottom 40% Expenditure Shares and Growths, 2000 and 2010 
 
In terms of expenditure shares, the bottom 40% spent 75% of their total budget on food, 
whereas the top 10% spent only 55% on food in 2000. In 2010, the food share for the bottom 
40% declined to 67% of their total budget. However, the food share for the top 10% fell faster 
than that of the bottom 40% from 55% to 42% of total expenditures. As expected, the bottom 
2000 2010
Growth 
2000-2010 
(%)
Share of 
total 
expenditure 
2000 (%)
Share of 
total 
expenditure 
2010 (%)
2000 2010
Growth
2000-2010 
(%)
Share of 
total 
expenditure 
2000 (%)
Share of 
total 
expenditur
e 2010 (%)
Rice 23,135 26,748 16 25 19 30,979 30,979 0 7 4
Legume 1,363 1,976 45 1 1 2,866 2,306 -20 1 0
Fish 7,485 9,696 30 8 7 24,914 29,360 18 6 4
Meat 1,772 1,644 -7 2 1 19,121 16,683 -13 4 2
Egg and milk 2,658 3,914 47 3 3 18,191 27,578 52 4 3
Veggetables 5,499 8,566 56 6 6 14,975 18,536 24 3 2
Nuts 3,392 3,228 -5 4 2 7,718 6,464 -16 2 1
Fruits 2,136 1,978 -7 2 1 14,875 16,167 9 3 2
Oil and fat 3,723 4,523 21 4 3 9,035 8,409 -7 2 1
Beverage ingredients 4,257 5,347 26 5 4 11,253 11,603 3 2 1
Spices 2,378 2,400 1 3 2 5,784 5,083 -12 1 1
Other foods 1,334 2,914 118 1 2 7,061 10,256 45 2 1
Ready foods and drinks 4,084 9,015 121 4 6 56,537 131,440 132 13 16
Alcohol 119 190 60 0 0 959 1,984 107 0 0
Tobacco 6,937 10,678 54 7 8 23,489 39,173 67 5 5
Total food expenditures 70,271 92,816 32 75 67 247,756 356,023 44 55 42
Non-food Items
Housing 10,781 21,080 96 12 15 96,969 184,750 91 22 22
Goods and services 2,581 9,386 264 3 7 22,587 91,763 306 5 11
Education 1,820 3,639 100 2 3 19,543 32,131 64 4 4
Health 1,313 2,292 75 1 2 12,286 26,580 116 3 3
Clothing 4,291 4,609 7 5 3 18,221 21,953 20 4 3
Durable goods 1,166 1,513 30 1 1 19,839 54,843 176 4 7
Taxes and insurances 318 1,070 237 0 1 4,674 21,366 357 1 3
Party,ceremony,etc. 998 885 -11 1 1 9,110 12,288 35 2 1
Total nonfood expenditures 23,267 46,640 100 25 33 203,228 481,717 137 45 58
Total expenditures (pce) 93,537 139,456 49 450,984 837,740 86
Bottom 40% Highest 10%
Food Items
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40% spent 25% of their budget on rice, which is the main staple for many Indonesians. 
Expenditures on fish were approximately 8% of total expenditures in 2000 and declined to 7% in 
2010. In contrast, in terms of spending on food item, the top 10% spent a large portion of their 
total expenditures on ready-to-eat food and drinks (i.e., bread, cookies, fried rice, instant noodles, 
chicken rice, beef bowls, etc.). One possible explanation is that most people in this group live in 
urban areas where there are many different options for food and drinks. In addition, due to their 
work, this population has limited time to cook, which means that they may have to purchase 
ready-to-eat food and drinks. Interestingly, both groups spent a large portion of their total 
expenditures on housing. The rich spent 22% of their total expenditures on housing, whereas the 
bottom 40% spent 12% of their expenditures on housing. It is likely that many people in the 
bottom 40% do not own houses and must rent them. In contrast, the top 10% is likely to own 
houses, and their housing expenditures are the estimated market prices if they rent their houses to 
someone else. Additionally, the growth of housing expenditures is above 90% between 2000 and 
2010 for both groups. This finding might indicate a rising trend in housing values and thus 
increasing rents.  
Furthermore, much of the expenditure growth for both groups has been driven by non-
food expenditures. The bottom 40% spent twice more on non-food items in 2010 than in 2000, 
whereas the top 10% spent 137% higher on non-food items. For the bottom 40%, the top three 
non-food expenditure categories are goods and services, taxes and insurance, and education, 
respectively. Goods and services grew by 264% between 2000 and 2010. Major non-food items 
included in this category are fuel for vehicles and transportation costs, and these items’ 
contributions to non-food expenditures are very large. For example, between 2005 and 2010, the 
bottom 40% spent 134% more on fuel and transportation costs. The price of fuel has risen 
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considerably since 2000 due to several fuel subsidy cuts, which will be discussed below. In 
addition, expenditures on taxes and insurance, which include land and building, vehicle taxes, 
and health and life insurance, have increased significantly by 237%. However, it is not clear 
which item in this category most contributes to growth. Meanwhile, the bottom 40% has spent 
twice more on education in 2010 than in 2000. This finding is not surprising given that more 
people become aware of the importance of education as an economy develops.  
However, for the top 10%, the top three non-food expenditures are taxes and insurance, 
goods and services, and durable goods, respectively. Expenditures on taxes and insurance grew 
by 257% as this group’s wealth and assets increased over time. The rich also demanded more 
goods and services. They spent more not only on fuel and transportation costs but also on leisure 
items, such as hotels, movie theaters, cable TVs, etc., and on household services, such as 
domestic helpers, gardeners, and drivers. Expenditures on these goods and services rose by 306% 
between 2000 and 2010. Moreover, the rich purchased more durable goods, including furniture, 
home appliances, jewelry, TV, cars, motorcycles. Expenditures on durable goods increased by 
176%.  
 
2.4.2 Fuel Subsidy Cuts 
Based on the FW bipolarization measures, polarization increased considerably and 
showed spikes in 2002, 2005, and 2008. The FW bipolarization component breakdown in Table 
2.5 further below reveals that the income share of those below the median per capita expenditure 
(i.e., median share L(0.5)) fell; thus, the relative median deviation, T, increased substantially in 
2002, 2005, and 2008. This finding suggests that given the inequality in the country as indicated 
by the Gini index, the gap between those above and below the median widened in these years. As 
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a consequence, not only inequality but also polarization increased.  
One possible explanation for increasing polarization is that during these years, the 
Indonesian government cut the fuel subsidy due to rising world oil prices. Many other factors 
might contribute to a significant increase in polarization in 2002, 2005, and 2008, yet we believe 
that fuel subsidy cuts have significant direct and indirect impacts on worsening polarization. 
Table 2.3 presents price changes of three types of fuel since 1993. In 2000, the price of premium 
fuel for vehicles was only Rp 1,150, but it increased to Rp 4,500 in 2009, an increase of nearly 
300%. Premium fuel was the most common type of fuel consumed by both middle- and high-
income people for their cars or motorcycles because it is partly subsidized by the government 
and is thus cheaper than other types of fuel with higher octanes. Meanwhile, the price of 
kerosene, which is consumed mostly by the poor, also increased from Rp 350 to Rp 2,500 from 
2000 to 2008, an increase of more than 600%. In general, the poor use kerosene mostly for 
everyday cooking: 
Table 2.3. Fuel Price Changes 1993-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   Source: Abdini 2012 
The status of Indonesia has changed from an exporter to an importer of oil since early 
2002 due to low domestic production of oil. Fuel (and energy) subsidies comprised a large 
portion of Indonesia’s budget and were the largest compared to China, India, Thailand, and 
South Korea. When global oil prices surge, the policy options are to maintain, raise, or reduce 
8-Jan-93 700 280 380
5-May-98 1200 71 350 25 600 58
15-May-98 1000 -17 280 -20 550 -8
1-Oct-00 1150 15 350 25 600 9
16-Jun-01 1450 26 400 14 900 50
17-Jan-02 1550 7 600 50 1150 28
2-Jan-03 1810 17 700 17 1890 64
1-Mar-05 2400 33 2200 214 2100 11
1-Oct-05 4500 88 2000 -9 4300 105
24-May-08 6000 33 2500 25 5500 28
1-Dec-08 5500 -8 2500 0 5500 0
15-Dec-08 5000 -9 2500 0 4800 -13
15-Jan-09 4500 -10 2500 0 4500 -6
2-Jul-10 4500 0 2500 0 4500 0
Date % Change % Change % Change
Premium 
(Rp/litre)
Kerosene 
(Rp/litre)
Solar 
(Rp/litre)
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the subsidy. Apparently, the last option was chosen by the Indonesian government in 2002, 2005, 
and 2008, leading to higher domestic fuel prices, as shown in Table 2.3. Based on the structural 
path analysis (SPA), Azis (2009) identifies transmission mechanisms that take into account the 
direct, indirect, and feedback effects from a price shock (i.e., fuel subsidy cut) on households in 
Indonesia. According to Azis (2009), chemical, paper, coal petroleum, textiles, and construction 
are the most oil-intensive sectors in Indonesia. These sectors are highly dependent on one other. 
That is, one sector generates a high multiplier effect on another sector. In addition, the effect of 
rising oil prices on Indonesia’s chemical industry is lower output of this industry, which 
subsequently reduces the demand for production factors (capital and labor) directly and 
indirectly. Lower capital and labor demand ultimately creates downward pressure on wages and 
household income.  
Furthermore, Azis (2009) argues that both high and low-income households in urban 
areas are most affected by the negative impacts of oil price hikes in chemical industries. The two 
most important channels are identified from chemical industries to urban high-income groups. 
First, a lower demand for coal and petroleum commodities involving intersectoral linkages leads 
to lower demand for incorporated capital, which ultimately reduces household incomes. Second, 
in the absence of intersectoral linkages, lower output in chemical industries directly translates to 
a decrease in unincorporated capital, which eventually reduces the income of urban high-income 
groups. Moreover, for urban low-income households, the most important channel is similar to the 
first channel for urban high-income households. The second most important channel proceeds 
from lower output of chemical industries to a decrease in demand for manufacturing labor, which 
eventually hurts the income of urban low-income households.   
 Our analysis can be extended by closely examining the consumption expenditure 
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breakdowns as previously for only the years in which polarization increased considerably: 2002, 
2005, and 2008. Table 2.4 below shows the consumption patterns of the bottom 40% and the top 
10% during the price shock years. It also presents the growth of expenditures for these two 
groups. One interesting feature is that the total expenditure growth of the bottom 40% was 
positive in 2002 and 2008 and yet negative in 2005. In contrast, the total expenditure growth of 
the highest 10% was positive in these years, although its growth in 2005 was not as high as in 
2002 and in 2008. In addition, the magnitude of expenditure changes was much higher for the 
top 10% than for the bottom 40%. For example, in 2008, the expenditures of the bottom 40% 
grew only 3%, whereas the expenditures of the top 10% grew 23%. This finding suggests that 
price shocks such as fuel subsidy cuts had an insignificant impact on the consumption of the rich, 
whereas they affected the consumption of the poor as indicated by low and even negative growth 
in 2005. As a result, the gap between the mean expenditures of the poor and of the rich widened 
tremendously during the years in which price shocks occurred; thus, polarization increased 
significantly. 
As discussed, non-food expenditure growth contributed significantly to overall 
expenditure growth for both groups. This finding is not surprising because expenditures on fuel, 
kerosene, and solar are aggregated in the goods and services category. The bottom 40% spent 
70% more on this non-food category in 2005 than in 2004. Expenditures on many non-basic food 
and non-food items declined significantly. For example, meat consumption declined by 29%, and 
expenditures on clothing fell by 22% despite an unchanging consumption share. In sum, both 
food and non-food expenditures fell, and total expenditures thus declined as well in 2005 for the 
bottom 40%. This finding is consistent with the price changes of fuel, as shown in Table 2.3. In 
2005, kerosene used mostly by the poor for cooking increased by 214%. Premium and solar 
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prices also increased significantly in 2005. Nonetheless, in 2008, overall expenditures still grew 
slightly, and the growth of food expenditures is greater than that of non-food expenditures. 
Ready-to-eat food and drinks and fruit expenditures contributed most to total expenditure growth 
in 2008. In addition, health and taxes and insurance expenditures grew considerably as well:  
Table 2.4 Top 10% and Bottom 40% Expenditure Shares and Growths, Selected Years  
 
  
The top 10% experienced a substantial increase in goods and services expenditures in 
2002, 2005, and 2008. The highest increase in expenditures on this non-food category occurred 
in 2002. Moreover, in 2005, spending on taxes and insurance and goods and services grew by 
89% and 64%, respectively, contributed most to the total expenditure growth. Interestingly, total 
food expenditures grew faster than total non-food expenditures in 2008. Spending on ready-to-
eat food and drinks and on alcohol increased significantly, 88% and 70%, respectively. 
Share 
2001
Share 
2002
Share 
2004
Share 
2005
Share 
2007
Share 
2008
Growth
2002
Growth
2005
Growth
2008
Share 
2001
Share 
2002
Share 
2004
Share 
2005
Share 
2007
Share 
2008
Growth
2002
Growth
2005
Growth
2008
Rice 23 24 19 20 23 18 17 0 -16 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 -6 -10
Legume 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 1 23 1 0 1 0 0 0 -3 -18 42
Fish 8 7 8 8 7 7 0 -5 7 5 4 4 4 4 4 -3 2 5
Meat 2 1 2 1 1 1 -17 -29 45 4 3 3 3 2 2 9 0 16
Egg and milk 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 -5 5 4 3 3 4 4 3 8 13 15
Vegetables 6 6 6 6 6 8 11 -3 39 3 3 3 2 3 3 7 1 26
Nuts 3 3 3 3 2 2 -5 -13 -3 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -8 10
Fruits 2 2 2 2 2 2 27 -16 61 3 3 3 2 2 3 24 -7 58
Oil and fat 4 4 4 4 4 5 7 -12 30 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 -8 18
Beverage ingredients 5 4 4 5 4 4 2 -4 -9 2 2 2 2 2 1 -1 -4 0
Spices 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 -9 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 -5 11
Other food 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 31 -13 1 1 1 2 1 1 14 28 -5
Ready food and drinks 5 5 5 5 5 11 15 4 123 14 13 11 12 11 17 14 19 88
Alcohol 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3 -8 -17 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 70
Tobacco 9 8 9 8 7 7 1 -11 -7 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 -7 2
Total food expenditures 74 72 69 71 69 70 8 -4 5 53 47 47 43 43 44 8 4 25
Non-food Items
Housing 12 14 17 16 15 19 30 -16 34 20 25 28 24 23 24 50 -2 29
Goods and services 3 3 3 5 6 8 19 70 -26 5 8 7 11 12 15 89 64 62
Education 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 14 0 4 3 4 4 4 4 9 7 35
Health 2 2 1 1 2 2 4 -9 133 3 3 3 3 3 4 7 9 79
Clothing 5 4 4 4 3 4 7 -22 -42 4 4 3 3 3 4 23 -3 54
Durable goods 1 1 1 1 1 2 -1 -10 -52 7 6 5 6 4 13 10 51 276
Taxes and insurances 0 0 0 0 0 1 13 31 52 1 1 1 2 2 2 51 89 41
Party,ceremony,etc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 -6 -7 3 3 2 2 1 3 18 17 163
Total nonfood expenditures 26 28 31 29 31 30 18 -12 3 47 53 53 57 57 56 38 19 22
Total expenditures (pce) 11 -7 3 22 12 23
Bottom 40% Highest 10%
Food Items
 82 
Additionally, durable goods and party and ceremony expenditures increased by 276% and 163% 
in 2008.   
Examining the food and non-food item shares to total expenditures, we find slight 
changes in the consumption patterns of both groups. The bottom 40% still spent approximately 
70% of their money on food, whereas the top 10% spent more than 50% of their money on non-
food items. In 2002, the share of food expenditures declined, yet the share of non-food 
expenditures increased for the bottom 40%. However, the opposite occurred in 2004-2005 and in 
2007-2008. That is, the share of food expenditures slightly increased, whereas the share of non-
food expenditures declined marginally. In contrast, for the top 10%, food shares dropped 
significantly in 2001-2002 from 53% to 47% and in 2004-2005 from 47% to 43%, whereas they 
increased slightly in 2007-2008 from 43% to 44%. 
 
2.4.3 Allocating Savings from Fuel Subsidy Cuts to Anti-Poverty Programs 
 The government’s decision to drastically cut fuel subsidies was followed by a series of 
compensating policies targeting the poor in 2005. A summary of these programs is shown in 
Appendix B.8. In general, lack of socialization, weak administrative capability, and poor 
targeting are issues regarding the implementation of these programs. For example, the 
government’s anti-poverty program known as the BLT (i.e., unconditional cash transfers) in 
2005 and 2008 most likely helped to smooth the consumption patterns of the poor only 
temporarily. Although the intention of this program was good, the implementation on the ground 
was not as expected. Data on how many people were eligible for the program were collected 
rapidly and reflected the bias of local elites, who included their families and relatives when they 
were asked about eligibility for the program in their regions.  
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Number of 
households
% of total 
beneficiaries
Number of 
households
% of total 
beneficiaries
Number of 
households
% of total 
beneficiaries
1 37,148 44.24 47,383 39.43 1,750 16.95
2 21,087 25.11 30,933 25.74 2,003 19.4
3 14,384 17.13 22,716 18.9 2,143 20.75
4 8,649 10.3 14,388 11.97 2,390 23.15
5 2,707 3.22 4,755 3.96 2,040 19.76
83,975 100 120,175 100 10,326 100
SUSENAS Core 2006 = 277,202
BLT RASKIN KURPCE 
Quintiles
Table 2.5 Number and Percentage of Households Receiving Compensation Programs in 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 As shown in Table 2.5, these three programs show substantial leakage. Targeting the 
poor, these programs clearly benefit not only the poor (defined as those in the bottom 40%) but 
also middle- and upper-income households (defined as those other than the bottom 40%). 
Of three anti-poverty programs, the program of subsidized rice for the poor, or RASKIN, was 
enjoyed by more than 120 million, or 40% of all households in the SUSENAS Core. Households 
in the highest and second highest quintile accounted for approximately 16 percent of the total 
recipients. Like the RASKIN, the BLT also shows substantial inclusion errors in which 13.5% of 
total beneficiaries were classified as the highest and second highest quintile. In addition, a large 
proportion of middle-income households received this cash transfer program. In sum, the 
government transfers targeting the poor suffer from substantial leakage, benefitting non-poor 
households. 
 Rosfadhila et al. (2011) report that the implementation of the BLT in 2008 improved 
compared to that in 2005. Although the role of the implementing institutions improved, 
coordination among institutions at different levels was still an issue. Other problems include lack 
of socialization, domination of local apparatuses in verifying BLT beneficiaries, and significant 
cuts in total amounts allocated to the beneficiaries. Despite these issues, we believe that a series 
of government transfers to the poor through these anti-poverty programs may have improved the 
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consumption patterns of the poor (and the non-poor) when there was a price shock such as the 
fuel subsidy cut, although the magnitude of these effects was not as large as expected. 
Polarization likely improved to some extent from 2005 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2009 due to 
these transfers. 
 Based on our discussion of expenditure components and their growth, we conclude that 
the rich seem to be “immune” from price shocks such as fuel subsidy cuts. The rich maintain 
their standard of living and continue to spend their money mostly on non-food items during 
periods of rising prices. Only in 2005, expenditures of the top 10% grew slightly by 12%, but in 
2002 and in 2008, their expenditures grew more than 20%. In contrast, the poor were impacted 
most severely by price shocks. Their expenditures either declined or grew only slightly. As a 
consequence, the gap between the average expenditures of the poor and those of the rich became 
larger and larger over time. This clearly led to an increase in polarization. 
The empirical evidence above suggests that Indonesia as a whole has become more 
polarized and unequal in terms of income distribution since 2000. This process is mainly due to 
the fact that the consumption expenditures of the rich grew much faster than those of the poor. A 
significant increase in the FW polarization index between 2000 and 2010 is largely due to 
“increased spread.” However, an increase in this index may also imply a disappearance of the 
middle class. A popular notion in recent years claims that the middle class in Indonesia has 
grown rapidly in the last decade. Clearly, this idea contradicts the notion of a disappearing 
middle class based on increases in the FW polarization index. The middle class, especially in the 
context of Indonesia and how it differs from the FW bipolarization concept, will be further 
discussed in the following section.  
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2.4.4 The Emergence of Indonesia’s Middle Class 
In the last decade, Indonesia has enjoyed rapid economic growth, and its economy 
continued to grow even during the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. According to the ADB 
(Chun, 2010) and the World Bank (2011), one implication of this growth is the apparent 
emergence of the middle class in Indonesia. In 2003, Indonesia’s middle class was estimated as 
approximately 38% of the population, or approximately 81 million people, but in 2010, the 
middle class increased to 56% of the population, or approximately 131 million people (World 
Bank, p.39). In addition, the number of people with expenditures between $2 and $6 per day 
showed the highest increase compared to those with higher expenditures.  
There are three different approaches for estimating the middle class: the absolute, 
relative, and hybrid approaches. The ADB and the World Bank used the absolute approach for 
Indonesia. That is, they established a specific arbitrary range of income/expenditures to define 
the middle class. Those in the population with per capita expenditures between $2 and $20 per 
day are considered middle class. Using the 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rate, the ADB 
and the World Bank converted $2 and $20 into Indonesian Rupiah and applied this to the 
distribution of income from the SUSENAS. Therefore, the cutoff points are relatively fixed over 
time. It is clear that if incomes grow, then more people will fall into this middle class category. 
In other words, given inequality in the distribution, if the income distribution shifts to the right 
while the cutoff points are relatively constant, then the number of middle class people will grow 
(Figure 2.9). In addition, the absolute range for defining the middle class is very large as 
indicated by the fact that more than half of Indonesia’s population is considered middle class in 
2010 (more than 100 million):  
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Figure 2.9. Income Distribution 2003 & 2010 
Several characteristics of this middle class in developing countries are as follows: First, 
the middle class is highly concentrated in urban areas and is regionally concentrated. Second, 
this group is likely to be better educated and is more likely to send their children to school (Chun 
2010). Third, middle class people are more likely to have salaried jobs in non-agricultural 
sectors, to migrate, to have smaller family sizes, and to spend more on health care. Fourth, in 
rural areas, the middle class is more likely than the poor to be involved in non-agricultural 
activities and to be local entrepreneurs (Banerjee and Duflo 2008). 
According to the ADB and the World Bank, the middle class in Indonesia has been rising 
rapidly in the last decade. Nevertheless, the FW bipolarization index indicates that bipolarization 
has increased since 2000, which implies that the middle class is disappearing. Why do these two 
measures have conflicting results? A possible explanation is that these measures have different 
definitions of the middle class and emphasize different things. As discussed, the ADB and the 
World Bank version of the middle class is an absolute measure and has a very wide range from 
$2 to $20. In the last decade, Indonesia’s economy grew on average approximately 5% per year. 
Clearly, based on this measure, the number of people in the middle class rose significantly given 
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that the income distribution shifted while the cutoff points were relatively constant over time. 
However, using the median as a reference point, Foster and Wolfson (1992, 1994, 2010) 
argue that a middle class is a group around the middle of the distribution (i.e., median). One of 
their propositions is that a polarization index is a function of between-group and within-group 
inequality as measured by the Gini index (Foster Wolfson 2010). This index has a nice 
interpretation: polarization equals between-group inequality, or “increased spread,” minus 
within-group inequality, or “increased bipolarity,” normalized by the ratio of the mean and 
median. Groups considered in this index are below and above the median income. When the 
distance between these two groups becomes farther, polarization and inequality tend to rise. 
Nonetheless, when inequality increases in those two groups (i.e., “increased bipolarity”), 
polarization tends to decline. Therefore, the key difference between the middle class of Foster 
Wolfson and that of the World Bank and the ADB is that the FW index uses the median as a cut-
off point for income groups, whereas the WB and ADB use their absolute $2 and $20 range as 
their cut-off points. Different years will result in different medians because the distribution of 
income will be different, whereas the $2 and $20 range is relatively constant for each year. 
Table 2.6 shows Indonesia’s income distribution between 2000 to 2010. The mean and 
median show increasing trends. The distribution also shows an upward trend and is positively 
skewed. Furthermore, those at the top of the income distribution experienced faster growth in 
their income shares compared with those at the lowest distribution between 2000 and 2010, as 
discussed above. As a result, polarization increased substantially during the study period.  
Moreover, as shown in Table 2.6, the percentage of the population in the middle class for 
several given income ranges has declined. The relative median deviation denoted by T shows 
that the gap between the above and below median groups has widened over time. Both between- 
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and within-group inequality have increased since 2000. However, between-group inequality 
grew faster than within-group inequality, resulting in an increase in the Foster Wolfson 
polarization. Therefore, based on these results, we may conclude that the middle class in 
Indonesia has declined in the last decade: 
Table 2.6. Indonesia’s Income Distribution 2000-2010 
 
The discussion above reveals that different middle class measures yield different results. 
The result really depends on what one attempts to measure. The absolute middle class measure 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mean income µ 152,824 161,631 194,793 195,555 185,343 196,298 211,167 210,798 263,555 260,396 309,871
Median income m 122,773 130,213 148,901 157,259 146,868 144,101 161,323 168,089 203,466 200,423 227,212
Median income/Mean income (m /µ) 0.80 0.81 0.76 0.80 0.79 0.73 0.76 0.80 0.77 0.77 0.73
Skewness (1 - m /µ) 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.27
Quantiles (shares in total per capita 
income)
Q1 8.91 9.14 8.45 8.95 8.62 7.61 8.23 8.70 7.17 8.26 7.66
Q2 12.62 12.78 11.92 12.66 12.38 11.18 11.81 12.38 11.83 11.86 11.17
Q3 16.11 16.18 15.36 16.13 15.91 14.76 15.36 16.01 15.54 15.47 14.74
Q4 21.29 21.33 20.78 21.31 21.21 20.58 21.04 21.64 21.48 21.16 20.56
Q5 41.08 40.57 43.49 40.94 41.87 45.87 43.57 41.27 43.98 43.26 45.86
D9 14.43 14.38 14.58 14.44 14.50 14.89 14.89 14.97 14.92 14.86 14.83
D10 26.65 26.19 28.91 26.50 27.37 30.99 28.68 26.30 29.06 28.39 31.04
V19 9.50 9.41 9.85 9.46 9.57 10.22 10.02 9.87 9.95 10.01 10.30
V20 17.15 16.78 19.06 17.04 17.80 20.77 18.66 16.43 19.10 18.38 20.73
Gini (G ) 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.36 0.34 0.37
%  of the population with incomes …
< 40% of median income 1.78 1.10 1.20 1.18 1.76 2.51 1.70 1.62 5.10 1.97 2.30
< 50% of median income 5.53 3.82 4.30 4.10 5.12 6.76 5.24 5.17 10.03 5.77 6.36
< 60% of median income 12.37 9.14 10.19 9.45 11.01 13.42 11.37 11.42 14.51 12.15 12.93
60%  to  75%  of median income 13.90 11.92 12.71 11.86 12.10 12.50 12.23 12.45 9.59 12.60 12.40
75%  to 100% of median income 23.21 22.20 21.99 21.95 21.47 20.06 20.80 21.20 20.41 20.62 20.00
100% to 125% of median income 16.96 17.30 16.61 17.49 16.73 15.05 15.70 16.26 15.57 15.43 14.99
125% to 150% of median income 10.81 12.02 11.12 11.74 11.49 10.36 10.61 11.04 10.81 10.48 10.22
150% to 200% of median income 11.45 13.32 12.42 13.17 12.81 11.99 12.16 12.46 12.55 12.00 11.91
> 200% of median income 11.29 14.10 14.96 14.35 14.38 16.62 17.12 15.17 16.56 16.73 17.55
%  of the population in the middle class
given income range …
75% to 150% of median income 50.98 51.52 49.72 51.17 49.69 45.47 47.12 48.49 46.79 46.53 45.21
75% to 125% of median income 40.18 39.50 38.60 39.44 38.20 35.11 36.50 37.46 35.99 36.05 34.99
50% to 150% of median income 71.73 68.76 68.32 68.39 67.69 64.63 65.48 67.19 60.86 65.50 64.17
Polarization FW
Median share L (0.5) 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.26
Relative median deviation T 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.47 0.45 0.48
Gini Between 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.24
Gini Within 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.14
Polarization index P 0.120 0.123 0.131 0.124 0.129 0.147 0.137 0.129 0.140 0.138 0.143
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by the ADB and the World Bank resulted in a rising middle class as the economy continues to 
grow rapidly. Nevertheless, the FW polarization measure shows that the distance between those 
in the above- and below-median income groups has significantly increased over time, and in 
these two groups, income has become more homogenous (i.e., increased bipolarity), implying a 
decline in the number of those around the middle. Comparing these two measures of the middle 
class, one can see that the ADB and the World Bank version of the middle class indicates a 
promising picture of the economy, whereas the FW version of the middle class shows the 
opposite.  
 
2.4.5 National Polarization and Inequality Based on the SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module: 
A Different Story? 
 In the previous section, we demonstrated and discussed national polarization and 
inequality based on estimations from the SUSENAS Core from 2000 to 2010. Our results show 
that polarization and inequality indices fluctuated, disagreed in their directions in certain periods, 
and soared when there was a price shock. In addition, these indices show an increasing trend, and 
we conclude that Indonesia has become a more polarized and unequal society since 2000. What 
if we employ a different data set (i.e., the SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module or the SPCM) 
and estimate polarization and inequality? Will we obtain different results? If yes, how will the 
results differ from those of the SUSENAS Core? 
 As mentioned above in the data discussion, the SPCM collects detailed data on 
consumption expenditures. Households are surveyed regarding how much they spend on a long 
list of food and non-food items. Total household expenditures are simply the sum of the money 
value of food and non-food items. In contrast to this method, the SUSENAS Core inquires about 
a shorter list of household expenditures on food and non-food items and relies on aggregations. 
Whereas the SUSENAS Core is conducted every year with a larger sample of households, the 
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SPCM was conducted every three years prior to 2007 with smaller samples. In this study, the 
SPCM data from 2002 to 2010 are used. The SPCM data from 2002 and 2005 consist of 
approximately 10,000 households, whereas the SPCM 2007-2010 data include approximately 
66,000 households.  
 Figure 2.10 presents expenditure shares of the top and bottom 20%. This figure clearly 
indicates an increasing trend of expenditure shares of the rich. Between 2005 and 2007, the 
expenditure share of the rich jumped considerably from 43.6% to 45.6%. It declined slightly 
from 2007 to 2008 but steadily increased to 45.1% in 2010. Overall, since 2000, the rich in 
Indonesia have been getting richer, and this is consistent with our results from the SUSENAS 
Core. The speed of these changes is remarkably high. Keep in mind that the SUSENAS fails to 
include the richest of the rich. In effect, polarization and inequality estimations in this study are 
most likely to underestimate the real polarization and inequality in Indonesia. In contrast, the 
poor have seen their expenditure share fall steadily since 2000. The share of the poor fell 
substantially from 2002 to 2007 and rose slightly before it fell from 2007 to 2010. This figure 
illustrates an “increased spread” in which the rich are getting richer while the poor are getting 
poorer: 
 
Figure 2.10 Trend of Expenditure Share of Highest 20% and Bottom 20% 
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Table 2.7 and Figure 2.11 show inequality and polarization indices based on the SPCM 
from 2002 to 2010. Several features are apparent from the table and figure. First, the trends of 
polarization and inequality are slightly different. For example, the FW fell steadily from 2005 to 
2009 after it soared to a high level in 2005. In contrast, both the GE and Gini rose significantly 
between 2002 and 2007, fell steadily from 2007 to 2009, and increased between 2009 and 2010. 
Second, although the FW4 and DER measure polarization, they show different trends. This 
finding illustrates that bipolarization and pure polarization measures do not always agree in 
terms of direction and trend. Whereas the FW index emphasizes two income groups, the DER 
index concerns more than two income groups in a distribution. Finally, all indices except the 
DER have risen substantially since 2002, with the GE showing the highest increase:  
Table 2.7 Inequality and Polarization Indices Based on SPCM 
GE Gini FW DER 
2002 0.190 0.342 0.147 0.198 
2005 0.220 0.352 0.169 0.216 
2007 0.230 0.377 0.164 0.203 
2008 0.221 0.369 0.160 0.202 
2009 0.221 0.368 0.157 0.203 
2010 0.233 0.378 0.171 0.204 
Growth (%) 22.76 10.47 16.64 2.82 
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Figure 2.11 Graph of Inequality and Polarization Indices estimated from SPCM 
                                                 
4 The Wang‐Tsui bipolarization index is also estimated, but the trend is very similar to that of the FW. 
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Our next step is to compare the polarization and inequality indices estimated from the 
SPCM and from the SUSENAS Core (SC). Table 2.8 shows these comparisons, and graphs are 
shown in Appendix B.9. In terms of magnitude, the polarization indices from the SPCM are 
much higher than those from the SC. However, what is interesting is that the trends are slightly 
different. Unlike those from the SC, the polarization indices from the SPCM do not always show 
an increase when there was a price shock. Between 2007 and 2008, both polarization indices 
from the SC experienced an increase, whereas polarization indices from the SPCM fell slightly. 
These patterns also apply to inequality measures with greater changes. In our view, those 
polarization indices from the SC are more reasonable because they capture at least some 
immediate effects of higher fuel prices. Regardless of these differences, our conclusion still 
holds; Indonesia has become more polarized and unequal over time. 
Table 2.8. Comparison of Inequality and Polarization from the SCM and SC 
GE Gini FW DER GE Gini FW DER
2002 0.190 0.342 0.147 0.198 0.195 0.345 0.131 0.192
2005 0.220 0.352 0.169 0.216 0.232 0.376 0.147 0.198
2007 0.230 0.377 0.164 0.203 0.166 0.321 0.129 0.177
2008 0.221 0.369 0.160 0.202 0.219 0.362 0.140 0.179
2009 0.221 0.368 0.157 0.203 0.193 0.345 0.138 0.187
2010 0.233 0.378 0.171 0.204 0.230 0.375 0.143 0.193
SUSENAS Consumption Module SUSENAS CORE
 
 
2.5. Regional Inequality and Polarization 
This section discusses changes in polarization and inequality from 2000 to 2010 by 
regional groupings. Like those measures for national income distribution, similar polarization 
and inequality measures are applied to the regional groupings. The main objectives are to 
analyze how polarization and inequality behave over time and to compare inequality and 
polarization indices within each region. Following regional classifications in other regional 
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studies, this paper analyzes regional inequality and polarization through five types of regional 
dimensions in Indonesia: 
2.5.1 Urban and rural regions. 
2.5.2 Western Indonesia and Eastern Indonesia. 
2.5.3 Java-Bali Island and outside Java-Bali. 
2.5.4 Jakarta and non-Jakarta provinces. 
2.5.5 Natural resource-rich provinces, including East Kalimantan, Riau, and Papua versus 
non-natural resource-rich provinces. 
The components of the Foster Wolfson (FW) polarization index for each region are shown 
in Appendix B.11. 
 
2.5.1 Urban and Rural Indices 
Table 2.9 presents the evolution of urban and rural inequality and polarization indices, 
and Figure 2.12 illustrates these measures’ changes relative to their values in the year 2000.  
The fluctuations of urban polarization and inequality indices are very similar during the period of 
study, yet the rates of change differ. The directions of the polarization measures agree with those 
of the inequality measures in most periods. In some periods, however, the directions of 
polarization and inequality measures are opposed. For example, between 2008 and 2009, 
polarization measures show an increase, whereas inequality measures show a large drop. This 
finding suggests that the within-income-groups inequality in the distribution declined during that 
period. Furthermore, the patterns of all measures are remarkably similar to the national patterns. 
This result is not surprising because 65% of national income came from urban areas in 2010, 
compared with 53% in 2000: 
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Table 2.9. Urban and Rural Inequality and Polarization Indices 
Urban Rural 
Year GE(0) Gini FW DER Year GE(0) Gini FW DER 
2000 0.182 0.334 0.124 0.179 2000 0.103 0.252 0.100 0.161 
2001 0.164 0.318 0.124 0.179 2001 0.094 0.240 0.100 0.164 
2002 0.207 0.354 0.135 0.191 2002 0.102 0.250 0.101 0.165 
2003 0.173 0.325 0.127 0.180 2003 0.099 0.245 0.101 0.163 
2004 0.184 0.333 0.128 0.181 2004 0.106 0.252 0.103 0.163 
2005 0.243 0.384 0.152 0.198 2005 0.131 0.283 0.119 0.173 
2006 0.202 0.352 0.142 0.188 2006 0.115 0.265 0.111 0.168 
2007 0.169 0.323 0.131 0.174 2007 0.101 0.250 0.107 0.161 
2008 0.227 0.368 0.139 0.176 2008 0.142 0.289 0.116 0.165 
2009 0.199 0.350 0.141 0.184 2009 0.119 0.270 0.114 0.169 
2010 0.239 0.382 0.147 0.194 2010 0.124 0.275 0.116 0.170 
Growth 31.330 14.518 18.128 8.461 Growth 19.859 9.142 16.411 5.696 
 
Figure 2.12. Urban (left) and Rural (right) Inequality and Polarization Indices  
In contrast, in rural regions, inequality indices fluctuated while polarization indices 
remained constant in the beginning of the period. For example, polarization measures were 
relatively stable while inequality measures showed a w-shaped pattern between 2000 and 2003. 
Polarization measures in rural areas fluctuated between 2007 and 2010, whereas polarization 
indices in urban regions showed an upward trend. 
Within urban areas, both income inequality and income polarization increased 
significantly since 2000. GE(0) showed the highest growth at 31.33% and grew more rapidly 
than another inequality measure, Gini. Meanwhile, income polarization as indicated by the FW 
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index showed the second highest growth, and the FW increased faster than the DER. Similarly, 
within rural areas, the highest growth is the GE(0), and the second highest growth is the FW. The 
GE(0) rose faster than Gini, and the FW increased faster than the DER.  
However, the differences in growth between polarization and inequality indices in rural 
areas were not as large as those in urban areas. For example, the growth difference between the 
GE(0) and the FW in rural areas was only approximately a little more than 3 percentage points, 
whereas the growth difference between the GE(0) and the FW in urban areas was approximately 
13 percentage points. In addition, comparing growth of indices in urban and rural regions, we 
can see that inequality and polarization measures grew much faster in urban than in rural areas 
since 2000. For example, the FW in urban areas grew by 18.1%, whereas in rural areas it 
increased by 16.4%.   
In sum, urban and rural regions became more polarized and more unequal in terms of 
income in the last decade. A widening gap between the poor and the rich (i.e., “increased 
spread,” higher “alienation,” higher “between-group inequality”) may be responsible for an 
increase in polarization and inequality in both urban and rural areas. In addition, when there was 
a major price shock, polarization and inequality worsened in both regions. Regions’ different 
responses to price shocks are translated to different levels and changes in polarization and 
inequality measures. Regions with higher income shares, in this case urban areas, are more likely 
than other regions to show trends that are similar to the national polarization and inequality 
measures. Finally, polarization and inequality have worsened much more rapidly in urban than in 
rural regions since 2000.   
  
 96 
2.5.2 West and East Indices 
Table 2.10 presents the evolution of western and eastern inequality and polarization 
measures, and Figure 2.13 illustrates the evolution of these measures during the period of study: 
Table 2.10. Eastern and Western Inequality and Polarization Indices 
East West 
Year GE(0) Gini FW DER Year GE(0) Gini FW DER 
2000 0.164 0.317 0.123 0.171 2000 0.164 0.317 0.118 0.180 
2001 0.164 0.318 0.130 0.175 2001 0.154 0.308 0.120 0.184 
2002 0.165 0.319 0.126 0.180 2002 0.197 0.346 0.131 0.196 
2003 0.144 0.298 0.121 0.173 2003 0.165 0.317 0.124 0.183 
2004 0.158 0.312 0.129 0.173 2004 0.178 0.329 0.128 0.186 
2005 0.217 0.365 0.145 0.191 2005 0.231 0.376 0.145 0.201 
2006 0.192 0.344 0.141 0.186 2006 0.196 0.347 0.135 0.193 
2007 0.166 0.321 0.133 0.175 2007 0.165 0.320 0.127 0.180 
2008 0.210 0.354 0.141 0.178 2008 0.219 0.362 0.137 0.181 
2009 0.195 0.346 0.145 0.184 2009 0.191 0.344 0.135 0.190 
2010 0.233 0.377 0.148 0.188 2010 0.229 0.374 0.141 0.197 
Growth 42.124 18.855 20.305 9.820   Growth 38.929 17.997 19.290 9.084 
Figure 2.13.Eastern (left) and Western (right) Polarization and Inequality Indices 
Inequality and polarization measures in the east show almost identical trends in most 
periods. Similar directions of polarization and inequality measures were caused by larger gaps 
between income groups in the distribution. However, between 2008 and 2009, polarization 
measures rose while inequality measures decreased. This is caused by a decline in within-group 
inequality in this period. Furthermore, compared to other indices, the GE(0) showed the highest 
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
'00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10
GE(0) Gini FW DER
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
'00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10
GE(0) Gini FW DER
 97 
growth since 2000, and the FW was the second highest growth. The GE(0) rose more rapidly 
than the Gini, and the FW increased more rapidly than the DER. In addition, the FW has a 
slightly different pattern compared to the DER in one period. That is, the FW declined while the 
DER increased between 2001 and 2002. 
Similarly, in the west, the GE(0) had the highest growth, and the FW had the second 
highest growth during the period of study. Between two polarization measures, the FW showed 
larger changes than the DER from 2000 to 2010. This result is due to the differences in what 
these measures estimate. The FW index measures “increased spread” and “increased bipolarity” 
in a discrete distribution (i.e., above and below median), whereas the DER measures “the sum of 
effective antagonism” in a continuous distribution. Moreover, as in the urban areas discussed 
previously, the west showed trends nearly identical with the national trends because it accounts 
for more than 80% of the total income shares. Furthermore, in the early period (2000-2001), 
polarization increased, whereas inequality declined.   
Comparing polarization and inequality indices between the east and the west, we can see 
that in general, inequality and polarization in the east increased more rapidly than in the west 
since 2000. For example, the FW in the east showed an increase of 20.3%, whereas the FW in 
the west showed an increase of 19.2%. In short, both regions experienced a significant increase 
in inequality and polarization. 
 
2.5.3 Java Bali and Outside Java Bali Indices 
Table 2.11 presents the inequality and polarization measures of Java Bali and outside 
Java Bali, and Figure 2.14 graphs the evolution of these measures: 
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Table 2.11. Java Bali and Non-Java Bali Inequality and Polarization Indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Java Bali (left) and Non-Java Bali (right) Inequality and Polarization Indices 
Within Java Bali, trends of polarization and inequality are similar to national trends 
because Java Bali account for more than 60% of the national income. In addition, in most 
periods, polarization and inequality indices moved in similar directions. Only in two periods, 
between 2000 and 2001 and between 2008 and 2009, polarization and inequality indices moved 
in opposite directions. Furthermore, inequality showed the highest increase, whereas polarization 
represented by the FW index was the second highest. Between two inequality measures, the 
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JavaBali Other Islands 
Year GE(0) Gini FW DER Year GE(0) Gini FW DER
2000 0.170 0.322 0.122 0.187 2000 0.155 0.308 0.118 0.170
2001 0.165 0.319 0.127 0.193 2001 0.140 0.292 0.120 0.172
2002 0.213 0.361 0.142 0.212 2002 0.153 0.307 0.124 0.177
2003 0.173 0.325 0.129 0.191 2003 0.143 0.295 0.120 0.174
2004 0.188 0.338 0.134 0.195 2004 0.153 0.306 0.126 0.174
2005 0.246 0.387 0.156 0.216 2005 0.201 0.351 0.143 0.187
2006 0.208 0.358 0.146 0.203 2006 0.174 0.327 0.133 0.182
2007 0.179 0.334 0.141 0.194 2007 0.143 0.297 0.125 0.169
2008 0.237 0.378 0.155 0.197 2008 0.192 0.337 0.134 0.171
2009 0.205 0.356 0.145 0.203 2009 0.174 0.327 0.135 0.180
2010 0.229 0.374 0.156 0.217 2010 0.233 0.377 0.138 0.182
Growth 34.544 16.140 28.264 16.141 Growth 50.297 22.433 17.017 7.159
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GE(0) grew more rapidly than the Gini, whereas between two polarization indices, the FW grew 
much faster than the DER.  
In contrast, trends of polarization and inequality indices in non-Java-Bali regions are 
completely different than national trends or those in Java and Bali. For example, there were only 
two spikes in inequality indices, whereas there were three spikes for Java Bali. Furthermore, in 
some periods, polarization and inequality indices moved in different directions. For instance, 
between 2008 and 2009, polarization increased while inequality declined. This is probably due to 
a decline in within-group inequality of relevant income groups that the FW and the DER 
measures assumed. In terms of growth (changes), the GE(0) rose by 50%, representing 
remarkable growth. Unlike in Java Bali, the second highest growth was the Gini index in non-
Java Bali.  
Comparisons of inequality reveal that non-Java Bali experienced a more rapid increase 
than Java Bali. However, in terms of polarization, non-Java Bali experienced less rapid growth 
than Java Bali. In conclusion, both regions became more polarized and more unequal since 2000. 
However, trends of polarization and inequality indices in both regions differ. Whereas trends in 
Java Bali are similar to the national trends, those in non-Java Bali are very different. 
Additionally, inequality in non-Java Bali grew faster than in Java Bali, whereas polarization in 
non-Java Bali increased less rapidly than in Java Bali.  
 
2.5.4 Jakarta and Outside Jakarta Indices 
As the capital of Indonesia, Jakarta is a major metropolitan city where business activities, 
especially services, are concentrated. Jakarta generates nearly 18% of the Indonesian GDP. 
Because some of Jakarta’s inhabitants work in high-paying jobs or own firms, it is highly likely 
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that the income gap is relatively high compared to other provinces. Significant income inequality 
and urbanization are evident and may contribute to problems such as slump areas, floods, and 
high crime rates. Table 2.12 presents the inequality and polarization measures for Jakarta and 
outside Jakarta, and Figure 2.15 graphs these measures: 
Table 2.12. Jakarta and Non-Jakarta Inequality and Polarization Indices 
Jakarta Other Provinces 
Year GE(0) Gini FW DER Year GE(0) Gini FW DER 
2000 0.236 0.378 0.137 0.204 2000 0.146 0.300 0.116 0.172 
2001 0.158 0.314 0.129 0.192 2001 0.144 0.297 0.119 0.177 
2002 0.261 0.394 0.145 0.238 2002 0.161 0.315 0.125 0.182 
2003 0.166 0.313 0.118 0.198 2003 0.145 0.297 0.119 0.176 
2004 0.232 0.369 0.131 0.226 2004 0.151 0.304 0.125 0.176 
2005 0.274 0.407 0.143 0.233 2005 0.204 0.354 0.142 0.191 
2006 0.220 0.365 0.137 0.212 2006 0.173 0.326 0.133 0.184 
2007 0.148 0.299 0.116 0.182 2007 0.149 0.304 0.125 0.173 
2008 0.218 0.363 0.135 0.227 2008 0.200 0.346 0.137 0.175 
2009 0.195 0.346 0.142 0.198 2009 0.176 0.329 0.134 0.183 
2010 0.261 0.400 0.159 0.232 2010 0.203 0.353 0.139 0.188 
Growth 10.516 5.826 16.146 13.512 Growth 38.903 17.694 20.132 8.995 
Figure 2.15. Jakarta (left) and Non-Jakarta (right) Inequality and Polarization Indices 
Within Jakarta, polarization and inequality indices show high volatility and instability 
during the period of study. However, trends for all measures except the GE(0) tended to be 
similar. As shown, the trend of the GE(0) was very volatile compared to those of other indices. 
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Spikes were often followed by large drops. These radical changes were largely due to the fact 
that the GE(0) is highly sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the distribution. Furthermore, in 
terms of the direction of the indices, all inequality and polarization indices tended to agree in 
most periods. Nevertheless, between 2008 and 2009, the FW increased, whereas other indices 
declined. Moreover, unlike in the other regions discussed above, polarization increased more 
rapidly than inequality in Jakarta. The FW had the highest growth, and the DER showed the 
second highest growth.  
Within non-Jakarta regions, trends of polarization and inequality resemble the national 
trends. In most periods, polarization and inequality agreed in their directions. In some periods, 
however, polarization and inequality moved in opposite directions. Moreover, similar to the 
results for some regions discussed above, within non-Jakarta regions, the GE(0) showed the 
highest growth, and the FW experienced the second highest growth since 2000.  
Furthermore, inequality in non-Jakarta increased more rapidly than that in Jakarta since 
2000. However, the FW in non-Jakarta grew slightly faster than that in Jakarta, whereas the DER 
in non-Jakarta increased less rapidly than that in Jakarta.  
In sum, both Jakarta and other provinces became more polarized and more unequal since 
2000. Within Jakarta, the increase in polarization was much higher than the increase in 
inequality. In contrast, within non-Jakarta provinces, the GE(0) had the highest growth compared 
with other indices, and the second highest growth was the FW. Across regions, inequality in non-
Jakarta provinces rose more rapidly than that in Jakarta. However, the FW of non-Jakarta 
provinces was higher than that of Jakarta, whereas the DER of non-Jakarta provinces was less 
than that of Jakarta.  
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2.5.5 Natural Resource-Rich (NRR) and Non-Natural Resource-Rich (NNRR) Provinces 
Four provinces in Indonesia can be classified as natural resource-rich provinces: Aceh, 
Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua. This classification is based on high contributions of mining 
(e.g., oil, gas, and minerals) to the provinces’ GDP. Usually, the contribution of the mining 
sector to the regional GDP is more than 30% of the total GDP (see Appendix B.12). However, 
this high contribution of mining to the total output has declined over time. For example, Riau 
province’s share of mining to its GDP was 64.3% in 2000 but 48.68% in 2010.  
Table 2.13 presents the trends of the inequality and polarization measures for natural 
resource-rich provinces (NRR) and non-natural resource-rich provinces (NNRR), and Figure 
2.16 graphs these measures: 
Table 2.13. Natural Resource-Rich and Non-NRR Inequality and Polarization Indices 
Natural Resource-Rich Provinces Other Provinces 
Year GE(0) Gini FW DER Year GE(0) Gini FW DER 
2000 0.171 0.324 0.120 0.180 2000 0.162 0.315 0.118 0.177 
2001 0.183 0.329 0.125 0.169 2001 0.154 0.307 0.120 0.181 
2002 0.157 0.310 0.121 0.182 2002 0.194 0.344 0.129 0.194 
2003 0.169 0.320 0.133 0.173 2003 0.162 0.314 0.121 0.181 
2004 0.183 0.333 0.138 0.179 2004 0.176 0.326 0.126 0.182 
2005 0.223 0.367 0.153 0.183 2005 0.230 0.374 0.143 0.198 
2006 0.199 0.348 0.148 0.184 2006 0.195 0.346 0.134 0.189 
2007 0.172 0.323 0.139 0.168 2007 0.164 0.320 0.126 0.177 
2008 0.208 0.347 0.146 0.174 2008 0.217 0.361 0.136 0.180 
2009 0.190 0.340 0.150 0.183 2009 0.191 0.343 0.135 0.186 
2010 0.221 0.365 0.151 0.185 2010 0.230 0.375 0.141 0.194 
Growth 29.013 12.538 26.093 2.649 Growth 41.799 19.154 18.961 9.516 
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 Figure 2.16. Natural Resource-Rich (left) and Non NRR (right) Inequality and Polarization   
As in prior results shown above, regions with a large share of the national income tend to 
mimic the trends of the national polarization and inequality measures. As shown in the right 
panel of Figure 2.16, non-natural resource-rich provinces exhibited trends similar to the national 
trends. In most periods, polarization and inequality indices tended to move in similar directions. 
Nonetheless, in two periods, they moved in opposite directions. In terms of growth, the GE(0) 
showed the highest growth, and the FW showed the second highest growth. 
Within natural resource-rich (NRR) provinces, several features are apparent (Figure 2.14, 
left panel). First, compared to its value in 2000, the FW showed large changes and an upward 
trend. In most periods, the FW moved in the same directions as the other inequality measures, 
suggesting that an increase in between-group inequality or “increased spread” was the chief 
driver of the rising FW index. Nonetheless, in some periods, the FW moved in the opposite 
direction from other inequality indices, suggesting rising within-group inequality. Second, in 
some periods, the FW’s directions do not agree with those of the DER. For instance, between 
2000 and 2001, the FW increased while the DER declined substantially. Third, similar to those 
regions in non-NRR provinces, the GE(0) experienced the highest growth since 2000, and the 
FW showed the second highest growth. 
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Comparing polarization and inequality indices across regions shows that inequality 
within non-NRR provinces rose more rapidly than that within NRR provinces. In addition, the 
FW within non-NRR provinces increased less rapidly than that within NRR provinces. 
Nevertheless, the DER within non-NRR provinces rose more rapidly than that within NRR 
provinces since 2000. 
Based on the results above, we may conclude that within both regions, polarization and 
inequality rose substantially since 2000. More specifically, the gap between the rich and the poor 
significantly widened in the last decade. In addition, although inequality within the poor and the 
rich groups has been relatively stable, it sometimes declines and drives polarization up while 
inequality goes down. Across regions, inequality in the non-natural resource-rich provinces grew 
faster than that in the natural-resource-rich provinces. In addition, bipolarization in the non-
natural resource-rich provinces as measured by the FW rose less rapidly than that in the natural-
resource-rich regions. However, the DER within non-NRR provinces rose more rapidly than that 
within NRR provinces since 2000. 
 
2.5.6  Remarks on National and Regional Income Polarization and Inequality 
There is no doubt that Indonesia has experienced a period of relatively high economic 
growth in the last decade. This growth has been instrumental in reducing poverty in Indonesia. 
However, this growth may also be associated with worsening income distribution. As 
demonstrated in the exercise above, there are movements between and within income groups. 
Comparing polarization and inequality measures at the national and regional levels, we can see 
that polarization and inequality have risen significantly in the last decade, although we see some 
volatile movements in the period of study. We also find that within all regions except Jakarta, 
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inequality as indicated by the GE(0) grew more rapidly than polarization. 
As discussed, polarization and inequality are two different concepts. Indeed, in the 
exercise above, we see that in some periods, polarization and inequality move in opposite 
directions. Nevertheless, in analyzing polarization, one is likely to employ inequality terms such 
as between-group and within-group inequality because income polarization concerns interactions 
between income groups and within income groups in the distribution. In terms of the direction of 
polarization and inequality, we conclude the following: Given within-group inequality, when 
between-group inequality rises (declines), polarization and inequality move in the same 
direction. Conversely, given between-group inequality, when within-group inequality increases 
(declines), polarization and inequality do not agree in their directions. In the case of Indonesia, 
between-group inequality is likely to be the main driver of polarization. This finding is consistent 
with other studies and with a popular perception that the gap between the poor and the rich has 
been widening over time, or in the Foster-Wolfson term, an “increased spread” has occurred. 
However, polarization measures take into account not only between-group inequality but also 
within-group inequality. This is why in some periods, polarization measures were rising while 
inequality measures were declining. In other words, inequality measures are only one aspect of 
polarization measures.  
Therefore, in the case of Indonesia, compared with the DER index, the Foster Wolfson 
polarization index captures to a greater degree the main concern in Indonesia about the widening 
gap between the poor and the rich. The FW index also captures “increased bipolarity” or 
increased within-group inequality when inequality measures fail to capture this. More important, 
the key advantage of the Foster Wolfson index over the DER is that it is relatively easier to 
calculate and interpret than the DER given that the FW index requires readily available statistics, 
 106 
such as the mean, the median, and the Gini index.  
Another important observation is that whenever there was a price shock such as a fuel 
subsidy cut, polarization worsened considerably at either the national or regional level. Taking 
the results of the polarization estimations at face value, we observe dramatic changes in the value 
of all indices during price shocks due to drastic changes in the consumption patterns of the poor. 
As shown previously, the real expenditures of the poor either grew slightly (single digit 
percentage) or fell to some extent, whereas the expenditures of the rich surged substantially 
(double digit growth) during the price shock. This finding suggests that the poor responded to 
shocks by shifting their consumption patterns by, for example, reducing their consumption of 
meat and fruit. On the contrary, it seems that the rich were not affected at all by price shocks. 
They do not seem to change their consumption patterns to adjust to changing prices.  
Examining the regional levels, we notice that in some regions, polarization has worsened 
more rapidly than in other regions since 2000. These regions include eastern Indonesia, urban 
regions, Java Bali, non-Jakarta provinces, and natural resource-rich provinces. Although we do 
not suggest a causal link between polarization and conflict, it is in these regions that social 
conflicts occur frequently.  
 
2.6  Conclusion 
At the national and regional levels, polarization and inequality show volatile and very 
dynamic movements. However, one thing is clear: polarization and inequality have risen rapidly 
since 2000. This finding suggests that Indonesian society as a whole and regionally has become 
rapidly more polarized and more unequal in terms of consumption expenditures over time. 
According to several polarization and inequality indices, polarization and inequality move in the 
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same direction (or show a similar trend) most of the time. However, there are some periods in 
which polarization and inequality conflict in terms of their directions, suggesting that 
polarization and inequality indeed measure different features of the distribution. Based on this 
exercise, we conclude that the directions of polarization and inequality measures depend on 
which inequality component, between- or within-group inequality, changes the most. Given 
within-group inequality, when between-group inequality increases (decreases), polarization and 
inequality move in a similar direction. Conversely, given between-group inequality, when 
within-group inequality increases (decreases), polarization and inequality move in opposite 
directions. Furthermore, regions with a large share of total consumption expenditures tend to 
have trends in polarization and inequality that are similar to national trends. 
Two polarization measures are estimated in this study. The Foster Wolfson index 
represents a “bipolarization” measure, whereas the Duclos Esteban Ray index represents a “pure 
income polarization” measure. The FW index only considers two income groups, whereas the 
DER considers several income groups in the income distribution. In the case of Indonesia, the 
Foster Wolfson polarization index captures the public’s main concern in Indonesia about the 
widening gap between the poor and the rich (i.e., “increased spread”) to a greater degree than 
does the DER index, which emphasizes multiple income groups. The FW index also captures 
“increased bipolarity” or increased within-group inequality when inequality measures fail to 
capture this. More important, the key advantage of the Foster Wolfson index over the DER is 
that it is relatively easier to calculate and interpret because it requires readily available statistics, 
such as the mean, the median and the Gini index. These advantages might be useful for 
socializing policy makers to the idea of polarization.Nonetheless, a disadvantage of the Foster 
Wolfson index is that it requires the Gini index, which is an inequality measure. Wang and Tsui 
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(2000) identified this disadvantage and proposed a polarization index that is a generalization of 
the FW index and does not require any traditional inequality measures. We estimate the Wang 
and Tsui polarization index as well and find similar increasing trends at the national and regional 
levels. 
One possible explanation for why polarization has increased substantially over time is 
that the expenditures of the rich have risen much faster than those of the poor since 2000. Much 
of the expenditure growth for both groups has been driven by non-food expenditures. Fuel 
subsidy cuts occurred in 2002, 2005, and 2008 led to an increase in both groups’ expenditures in 
the goods and services category. During these high prices regimes, the rich still maintained their 
standard of living by consuming their regular food and non-food items, whereas the poor 
adjusted and decreased their consumption. As a consequence, the expenditure gap between the 
rich and the poor became larger over time, leading to an increase in polarization.  
We believe that based on our samples, despite issues with the implementation of anti-poverty 
programs, these programs may have contributed to improvements in the consumption of the poor 
when there was a price shock such as a fuel subsidy cut, although the magnitude of these effects 
was not as large as expected. It is likely that these transfers might assist the poor (and the non-
poor due to large leakages) in coping with rising prices, especially food prices, and reduce 
polarization temporarily. Fuel subsidy cuts saved the government’s budget from deteriorating; 
however, they clearly exacerbated polarization indicating that maintaining the government’s 
fiscal position was prioritized over improving socioeconomic conditions. 
Furthermore, an increasing trend of the FW index might be perceived as a disappearance 
of the middle class. Based on the FW index, polarization has increased since 2000 at the national 
level, suggesting that the middle class has declined. However, one popular perception is that 
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Indonesia has seen its middle class grow rapidly in the last decade, based on an absolute measure 
of the middle class (those who spend from $2 to $20 per day). This finding clearly does not agree 
with the notion of a disappearing middle class based on the FW polarization index. A rising 
middle class is likely to be viewed as an indicator of how successful a country’s government is in 
terms of economic development. Comparing these two measures, one can see that the absolute 
measure of the middle class indicates that most people are better off due to high economic 
growth (i.e., inclusive growth), whereas the FW version of the middle class shows the opposite 
(i.e., exclusive growth). The main point is that different measures lead to different results, and 
one measure may or may not agree with another measure. 
In this study, we also estimate polarization and inequality indices based on a different 
data set, that is, the SUSENAS Panel Consumption Module (SPCM). Unlike the SUSENAS Core 
(SC), the SPCM was conducted every three years prior to 2007, and the samples were smaller 
than the SC (approximately 10,000 households). However, the key advantage of the SPCM is 
that it provides a detailed breakdown of household expenditures. In addition, because the SPCM 
is a panel data set, one can observe consumption expenditure mobility or changes in the 
expenditures of certain households across time. Our results indicate that the trends of 
polarization estimated from either the SPCM or the SC differ only slightly. The trends move in 
opposite directions only between 2005 and 2007. Nevertheless, both data sets show that 
polarization has significantly increased over time. Interestingly, the trends of the inequality 
measures from these data sets are completely different. The inequality indices estimated from the 
SC are more volatile and erratic compared to those from the SPCM. Further studies are needed to 
verify these differences and seek the causes of the differences. 
An important caveat regarding the SUSENAS data set is that one should be very careful 
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with the quality and the reliability of the data, particularly when examining an income 
distribution in Indonesia. Several problems are as follows: First, total household expenditures 
from the SUSENAS are less than total household consumption in the national account, especially 
on non-food expenditures. As one study suggests, this issue leads to underestimation of 
consumption inequality. Second, the absence of the ultra-rich in the SUSENAS, due mostly to 
lack of access during the survey, results in underrepresentation of this group in the true 
distribution of income. Third, the CBS does not differentiate between purchased, home 
produced, and gifted food items. There is only one aggregate monetary value for each food item. 
Finally, variables and definitions continue to change over time, resulting in confusion if one 
examines changes over time.  
 Given the level and the trend of polarization, we believe that there are three important 
issues for further study: First, factors and mechanisms that directly and indirectly affect 
polarization are still unclear. Based on our casual observation, we argue that price shocks may 
lead to worsening polarization. However, formal approaches need to be explored to verify this 
link. Rising polarization can be regarded as an outcome of interactions among many factors in a 
complex and large system. Identifying these factors will be a crucial step and will be fruitful 
especially if one attempts to decrease polarization. Second, one may perceive polarization as one 
of many factors affecting other things. A close link between rising polarization and social unrest 
has been well documented in the literature. As stated in the introduction of this paper, it is the 
link between polarization and social unrest that motivates scholars to develop polarization 
indices. Nevertheless, empirical studies examining this link in Indonesia are almost nonexistent. 
In our next chapter, we explore the effect of polarization on economic growth. Our aim is to 
present empirical evidence to test our hypothesis that polarization indeed has a negative impact 
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on economic growth in Indonesia.   
 Assuming that rising polarization has short-term and long-term negative implications, we 
suggest that policy makers continuously monitor the degree and trends of polarization at the 
national and regional levels. Of course, attempts to decrease polarization will not be easy due to 
the complexity of Indonesia’s political and economic system. However, the Indonesian 
government needs to step up and lead these efforts with concrete and comprehensive action plans 
before rising polarization leads to significant social unrest or regional disintegration, both of 
which have occurred in Indonesia’s history. 
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No Name Year Type Formula  Group Based Country Application
Their comment: incorrect to use Gini since polarization different than inequality. Develop a class of generalized FW indices.
6
Chakravarty & 
Majumder
2001  bi‐polarization No  Rural & Urban India
Use Atkinson, Kolm, Sen ethical inequality index to develop polarization index that relates to the Wolfson polarization index
8
Montalvo & Reynal‐
Querol
2002 
2005a&b
social 
polarization
Yes Ethnicity in countries
Generalization of RQ index, Requires exogenous social‐group K that are assumed to be density functions (one for each population subgroup). Computed Religion polarization index.
Requires exogenous social‐group K. Social polarization measures for cardinal and categorical or ordinal data.
Chile
9 Permanyer 2008 social 
polarization
Yes 79 countries, the World Value 
Surveys
10 Permanyer & Ambrosio 2000 social 
polarization
Yes
Take into account only the size of groups,  not the feeling of alienation between them. No axiomatic approach. Focus on  ethnic pol.as explanatory variable of civil wars.
5
Tsang & Wui 2000  bi‐polarization No China
US, Canada, PWT, Argentina
Requires Gini index, Increased spread (the rich becoming rich & the poor becoming poorer) and increased bipolarity (the poles are more well‐defined) framework.
7
Kanbur & Zhang 2001 social 
polarization
Yes China,Russia
Derived from GE index decomposition, Requires exogenous social‐group K
4
Foster & Wolfson
Wolfson
1992
1994
 bi‐polarization No
2
Esteban, Gradin & Ray 1999 income 
polarization
No
Pure income polarization,continuous distribution allows for individuals not to be clustered around discrete income intervals, lets the area of identification influence be determined by non‐
parametric kernel techniques, avoiding arbitrary choices. α ϵ [.25,1]
3
1
Esteban & Ray 1991
1994
income 
polarization
No China, Russia
Income groups only,use natural logarithm of income,discrete.Identify number&the support interval of each disjoint income group,identification‐alienation framework. α ϵ (0,1.6]
OECD countries, Argentina,PWT, 
Latin America,Spain
Requires between‐group and within‐group Gini and the second term is corrected for error made in clustering distribution into groups, number of groups used is left to the researcher.
Duclos, Esteban, & Ray 2005 income 
polarization
No
Latin America, Argentina,Ivory 
Coast, 21 countries from LIS data
APPENDIX B 
 
B.1 Summary of Polarization Measures 
Table B.1 Summary of Polarization Measures 
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B.2 Gini and GE Index 
 
Gini Index 
The Gini index is the most widely used measure of inequality and is based on the Lorenz 
curve, a cumulative frequency curve that evaluates the distribution of income/expenditures with 
a uniform distribution that represents equality (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). The Gini index is 
one of the strongly Lorenz-consistent inequality measures, and it satisfies all of the following properties 
(Fields, 2001):  
 Anonymity holds because if we permute the income distribution, we obtain the same 
Lorenz curve and hence the same Gini coefficient. 
 Income homogeneity holds because if everyone’s income is multiplied by the same 
positive scalar multiple , the Lorenz curve is unchanged; therefore, the Gini coefficient 
is unchanged as well. 
 Population homogeneity holds because if we replicate the population an integral number 
of times, the new points will lie along the straight lines connecting the original points; 
therefore, the Lorenz curve will be the same, and the Gini coefficient will be unchanged. 
 Pigou-Dalton Transfer sensitivity holds because under this criterion, the transfer of 
income from rich to poor reduces measured inequality. 
The Gini index is easy to interpret and used very often empirically. However, its limitations are 
as follows (Haughton and Khandker, 2009):  
1. It is not decomposable or additive across groups. That is, the national Gini index is not 
equal to the sum of the Gini index of its subgroups. For instance, one might be able to 
calculate the eastern and western Indonesia’s Gini, but he or she could not determine how 
much each region contributes to the national Gini index. 
2. Statistical testability: one should be able to test for the significance of changes in the index 
over time. This problem, however, can be overcome by using bootstrap techniques.  
 
GE Index 
The generalized entropy (GE) inequality index is strongly-Lorenz-consistent and is an 
inequality measure that satisfies the same properties as the Gini index. The general formula for 
the GE measure is as follows: 
ܩܧሺߙሻ ൌ 1ߙሺߙ െ 1ሻ ൥
1
ܰ෍൬
ݕ௜
µ൰
ఈே
௜ୀଵ
െ 1൩ 
Where ݕ௜ is ith income, µ is the total sample mean, and α is the weight given to distances 
between incomes at different parts of the income distribution and can take any real value 
between zero and infinity. For lower values of α, the GE is more sensitive to changes in the 
lower tail of the distribution, and for higher values of α, the GE is more sensitive to changes that 
affect the upper tail. The most widely used values of α are 0,1, and 2. The formula for Theil’s T 
index or the GE(1) is as follows: 
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Theil’s L index is the GE(0) and is sometimes referred to as the mean log deviation measure: 
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B.3 Calculation of Deflator 
 
An important step in estimating polarization indices is converting nominal per capita 
expenditure to real per capita expenditure. In doing so, I use the CPI as the deflator instead of the 
regional GDP deflator. Following best practice in other countries, Indonesia’s Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS) changes the CPI’s base year every five years to capture the changing 
consumption patterns of Indonesia’s population. The CBS also adds more cities, which have 
different weights, to estimate the level of the national CPI and CPI’s changes over time. With 
1996 as the base year, the number of cities was 42, whereas in 2002, the number of cities was 45. 
The last base year was 2007 with 66 cities representing Indonesia. From 2000 to 2011, the 
number of provinces has increased from 30 to 33 due to decentralization. My data are per capita 
expenditures from 2000 to 2010, and I used 2002 as my base year. I also specify the number of 
provinces as 26, which is the number of provinces prior to decentralization (it was 27 in the 
Suharto era, but after the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia lost Timor Timur). The simple 
formula below shows how I deflate the per capita expenditures: 
Real per capita expenditure  =   nominal per capita expenditure in Rupiah   
                  CPI/100  
Steps to deflate per capita expenditures from 2000 to 2010 with 2002 as the base year: 
1. Calculate the yearly inflation of 42 cities in 2000 and 2001 based on the base year 
1996=100. 
2. Divide CPI=100 in 2002 by the yearly inflation in 2001 to obtain the CPI in 2001 based 
on the base year 2002. 
3. Divide the CPI in 2001 from number 2 by yearly inflation in 2001 to obtain the CPI in 
2000 based on the year 2002. For example, 
  
2000 2001 2002  2001 2002 
(CPI1996) 
2002 
Lhokseumawe 83.52 93.26 103.51 1.117 1.110 1 
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4. Divide the CPI in 2000 and 2001 by the CPI in 2002 to obtain the deflator for the years 
2000 and 2001 (in this case, 0.807 and 0.901). 
5. To obtain the deflator for the years 2003 through 2007, divide the CPI of 45 cities by 
100. 
6. Because 2007 is the new base year, I calculate yearly inflation from 2008 to 2010. 
7. To obtain the CPI from 2008 to 2010 that is based on the base year 2002, I multiply CPI 
in 2007 by yearly inflation (base year 2007=100). For example, 
Inflation year on year (percentage) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010   2008* 2009* 2010* 
Lhokseumawe 151.47 157.8 174.006 180.102 188.450   1.103 1.035 1.046 
 * Base year 2007 = 100 
 
8. Again, to obtain the deflator for the years 2008 to 2010, I divide the CPI in step 7 by 100. 
9. the data are CPI for cities in Indonesia, I average the deflators to provincial deflators. I do 
this for 45 cities (I exclude 21 additional cities for the CPI base year 2007) 
10.  I merge the deflator data with SUSENAS 2000 to 2010 and estimate the polarization 
indices. 
 
B.4 Wang Tsui Polarization Index 
 
Table B.4    Figure B.4 Wang Tsui Polarization 
 
 
B.5 Regional Polarization Based on Kanbur Zhang Index 
 
Using the ratio of between- and within-inequality components, which are estimated by 
decomposing the national GE index, Kanbur and Zhang (KZ) propose an alternative measure that 
captures social polarization in the exogenously given non-income groupings. Unlike income 
polarization measures that concern income groups, the KZ polarization measure emphasizes 
social groups such as regions, ethnicity, and religions. Before employing this measure, one needs 
  Wang Tsui 
2000 0.618 
2001 0.647 
2002 0.659 
2003 0.648 
2004 0.655 
2005 0.694 
2006 0.656 
2007 0.629 
2008 0.664 
2009 0.656 
2010 0.670 
Growth 8.37 
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B W B/W B W B/W B W B/W B W B/W B W B/W
2000 17.48 82.52 0.21 0.19 99.81 0.0019 0.08 99.92 0.0008 8.85 91.15 0.0971 1.38 98.62 0.0140
2001 20.15 79.85 0.25 0.35 99.65 0.0035 0.54 99.46 0.0055 7.69 92.31 0.0834 0.91 99.09 0.0092
2002 22.78 77.22 0.29 1.02 98.98 0.0103 1.74 98.26 0.0177 14.98 85.02 0.1762 0.82 99.18 0.0082
2003 19.95 80.05 0.25 0.90 99.10 0.0091 1.16 98.84 0.0117 10.75 89.25 0.1204 0.55 99.45 0.0056
2004 21.35 78.65 0.27 1.08 98.92 0.0109 1.56 98.44 0.0158 13.02 86.98 0.1496 0.54 99.46 0.0054
2005 22.15 77.85 0.28 1.01 98.99 0.0102 1.31 98.69 0.0133 10.60 89.40 0.1185 0.73 99.27 0.0074
2006 22.12 77.88 0.28 0.75 99.25 0.0075 0.95 99.05 0.0095 11.23 88.77 0.1265 0.59 99.41 0.0059
2007 21.25 78.75 0.27 0.90 99.10 0.0090 0.83 99.17 0.0084 10.49 89.51 0.1172 0.76 99.24 0.0076
2008 16.20 83.80 0.19 0.72 99.28 0.0073 0.07 99.93 0.0007 8.42 91.58 0.0919 1.02 98.98 0.0103
2009 17.98 82.02 0.22 0.38 99.62 0.0039 0.20 99.80 0.0020 8.42 91.58 0.0919 0.77 99.23 0.0078
2010 20.76 79.24 0.26 0.29 99.71 0.0029 0.29 99.71 0.0029 10.42 89.58 0.1163 0.27 99.73 0.0027
Growth (%) 15.81 -4.14 19.16 34.47 -0.10 34.53 72.52 -0.21 72.58 15.09 -1.76 16.55 -410.86 1.11 -416.61
Year
Urban-Rural West-East JavaBali-Other Islands Jakarta-Other Provinces NRR-NNRR Provinces
to specify the social groups. In this paper, the KZ polarization indices for regional and ethnic 
groupings are estimated and analyzed. The results of the KZ indices based on regional groupings 
are presented in Table B.5: 
 
Table B.5. GE(0) Inequality Decomposition and Kanbur Zhang Polarization Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several observations are evident based on Table B.5. First, in general, within-group 
inequality dominates income inequality in Indonesia regardless of the regional dimensions that 
we use. This is consistent with other studies that decompose Indonesia’s income inequality (see 
Akita 2003). A large share of the within-group inequality component in overall inequality simply 
suggests that there are high variations of income within each region considered. Depending on 
regional dimensions, the contribution of within-group inequality to national inequality is 
relatively high, between 77% and 99%. It is clear from Table B.5 that a high contribution of 
within-group inequality given between-group inequality leads to a low value in the polarization 
index because within-group inequality is the denominator in the KZ index. For instance, for the 
urban-rural dimension, the within-group inequality contribution to national inequality is between 
75% and 83%. In contrast, between-group inequality accounted for approximately 20% of 
national inequality. As a result, the polarization index is approximately 0.2. In contrast, the 
polarization index for the West-East measure is very low due to a higher percentage of within-
group inequality, approximately 99% of national inequality. This finding suggests that we are not 
able to compare the KZ index across different regional dimensions. However, we could say that 
the regional dimension in question has become more or less polarized since 2000. 
Second, regional polarizations vary in changes and direction and depend on which 
regional classification is used. Figure B.5 shows a comparison between the urban-rural and 
Jakarta-other provinces for the KZ indices. As shown, two indices have different trends, although 
in some periods, the trends are similar. For example, from 2000 to 2001, urban-rural polarization 
increased, whereas polarization in the Jakarta-other provinces declined slightly. However, 
between 2001 and 2004, polarization for both regional groupings showed similar trends: 
  
 
 
 
   
 117 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
'00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10
Urban‐Rural Jakarta‐Other Provinces
 
Figure B.5. Urban-rural and Jakarta-others Polarization and National Inequality 
 
Third, despite a higher contribution of within-group inequality to national inequality 
relative to between-group inequality, changes in between-group inequality drive changes in the 
KZ index for all regional dimensions considered. In other words, changes in between-group 
inequality are often greater than changes in within-group inequality for all regional dimensions. 
Meanwhile, the trends of within-group inequality for all regional dimensions are similar to those 
of national inequality. Most important, within-group inequality shows an increasing trend.  
Finally, comparing only two points in time, 2000 and 2010, we can see that all regional 
dimensions except the natural resource-rich province-other dimension increased substantially 
(see growth in Table 11).The Java Bali-others shows the largest increase since 2000, whereas the 
Jakarta-other province has the smallest growth in the polarization index. In short, almost all 
regional dimensions have become more polarized since 2000. 
To summarize, within-group inequality shows the largest contribution to income 
inequality in Indonesia regardless of the regional dimensions that we use. Nonetheless, in 
general, changes in between-group inequality drive changes in the polarization index. That is, 
changes in between-group inequality are often greater than changes in within-group inequality. 
As a result, trends of the polarization index are similar to those of between-group inequality. 
Furthermore, when one observes only two points in time, 2000 and 2010, polarization 
increased substantially for all regional dimensions except the natural resource-rich province-
others dimension, suggesting that almost all regional dimensions became more polarized since 
2000. 
 
B.6 Regional Polarization Based on Permanyer Index 
 
As discussed above, the Permanyer index is classified as a social polarization index. 
Permanyer developed this index as an extension of the Duclos, Esteban, and Ray income 
polarization index. Instead of income, Permanyer considers what he calls “radicalism degree,” 
which can be measured with his polarization index. Several alternative theorems/polarization 
indices were developed with an axiomatic approach. Like the DER index, the Permanyer index is 
“the sum of effective antagonism” and considers not only the feeling of alienation between an 
individual belonging to one group and an individual from another group but also alienation 
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between individuals within the same group. Although the Permanyer index is a social 
polarization index, we applied it to income distribution as if it were an income polarization index 
because we would like to compare the results with those of the Kanbur Zhang index:  
 
Table B.6 Permanyer Polarization Measures 
 
 
Table B.6 shows the results for the Permanyer index among regional dimensions. In 
general, polarization of the west-east, urban-rural, and Java Bali-others dimensions shows a 
declining trend. However, polarization of the Jakarta-others and natural resource-rich province-
others dimensions indicates an increasing trend. Almost all regional dimensions show a 
substantial drop between 2007 and 2008 and a significant rise from 2008 to 2009. This large fall 
and rise are likely due to between-group inequality or the alienation component movements as 
shown in Table B.6. 
Unlike the KZ index discussed above, the Permanyer index shows different patterns. 
Based on the components of the KZ index, the contribution of within-group inequality to overall 
inequality is larger than that of between-group inequality for all regional dimensions except the 
NRR-NNRR provinces. However, examining the components of the Permanyer index, one can 
see that the contribution of between-group polarization to overall polarization is much larger 
than that of within-group polarization for the west-east, urban-rural, and Java Bali-others 
dimensions. In addition, the trends of both components vary greatly for different regional 
dimensions.  
 
B.7 Ethnic Polarization 
 
In this section, we present the KZ ethnic polarization index and its components, as shown 
in Table B.7a below. Based on the available ethnicity data from the SUSENAS 2002-2005, we 
can see that polarization between ethnic groups dropped from 2002 to 2004. However, 
polarization increased slightly between 2004 and 2005. Compared to the national inequality and 
polarization measures, the KZ polarization index shows a completely different trend. Whereas 
B W Pol. B W Pol. B W Pol. B W Pol. B W Pol.
2000 0.379 0.093 0.472 0.259 0.149 0.408 0.337 0.091 0.428 0.066 0.313 0.379 0.068 0.310 0.378
2001 0.385 0.096 0.482 0.263 0.148 0.411 0.326 0.100 0.426 0.056 0.326 0.382 0.146 0.256 0.403
2002 0.396 0.092 0.488 0.235 0.175 0.410 0.330 0.102 0.432 0.075 0.334 0.409 0.115 0.302 0.417
2003 0.384 0.092 0.476 0.249 0.154 0.403 0.323 0.102 0.425 0.062 0.323 0.385 0.155 0.249 0.404
2004 0.382 0.093 0.475 0.247 0.151 0.398 0.308 0.111 0.419 0.063 0.323 0.387 0.169 0.233 0.403
2005 0.362 0.105 0.468 0.244 0.155 0.399 0.308 0.111 0.419 0.060 0.353 0.414 0.113 0.304 0.417
2006 0.369 0.103 0.471 0.243 0.158 0.401 0.291 0.125 0.415 0.057 0.341 0.397 0.160 0.249 0.409
2007 0.365 0.099 0.464 0.252 0.142 0.394 0.290 0.118 0.408 0.053 0.321 0.374 0.158 0.235 0.393
2008 0.326 0.103 0.429 0.225 0.143 0.368 0.258 0.120 0.378 0.048 0.325 0.373 0.146 0.238 0.384
2009 0.356 0.107 0.463 0.250 0.148 0.397 0.279 0.127 0.405 0.050 0.340 0.390 0.156 0.245 0.401
2010 0.356 0.092 0.448 0.249 0.149 0.398 0.270 0.134 0.404 0.047 0.353 0.400 0.151 0.253 0.405
Growth -6.121 -1.093 -5.131 -4.003 -0.234 -2.625 -19.949 47.349 -5.647 -28.968 12.782 5.511 123.408 -18.240 7.180
NRR-NNRR ProvincesYear Urban-Rural West-East JavaBali-Other Islands Jakarta-Other Provinces
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the national inequality and polarization measures showed an increasing trend since 2003, 
polarization across ethnic groups showed a downward trend between 2002 and 2004 before it 
increased from 2004 to 2005:  
 
Table B.7a The KZ index for Ethnic Polarization 
   Between Within KZ index 
2002 6.36  93.64  0.068 
2003 5.89  94.11  0.063 
2004 3.87  96.13  0.040 
2005 4.40  95.60  0.046 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.7 The KZ Ethnic Polarization Index, National Polarization and Inequality Indices (left), 
and Within- and Between-group Inequality of the KZ Index (right). 
 
Furthermore, similar to the results of the regional KZ index discussed above, the within-
group component of the KZ ethnic polarization index is the largest contributor to inequality. 
However, the polarization trend is similar to the within-group inequality trend, as shown in 
Figure B.7 in the right panel. For example, between 2002 and 2003, the index experienced a 
slight drop given that both between and within-group components declined. Nevertheless, from 
2003 and 2004, a decrease in polarization was caused by a decrease in between-group 
components and an increase in within-group components. Based on the results above, we may 
conclude that Indonesian society became ethnically less polarized from 2002 to 2005: 
 
Table B.7b Several Key Statistics of Ethnic Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pop. 
Share
Mean 
PCE
Income 
share
Gini Pop. 
Share
Mean 
PCE
Income 
share
Gini Pop. 
Share
Mean 
PCE
Income 
share
Gini Pop. 
Share
Mean 
PCE
Income 
share
Gini
Melayu 0.059 182,641 0.055 0.304 0.059 187,669 0.056 0.289 0.058 177,340 0.055 0.306 0.056 190,154 0.055 0.345
Javanese 0.437 189,378 0.425 0.341 0.431 189,567 0.418 0.311 0.433 184,157 0.430 0.329 0.440 191,226 0.429 0.364
Madurese 0.037 143,028 0.027 0.265 0.039 151,644 0.030 0.248 0.035 137,068 0.026 0.260 0.036 144,144 0.027 0.334
Dayak 0.012 164,227 0.010 0.284 0.011 180,679 0.010 0.285 0.011 162,385 0.010 0.292 0.013 166,652 0.011 0.307
Bugis/Makassar 0.040 171,171 0.035 0.302 0.039 181,035 0.036 0.281 0.040 167,617 0.037 0.307 0.041 171,456 0.035 0.351
Chinese 0.017 453,637 0.040 0.381 0.013 504,973 0.032 0.396 0.011 422,466 0.025 0.368 0.011 522,795 0.030 0.433
Others 0.389 196,402 0.392 0.338 0.409 199,458 0.417 0.309 0.411 187,866 0.417 0.321 0.402 201,624 0.413 0.377
2002 2003 2004 2005
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
2002 2003 2004 2005
Within Between
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Table B.7b presents several key statistics of ethnic groups. The Javanese ethnic group has 
the largest population share and generates more than 40% of Indonesia’s total income. In 
contrast, the income share of the Chinese ethnic group is only 4%, yet their average per capita 
expenditure is the highest among the ethnic groups. In addition, within the Chinese group, 
income inequality is quite high and shows a significant rise between 2002 and 2005. Therefore, 
not only did the income gap between the Chinese and other ethnic groups widen, but the income 
gap within the Chinese group was also remarkably high: 
 
B.8 Summary of Anti-Poverty Programs 
 
Table B.8 Summary of Anti-Poverty Programs 
No Program Name Information Target Coverage Period Evaluation 
1 
RASKIN 
(Beras 
untuk 
keluarga 
miskin) 
Subsidized 
rice for the 
poor 
Very poor, 
poor and 
near poor 
17.5 million 
households 1998 
Mistargeting, poor quality 
of rice in some places, 
and higher than set prices 
due to high 
administration & 
transportation costs in the 
distribution. (Hastuti et 
al, 2012) 
2 
BSM  
(Bantuan 
Siswa 
Miskin) 
Scholarship 
for poor 
students 
Primary and 
secondary 
students 
8 million 
students 2005 
 Poor socialization, 
insufficient funds to cover 
school expenses and 
unreliable time of 
disbursement are some 
issues with this program. 
3 
BOS 
(Bantuan 
Operasional 
Sekolah) 
School 
operational 
grants to 
primary and 
junior high 
schools.  
All schools 
with poor 
and non-poor 
students 
Around 38 
million 
students in 
2005  
Since 
mid-2005 
No evidence in improving 
access to schooling for 
the poor and in increasing 
enrolment rates 
Around 30 
million 
students in 
2006 
(Suharyo et al, 2006). 
Lack of understanding of 
the program guidelines 
leading to different 
interpetations among 
implementers on the 
ground.  
4 
BLT 
(Bantuan 
Langsung 
Tunai) 
Direct cash 
transfers: no 
strings 
attached cash 
transfers of 
around $10 
per month 
Very poor 
households 
15 million 
households 
in 2005 
One year 
in 2005; 
BLT led to social 
conflicts due to unclear 
and untransparent process 
in verification of 
beneficiaries.  
Seven 
months 
in 2008 
Lack of socialization, 
lack of coordination 
among central and local 
institutions, and large cut 
of total amount are some 
issues. (Rosfadhila et al 
2011) 
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Table B.8 Summary of Anti-Poverty Programs (continued) 
No Program Name Information Target Coverage Period Evaluation 
5 
PNPM 
(Program 
Nasional 
Pemberda
yaan 
Masyarak
at 
Mandiri) 
Block grants 
for 
subdistricts 
involving 
participation 
of community 
members  
Poor 
villages 
All 
subdistricts 
in 2009 
Since 
2002 
High economic returns and 
low costs of rural 
infrastructure projects (Alatas, 
2005; Torrens, 2005). 
Maintaining infrastructures 
periodically requires high-
skilled labor, which most 
villages do not have. 
6 
PKH 
(Program 
Keluarga 
Harapan) 
Cash 
transfers with 
specific 
education and 
health 
conditions 
Poor 
househo
lds 
Around 
7,000 
household 
in pilot 
project  Since 
2007 
One study shows that PKH led 
to an increase in visits to 
health centers, in monitoring 
of children’s development, 
and in immunizations, but 
there are insignificant impacts 
of the program on education 
indicators such as absence 
rates. 
Later PKH 
covers 1.5 
million 
households 
(BAPPENAS, 2009). Regions 
with lack of health centers and 
schools are excluded. 
7 
KUR 
(Kredit 
Usaha 
Rakyat) 
Non-
collateral 
microcredit  
Small 
and 
medium 
enterpri
se 
(SME) 
  Since 2007 
More middle-income than 
lower-income groups enjoyed 
the program.  
It is mostly used in trade 
sectors instead of in 
agriculture, in which most 
poor households work. 
8 
ASKESK
IN 
(Asuransi 
Kesehatan 
Miskin) 
Health 
insurance 
covering 
basic 
healthcare 
and hospital 
inpatients 
Poor 
househo
lds 
60 million 
households 
with budget 
of around 
US $400 
million in 
2005 
Since 
2005 
Lack of explanation of 
procedures to beneficiaries, of 
administrative procedures, and 
of responsibilities of 
healthcare providers (Bachtiar 
et al. 2006). 
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B.9 Comparison of Polarization and Inequality Indices from SPCM and SUSENAS Core 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.9 Comparison of Polarization and Inequality Indices from SPCM and SUSENAS Core 
 
 
B.10 Other Polarization Measures 
 
Table B.10a Gradin Esteban Ray Polarization Index 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
urban 0.070 0.070 0.077 0.071 0.073 0.084 0.080 0.071 0.082 0.078 0.085 
rural 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.059 0.067 0.064 0.059 0.071 0.066 0.067 
west 0.067 0.068 0.075 0.070 0.073 0.080 0.076 0.069 0.078 0.075 0.079 
east 0.067 0.070 0.070 0.067 0.069 0.082 0.086 0.076 0.088 0.085 0.091 
javabali 0.070 0.072 0.082 0.074 0.077 0.088 0.081 0.076 0.086 0.080 0.087 
nonjavabali 0.065 0.067 0.069 0.067 0.069 0.078 0.077 0.069 0.080 0.077 0.081 
jakarta 0.078 0.072 0.091 0.073 0.085 0.091 0.084 0.069 0.081 0.079 0.092 
nonjakarta 0.065 0.067 0.070 0.067 0.069 0.079 0.077 0.070 0.080 0.077 0.081 
provnrr 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.072 0.075 0.082 0.079 0.073 0.080 0.079 0.081 
nonprovnrr 0.067 0.072 0.075 0.069 0.072 0.081 0.079 0.072 0.082 0.078 0.084 
  
 
0.080
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Table B.10b Reynal Querol Polarization Index 
 Urban-Rural West-East JavaBali-others Jakarta-others Provnrr-others 
2000 0.969 0.460 0.911 0.969 0.134 
2001 0.985 0.497 0.939 0.985 0.177 
2002 0.993 0.455 0.934 0.993 0.157 
2003 0.975 0.495 0.952 0.975 0.248 
2004 0.982 0.499 0.954 0.982 0.257 
2005 0.986 0.500 0.943 0.986 0.185 
2006 0.985 0.487 0.956 0.985 0.253 
2007 0.986 0.484 0.956 0.986 0.258 
2008 0.999 0.490 0.961 0.999 0.264 
2009 0.999 0.491 0.963 0.999 0.267 
2010 1.000 0.502 0.964 1.000 0.287 
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B.11 Foster Wolfson Decomposition by Region 
 
Table B.11 Foster Wolfson Decomposition 
 
Gini east west urban rural otherwise jakarta otherwise JavaBali otherwise provnrr
2000 0.317 0.317 0.334 0.252 0.300 0.378 0.308 0.322 0.315 0.324
2001 0.318 0.308 0.318 0.240 0.297 0.314 0.292 0.319 0.307 0.329
2002 0.319 0.346 0.354 0.250 0.315 0.394 0.307 0.361 0.344 0.310
2003 0.298 0.317 0.325 0.245 0.297 0.313 0.295 0.325 0.314 0.320
2004 0.312 0.329 0.333 0.252 0.304 0.369 0.306 0.338 0.326 0.333
2005 0.365 0.376 0.384 0.283 0.354 0.407 0.351 0.387 0.374 0.367
2006 0.344 0.347 0.352 0.265 0.326 0.365 0.327 0.358 0.346 0.348
2007 0.321 0.320 0.323 0.250 0.304 0.299 0.297 0.334 0.320 0.323
2008 0.354 0.362 0.368 0.289 0.346 0.363 0.337 0.378 0.361 0.347
2009 0.346 0.344 0.350 0.270 0.329 0.346 0.327 0.356 0.343 0.340
2010 0.377 0.374 0.382 0.275 0.353 0.400 0.377 0.374 0.375 0.365
Mean east west urban rural otherwise jakarta otherwise JavaBali otherwise provnrr
2000 143,225 154,289 197,235 121,691 145,978 313,037 149,461 154,638 150,647 213,554
2001 148,929 163,789 207,705 125,560 154,912 303,148 153,102 166,781 159,580 203,681
2002 164,562 199,346 257,675 141,866 180,847 486,588 174,285 206,893 192,321 252,732
2003 170,703 199,756 254,621 152,557 185,862 429,558 180,685 205,102 193,229 228,195
2004 158,806 189,886 244,148 140,578 174,395 446,935 168,439 196,283 183,017 216,709
2005 165,283 201,620 267,131 140,486 184,152 480,105 177,076 208,122 193,491 251,082
2006 184,016 215,652 281,847 155,995 198,923 496,254 195,388 221,471 208,273 250,904
2007 183,441 215,279 274,243 160,930 200,263 457,685 197,243 219,669 207,748 251,821
2008 228,691 269,370 335,067 196,333 250,145 591,943 257,946 267,323 258,334 331,911
2009 236,505 264,391 330,199 194,657 248,178 561,521 251,638 266,317 256,208 314,491
2010 283,404 314,438 402,530 215,846 290,846 744,450 283,404 314,438 306,586 348,777
Median east west urban rural otherwise jakarta otherwise JavaBali otherwise provnrr
2000 116,238 123,721 155,379 106,676 120,144 226,930 122,925 122,664 121,353 170,308
2001 121,043 131,560 168,425 111,425 127,173 238,939 127,958 131,489 128,793 166,146
2002 132,281 151,611 198,058 123,904 144,744 343,121 142,773 153,017 146,700 206,369
2003 141,509 159,886 205,359 135,015 153,709 342,638 150,691 161,772 155,496 187,389
2004 130,641 149,542 194,581 124,094 143,330 328,040 139,081 152,230 145,142 173,943
2005 124,957 147,498 196,664 118,969 140,270 333,097 136,964 148,797 142,083 193,454
2006 143,330 164,241 218,398 134,445 157,287 370,742 155,276 165,551 159,256 198,334
2007 148,744 171,094 222,493 141,512 163,971 388,186 165,259 170,030 165,641 209,284
2008 182,690 207,294 265,419 173,440 198,468 423,396 210,442 198,446 199,315 276,327
2009 184,762 202,947 255,514 166,404 195,732 434,449 201,936 199,477 197,127 254,673
2010 210,494 230,005 296,334 183,876 221,058 514,085 226,563 227,804 224,223 272,197
T east west urban rural otherwise jakarta otherwise JavaBali otherwise provnrr
2000 0.417 0.412 0.432 0.340 0.396 0.477 0.405 0.419 0.410 0.420
2001 0.423 0.405 0.418 0.329 0.395 0.415 0.393 0.419 0.404 0.432
2002 0.420 0.446 0.458 0.338 0.415 0.496 0.409 0.466 0.443 0.408
2003 0.398 0.416 0.428 0.334 0.396 0.407 0.396 0.427 0.411 0.429
2004 0.418 0.430 0.435 0.343 0.406 0.465 0.409 0.442 0.426 0.444
2005 0.475 0.482 0.496 0.383 0.461 0.506 0.461 0.498 0.480 0.485
2006 0.454 0.450 0.462 0.360 0.431 0.467 0.433 0.467 0.449 0.465
2007 0.429 0.421 0.429 0.344 0.407 0.397 0.402 0.444 0.420 0.438
2008 0.467 0.468 0.478 0.392 0.455 0.460 0.447 0.493 0.466 0.469
2009 0.460 0.447 0.459 0.368 0.435 0.456 0.435 0.465 0.447 0.461
2010 0.487 0.477 0.491 0.374 0.459 0.509 0.487 0.487 0.478 0.483
FW Pol. east west urban rural otherwise jakarta otherwise JavaBali otherwise provnrr
2000 0.123 0.118 0.124 0.100 0.116 0.137 0.118 0.122 0.118 0.120
2001 0.130 0.120 0.124 0.100 0.119 0.129 0.120 0.127 0.120 0.125
2002 0.126 0.131 0.135 0.101 0.125 0.145 0.124 0.142 0.129 0.121
2003 0.121 0.124 0.127 0.101 0.119 0.118 0.120 0.129 0.121 0.133
2004 0.129 0.128 0.128 0.103 0.125 0.131 0.126 0.134 0.126 0.138
2005 0.145 0.145 0.152 0.119 0.142 0.143 0.143 0.156 0.143 0.153
2006 0.141 0.135 0.142 0.111 0.133 0.137 0.133 0.146 0.134 0.148
2007 0.133 0.127 0.131 0.107 0.125 0.116 0.125 0.141 0.126 0.139
2008 0.141 0.137 0.139 0.116 0.137 0.135 0.134 0.155 0.136 0.146
2009 0.145 0.135 0.141 0.114 0.134 0.142 0.135 0.145 0.135 0.150
2010 0.148 0.141 0.147 0.116 0.139 0.159 0.138 0.156 0.141 0.151
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B.12 Contribution of mining and quarrying sector in total regional GDP  
 
Table B.12 Contribution of mining and quarrying sector in total regional GDP 
 
*Red boxes indicate provinces considered as natural resource-rich provinces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Code Province Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
11 Aceh 30.95 24.99 34.72 36.14 30.38 26.15 25.09 20.27 15.57 8.68 7.89
12 Sumatera Utara 1.90 1.60 1.52 1.43 1.21 1.22 1.20 1.23 1.23 1.19 1.18
13 Sumatera Barat 3.82 3.66 3.56 3.42 3.35 3.26 3.17 3.13 3.09 3.10 3.10
14 Riau 64.30 61.83 60.49 58.63 56.28 55.38 54.20 52.34 51.49 49.99 48.68
15 Jambi 64.30 61.83 60.49 58.63 13.15 12.59 11.02 11.31 12.10 11.52 12.29
16 Sumatera Selatan 31.49 31.30 30.31 29.22 28.04 26.86 25.62 24.27 23.45 22.89 21.97
17 Bengkulu 3.33 3.15 3.13 3.10 3.14 3.18 3.20 3.52 3.48 4.69 3.81
18 Lampung 2.60 2.54 4.12 4.23 3.62 3.05 2.76 2.52 2.36 2.04 1.86
19 Kepulauan Bangka Belitung13.33 13.05 14.07 19.87 18.66 17.32 16.61 15.86 15.04 14.72 14.15
21 Kepulauan Riau 20.17 13.68 9.56 8.24 7.40 6.92 6.59 6.11 5.57 5.44 5.13
31 DKI Jakarta 0.57 0.53 0.49 0.40 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24
32 Jawa Barat 4.63 4.23 3.81 3.75 3.35 2.94 2.71 2.44 2.35 2.45 2.32
33 Jawa Tengah 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.02 1.11 1.12 1.10 1.11 1.12
34 DI. Yogyakarta 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.69 0.67
35 Jawa Timur 2.06 2.04 2.02 1.97 1.90 1.96 2.01 2.09 2.17 2.21 2.27
36 Banten 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
51 Bali 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.65
52 Nusa Tenggara Barat 26.35 29.55 29.54 28.51 29.26 27.67 26.15 25.61 22.65 26.00 27.32
53 Nusa Tenggara Timur 1.55 1.50 1.47 1.44 1.38 1.37 1.33 1.31 1.30 1.29 1.29
61 Kalimantan Barat 1.30 1.30 1.28 1.25 1.22 1.21 1.20 1.34 1.65 1.71 1.76
62 Kalimantan Tengah 6.49 6.25 4.83 3.09 3.91 6.45 8.17 8.68 8.73 9.22 9.68
63 Kalimantan Selatan 20.72 21.02 21.57 21.56 21.00 21.61 22.12 21.92 22.15 21.80 22.21
64 Kalimantan Timur 34.78 35.30 37.34 37.79 37.61 38.14 38.60 38.95 39.27 40.11 41.47
71 Sulawesi Utara 7.43 7.29 6.70 5.97 5.52 5.20 5.16 5.27 5.36 5.24 5.05
72 Sulawesi Tengah 1.99 1.94 1.89 1.84 1.78 2.08 2.59 3.30 3.76 3.50 3.43
73 Sulawesi Selatan 9.99 10.05 9.28 9.78 10.14 10.02 10.01 10.06 9.06 8.14 8.77
74 Sulawesi Tenggara 3.96 3.56 4.29 6.03 5.65 5.72 5.01 5.75 5.19 5.11 5.81
75 Gorontalo 0.76 0.83 0.88 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.98 1.02 1.04 1.11 1.14
76 Sulawesi Barat 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.54 0.63 0.91 1.02 0.93
81 Maluku 0.79 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.73
82 Maluku Utara 5.24 5.24 5.16 5.04 4.91 4.77 4.72 4.93 4.79 4.17 4.16
91 Papua Barat 25.53 23.48 22.67 22.03 21.04 20.75 19.49 18.32 17.20 16.05 12.55
94 Papua 68.17 69.29 68.40 66.21 54.48 64.61 53.51 51.58 45.29 49.47 41.89
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CHAPTER 3 
IS INCOME POLARIZATION HARMFUL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Economists have long examined the link between economic growth and income 
inequality. Theoretical and empirical studies continue to increase. However, empirical studies 
show mixed results. Most studies confirm that income inequality does have a negative effect on 
economic growth, whereas other studies find a positive association. Various estimation methods, 
different periods of data (i.e., short and long term), and various units of analysis (i.e., countries, 
states, provinces) are employed, and results vary.   
In contrast, the relationship between economic growth and income polarization has not 
been explored extensively. Many studies tend to focus on the differences between inequality and 
polarization and attempt to show that both inequality and polarization are two different concepts. 
Only a few studies use income/non-income polarization as an explanatory variable. For example, 
one study directly tests the effect of ethnic polarization on civil wars (Montalvo, 2002). Another 
study uses the reduced form of growth model to test the negative effect of income polarization on 
growth and finds a significant relationship between these two variables (Ezcurra, 2009).  
Indonesia has enjoyed rapid economic growth in the last few years. However, differences 
in growth are quite substantial across Indonesia. Why do some regions in Indonesia have good 
performance (i.e., high growth), whereas others persistently show poor performance? Is income 
polarization harmful for growth? Do institutions affect growth and polarization? This study will 
attempt to answer these questions. We are aware that this is not an easy task given that there are 
many factors that might explain differences in growth. To complicate the matter, growth may 
sometimes have possible effects on those explanatory variables. Despite this issue, the current 
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literature on growth provides a guideline and a starting point. To my knowledge, no studies have 
examined the relationship between income polarization and growth in Indonesia. Therefore, this 
paper will contribute to the literature by examining closely the link between regional income 
polarization and economic growth in Indonesia.  
The paper is organized as follows: The following section will review studies on growth, 
inequality, and polarization. The third section will discuss the data used. The fourth section will 
discuss regional growth and polarization patterns. The fifth section will explain the estimation 
strategy employed. The sixth section will discuss the empirical results, and the seventh section 
will present a discussion on growth, polarization, and institutions. Finally, the last section will 
conclude.  
 
3.2 Economic Growth, Income Inequality, and Income Polarization 
Endogenous growth models are discussed very often in the literature, and many primary 
explanatory variables such as savings rates, preferences, and human capital are proposed to 
explain variations in economic outcomes across countries. However, in this section, we will limit 
our discussion by reviewing only studies that discuss the link between economic growth and 
income inequality. The second part will review studies that examine the relationship between 
economic growth and income polarization. 
 
3.2.1  Economic Growth and Income Inequality 
In the1990s and early 2000s, empirical studies that tested the relationship between 
economic growth and income inequality grew exponentially (i.e., the effect of income inequality 
on economic growth). Most studies using largely different data and various estimation 
techniques found that highly unequal income distributions had a harmful effect on growth (see 
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Barro 1991, 2000, Alesina & Rodrik, 1994, Persson & Tabellini, 1994). In addition, most studies 
observed a negative association between economic growth and income inequality across 
countries over a long period of time. Generally, economic growth was estimated using average 
per capita growth rates, whereas the Gini index was often used to estimate a country’s inequality 
in income distribution. Control variables included, for example, level of democracy, human 
capital (e.g., primary-school enrollment, secondary-school enrollment), demographic variables 
such as total fertility rates and mortality rates, and regional dummy variables such as Africa and 
Latin America. However, several studies showed opposing results, revealing a positive link 
between growth and inequality (see Li and Zou, 1998, Forbes, 2000, and Deininger and Olinto, 
2000). According to Knowles (2005), studies that found a positive relationship emphasized short 
periods of time (e.g., five years), whereas those that observed a negative link employed data 
spanning long periods of time (e.g., ten years or more). Therefore, theoretical and empirical 
evidence thus far shows inconclusive results regarding the relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth. 
Figure 3.1 shows several plausible mechanisms both from inequality to growth and from 
polarization to growth. We will first discuss the former mechanism (i.e., inequality to growth). 
Barro (2000) classifies into four broad categories several possible mechanisms explaining the 
relationship between inequality and economic growth: 1.Credit-market imperfections, 2. Political 
economy, 3. Sociopolitical unrest, and 4. Savings rates. A brief discussion of these categories 
follows. 
 First, according to credit market imperfection theories, access to credit is limited and 
depends on level of income and on ownership of assets that can be used as collateral. If 
individuals’ access to credit markets affects physical and human capital investment, then the 
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distribution of assets and income will determine the number of people who will make such 
investments. In countries/regions with more unequal distributions of asset and income, fewer 
individuals will make such investments, resulting in lower physical and human capital levels. As 
a consequence, growth declines. 
Second, political economy theories suggest that in countries/regions with unequal income 
distributions, median voters demand more redistribution of incomes through higher income taxes 
for the rich. Because higher income taxes are often assumed to have distortionary effects on an 
economy, investments are likely to decrease. As a result, growth declines (Knowles 2005).  
The third argument is that inequality may cause sociopolitical instability. The negative 
effect of this instability is a decline in investment and, thus, lower growth. Finally, the last 
argument is that the level of savings rates will affect growth. Given that generally, savings rates 
increase with the level of income, an increase in inequality tends to raise investments, which in 
turn enhances growth. Note that this argument assumes that domestic investment depends on 
national savings (i.e., more saving equals more investment), and the economy is partly closed. 
Furthermore, Nissanke and Thorbecke (2008) suggest that sociopolitical instability, disruptive 
rent-seeking behaviors, and high transaction costs are various conditions through which higher 
inequality lowers growth.  
Keefer and Knack (2002) provide a slightly different mechanism. They argue that higher 
polarization (or inequality - they use these terms interchangeably) leads to a less stable policy 
environment in which there is increasing future risk of deviating from current government 
policies. They test this claim by determining the effect of polarization, proxied by income Gini 
and land Gini, on institutions, proxied by security of property rights index across countries.  
Given that in highly polarized societies, there is increasing uncertainty (i.e., risk of less 
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protection of property rights), the responses of economic agents to this uncertainty are to reduce 
the scope of their economic activities, to organize their businesses to reduce risk exposure, and to 
invest in firms with less risk. As a result, these reactions lead to a lower rate of growth. The 
researchers’ empirical results show that income inequality, land inequality, and ethnic tensions 
(all are proxies for polarization) have an inverse relationship with property right security. 
Moreover, the addition of the property right security index in the growth regressions leads to a 
considerable decrease in the inequality coefficient. This result indicates that polarization 
negatively affects growth because it causes a less secure policy environment in the economy. 
Li and Zou (1998) report a possible positive correlation between inequality and growth in 
their theoretical and empirical models. They argue that government revenues from income 
taxation are used for not only production but also for public goods. In countries in which 
inequality is low, governments may impose a higher tax rate, and because higher tax is assumed 
to be a distortion in an economy, growth is lower. Other studies also observe this positive 
association between inequality and growth. Forbes (2000) observes that an increase in a 
country’s income inequality is positively associated with subsequent growth in the short and 
medium run. Both Li and Zou and Forbes use panel data structures in their analysis, but they use 
different estimators, namely, a fixed effect and random effect versus the Arrelano and Bond 
fixed-effect estimator. In sum, the relationship between inequality and growth is complex and 
ambiguous. This complex relationship can show either a positive or a negative association 
depending on many factors, such as estimation techniques, data quality, and period length.                                    
 Some studies in the literature on growth and inequality suggest that growth may have an 
effect on income inequality. In his seminal paper, Kuznet (1963) used data from three developed 
countries (USA, Germany, and Britain) and showed an inverted U-shaped relation between 
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income inequality and GNP per capita. This so-called Kuznet hypothesis argues that due to 
urbanization and industrialization in the early stages of development, income inequality should 
increase but should decrease in later stages due to a higher share of the rural labor force working 
in industries.  
In chapter three of his book, “Distribution and Development: A New Look at the 
Developing World,” Fields (2001) provides a great literature survey on the link between 
economic growth and income inequality. He asserts that most early studies confirmed the Kuznet 
hypothesis because of “the particular economic method used (ordinary least squares) and because 
the highest inequality countries are all middle-income Latin American ones” (p.63). When one 
takes into account changes in individual countries over time, the Kuznet hypothesis is likely to 
be rejected. For instance, using the fixed-effect approach, Fields and Jakubson (1994) find a U-
shaped instead of an inverted U-shaped curve across countries and across periods. They compare 
their results using OLS and their results using the fixed-effect technique. Their OLS results 
indicate a statistically significant inverted U-shaped curve, whereas their fixed-effect results 
show a statistically significant U curve. They argue that the striking difference between the two 
results from different estimation procedures occurs because “what is going on within countries is 
different from what is going on across countries” (p.43). Fields (2001) argues that “It is not the 
rate of economic growth or the stage of economic development that determines whether 
inequality increases or decreases” (p.69). Rather, policy choices and structural factors such as the 
basic nature of the economic system (e.g., socialist vs. non-socialist), the output structure (e.g., 
agriculture vs. non-agriculture), and regional patterns (e.g., Latin America vs. non Latin 
America) partly determine changes in inequality. In other words, it is not growth per se but what 
a country does that determines changes in inequality. 
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3.2.2 Economic Growth and Income Polarization 
Unlike studies examining the relation between inequality and growth, studies on the 
relation between polarization and growth are very limited, but there have been several attempts 
to explore the link. For India, Motiram and Sarma (2011) observe a positive link between 
polarization and growth. Examining a scatter plot of changes in polarization and growth, they 
conclude that states with higher growth rates are also those with higher increases in polarization. 
However, the researchers advise “caution in interpreting this as a casual linkage” (Motiram and 
Sarma, 2011, p.26). They also find a positive correlation between changes in inequality and 
growth.  
Furthermore, Ezcurra (2009) finds that high initial income polarization is associated with 
low subsequent growth in the European Union (EU). Different numbers of income groups used 
in the Esteban, Gradin, and Ray polarization index do not change this negative link. This 
negative association is quite robust to various model specifications that include control variables 
such as initial GDP per capita, human capital, sectoral employment, population density, and 
market potential. An important difference between Motiram and Sarma (2011) and Ezcurra 
(2009) is that the former study examines the relation between changes in polarization and 
growth, whereas the latter, following studies in inequality and growth, observes a link between 
initial polarization level and long-term economic growth.  
Most studies about income inequality and growth use the Gini index to measure 
disparities in distribution of income. As one of the traditional inequality measures, the Gini index 
captures the gap between the rich and the poor in a region. However, it does not consider other 
features of distribution such as polarization. Traditional inequality measures do not take into 
account “clustering” or the concentration of income around an average or around two or more 
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well-defined poles in a distribution, which is exactly what polarization is. In some cases, 
polarization is likely to be more relevant than inequality in affecting growth. Consider, for 
example, a situation in which there are two income groups above the median and two groups 
below the median. Suppose that those two groups become only one group above the median and 
one group below the median. Clearly, inequality has decreased, but polarization has increased.  
This study draws heavily from previous studies of inequality and growth, which means 
that the theoretical arguments explaining the link between polarization and growth might be very 
similar to those arguments explaining the link between inequality and growth. In this study, we 
test the following mechanism from polarization to growth: High polarization in an economy 
might affect sociopolitical stability given that a highly polarized society is prone to social unrest, 
which in turn will not only lower investment but also disrupt economic activities. As a result, 
growth is lower. Note that this mechanism is similar to that of the second argument about 
inequality and growth, discussed above. In this paper, we will test this path from polarization to 
growth, as shown in Figure 3.1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Polarization, Inequality, and Growth Mechanisms 
 
In addition, empirically, model specifications are also similar to those in the growth 
literature. Although most studies examine the inequality-growth nexus across countries, this 
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study observes the polarization-growth relationship across provinces in Indonesia. For Indonesia, 
we believe that income polarization is currently more relevant than income inequality because 
polarization captures not only a widening gap between the rich and the poor but also a 
concentration of income within those groups, especially within the rich group. 
 
3.3 Data  
For this study, three data types are used. First, per capita gross domestic regional product 
(GDRP) data are obtained from the Directorate of National and Regional Balance at the Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS). In this study, growth as a dependent variable is a five-year average of 
the GDRP per capita at the province level. The second type of data is the SUSENAS Core, which 
is a national household survey conducted every year, with more than 200,000 observations prior 
to 2010. Our variable of interest, the Foster-Wolfson polarization index, and most of the 
independent variables employed in this study are estimated from the SUSENAS Core. Third, 
employment shares in the formal sector are calculated from the SAKERNAS, an annual 
household survey designed to collect information about the labor force in Indonesia. 
As mentioned, the primary goal of this paper is to analyze the relationship between 
polarization and economic growth. The unit of analysis in this study is the province. The reasons 
for choosing the province instead of smaller jurisdictions are as follows: First, the provincial data 
are arguably smoother than district data. That is, compared with district data, the provincial data 
are likely to consist of less extreme values that severely affect estimations. For this reason, more 
studies of Indonesia utilize provincial rather than district data. However, the trade-off is that the 
statistical power of provincial data is significantly less than that of district data. For example, the 
number of provinces in Indonesia used in the paper is 26, whereas there are more than 400 
districts in Indonesia. One caveat is that aggregating data to the provincial level is not necessarily 
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an advantage because we are likely to lose a great deal of information. 
Second, official figures, such as unemployment and job opportunities, are estimated from 
the SAKERNAS. The data are representative only at the province level, meaning that if we 
estimate labor force-related variables below the provincial level, those variables do not represent 
the population in that region. As a consequence, estimations are less accurate. Therefore, we 
estimate our provincial employment share variables from the SAKERNAS. 
In the following section, we will discuss more specifically the variables included in the 
model. The Gross Domestic Regional Product (GRDP) can be calculated with three approaches. 
The first is the production approach in which GRDP is simply the value of final goods and 
services produced in the economy during a given period. Another definition of the GRDP 
according to the production approach is that the GRDP is the sum of value added to the economy 
during a given period. Value added is calculated by subtracting the value of intermediate goods 
from the value of a firm’s production. The second approach uses expenditures. The GRDP is the 
sum of domestic consumption (C), investment (I), the government’s expenditures (G), and the 
differences between exports and imports (X-M). In this study, we use two components of the 
GRDP estimated with the expenditure approach: the government’s consumption and investment. 
Both variables are in the form of a ratio of the total GRDP per province. Finally, the last method 
is the income approach in which the GRDP is the sum of the total income generated in the 
economy, such as rents, profits, wages, and interest. Our dependent variable is the growth of per 
capita GRDP, which is the ratio between the provincial GRDP and its total population. We use 
real GRDP with 2000 constant prices in which the nominal GRDP is divided by the GDP 
deflator to make the GRDP comparable across time. 
Our control variables include employment shares in agriculture and the mining sector. 
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These variables indicate the ratio of the number of people working in a certain sector to the total 
number of workers in all sectors. Nine sectors considered in this study include the following: 
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing 
2. Mining and Quarrying 
3. Manufacturing 
4. Electricity, Gas, and Water 
5. Construction 
6. Wholesale, Retail, Restaurants, and Hotels 
7. Transportation, Warehousing, and Communication 
8. Finance, Insurance, Rental Enterprises Building, Land, and Business Services 
9. Social Service, Social and Individual 
In defining a workforce, the CBS divides the population into two groups: 1. The 
population group below 15 years of age, which is considered a non-productive group, 2. The 
population group above 15 years of age, which is considered a productive group. According to 
the CBS, a person is considered working if he or she is above 15 years old, currently works, has 
a job but is currently not working, or does not have a job but is looking for one. Conversely, 
those above 15 years old who are not considered part of the workforce are those in school, 
homemakers, etc.  
Another control variable is the average years of education or schooling, which is the 
average years of formal education for those above 15 years old in a region (in this study, a 
province). The CBS calculates this number based on a population census (SP), a population 
survey between censuses (SUPAS), and a socioeconomic household survey (SUSENAS). To 
calculate the average years of education, the CBS needs information on school participation, the 
highest level of education (currently or previously attended), the highest level of diploma, and 
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the highest grade of education (currently or previously attended). The interpretation of this 
indicator is straightforward. For example, in 2010, the average year of education was 7.9 years 
for all of Indonesia. This means that on average, Indonesia’s population above 15 years old 
completed formal education until the second grade of junior secondary school.  
 The inflation variable represents changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in a 
province. The CBS collects information on the prices of goods and services in 66 major cities 
across Indonesia. The base year for the current CPI is 2007. The CBS’s surveyors visit several 
traditional and modern markets (e.g., supermarket) and conduct direct interviews. The Laspeyres 
formula is used to estimate Indonesia’s CPI. Note that the CPI represents general prices in urban 
areas but not in rural areas. 
 
3.4  Regional Growth and Polarization Patterns 
     Before we analyze our data using an econometric model, it is useful to observe the 
patterns of regional growth and polarization in Indonesia. Table 3.1 shows growth in the GRDP 
per capita by province for two periods (2000-2005 and 2006-2010) and for all periods (2000-
2010) using 2000 constant prices. 
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Table 3.1. Provincial Growth (%) 2000-2010 
 
3.4.1 Provincial Growth 
As shown at the bottom of column four in Table 3.1, Indonesia’s average national growth 
between 2000 and 2010 is 3.74%. It is more convenient to analyze the data by island/region 
groupings consisting of five islands: Sumatera, Java-Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and eastern 
Indonesia. From 2000 to 2010, provinces in Sulawesi Island on average outperformed other 
Period 1 Period 2 All Period 
Province 2000-2005 2006-2010 2000-2010
 Aceh 2.452 -3.621 -0.585
North Sumatera 3.522 5.252 4.387
West Sumatera 3.457 4.670 4.063
 Riau -2.335 1.466 -0.434
 Jambi 3.530 3.531 3.530
South Sumatera 4.246 3.288 3.767
 Bengkulu 5.139 4.070 4.604
 Lampung 3.698 3.986 3.842
 Kepulauan Bangka Belitung 4.837 1.877 3.357
Sumatera 3.172 2.724 2.948
 DKI Jakarta 3.814 4.448 4.131
West Java 2.689 3.821 3.255
Central Java 4.051 5.181 4.616
 DI Yogyakarta 2.904 3.945 3.425
East Java 3.719 5.382 4.550
 Banten 3.013 5.393 4.203
 Bali 2.441 3.716 3.079
Java-Bali 3.404 4.054 3.729
West Kalimantan 3.801 3.413 3.607
Central Kalimantan 3.830 3.675 3.753
South Kalimantan 4.216 3.670 3.943
East Kalimantan -0.582 -0.824 -0.703
Kalimantan 2.816 2.484 2.650
North Sulawesi 2.454 6.411 4.432
Central Sulawesi 5.089 5.435 5.262
South Sulawesi 4.937 5.562 5.250
Southeast Sulawesi 5.559 0.396 2.978
 Gorontalo 4.130 5.354 4.742
Sulawesi 4.434 4.632 4.533
West Nusa Tenggara 4.145 4.080 4.112
East Nusa Tenggara 2.429 3.041 2.735
 Maluku 1.300 1.594 1.447
North Maluku -0.829 3.682 1.426
 Papua 2.917 -5.759 -1.421
Eastern Indonesia 1.992 1.327 1.660
Indonesia 3.259 4.177 3.74
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provinces in other islands. Sulawesi’s growth is higher than national growth (4.53% versus 
3.74%). Within Sulawesi, central Sulawesi had the highest growth in Indonesia. In this 10-year 
period, Sulawesi is the only region whose growth is above national growth. Despite being the 
most populous regions in Indonesia, the Java-Bali Islands recorded growth slightly below 
national growth. However, major provinces such as Jakarta, Central Java, East Java, and Banten 
grew more than 4%, which is higher than national growth. Furthermore, provinces in Sumatera, 
Kalimantan, and eastern Indonesia on average grew at a rate considerably slower than the 
national growth rate. For example, only two provinces in the eastern region, Gorontalo and West 
NusaTenggara, outperformed national growth and had the highest growth among provinces in 
eastern Indonesia. Moreover, two provinces, Aceh and East Kalimantan, showed negative 
growth (-.585 % and -0.703%). It is not surprising that Aceh showed negative growth because it 
had experienced conflict for a long time, and only recently, the conflict between the government 
and the rebellious faction that wanted to separate this province from Indonesia was resolved. On 
the contrary, East Kalimantan, which is known as a natural resource-rich province, showed 
negative growth during the period of study. Note, however, that East Kalimantan is one of the 
provinces with the highest per capita GRDP and one of the largest contributors to Indonesia’s 
GDP.   
Breaking the 10 year-period into two five-year periods, we can see changes in the five-
year average growth for each province and region (Table 3.1, columns two and three). As 
previously, Sulawesi was consistently the highest growth region in Indonesia in both periods. 
Sulawesi’s growth was significantly higher than national growth. In fact, no other region 
matches Sulawesi’s high growth, not even Java-Bali. Within the region, North Sulawesi showed 
a dramatic change in growth between two periods (from 2.45% in period 1 to 6.411% in period 
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2). Although Southeast Sulawesi had the highest growth in period 1, its growth fell significantly 
to 0.39% in period 2 from 5.55% in period 1.  
Furthermore, only Java-Bali experienced an increase in growth from period 1 to period 2. 
All other regions or islands experienced a decline in their five-year average growth from period 1 
to period 2. Sumatera’s growth fell drastically from 3.17% in period 1 to 2.72% in the later 
period. A large decline in several provinces’ growth in the Sumatra region led to average growth 
declines in this region. For example, Bengkulu province experienced a considerable drop in 
growth between the two periods (5.13% in period 1 versus 4.070% in period 2). Eastern 
Indonesia consistently experienced low growth, and its growth fell slightly from 2.34% in period 
1 to 1.99% in period 2. Although almost all provinces in eastern Indonesia experienced an 
increase in growth from period 1 to period 2, Papua province showed a significant drop between 
the two periods, resulting in a large decline in the region’s average growth. We provide maps 
illustrating growth patterns in Indonesia in Appendix C.1. 
 
3.4.2 Provincial Polarization 
 Figure 3.2 below presents the level of the Foster-Wolfson polarization index in 2000 and 
its changes between 2000 and 2005 by province (see Appendix C.2 for provincial polarization 
values and changes). Several features are apparent in Figure 3.2. First, Indonesia became more 
polarized in 2005 from 2000. Almost all provinces experienced an increase in polarization but at 
different rates. In most provinces, polarization grew more than 11% from the polarization level 
in 2000. At the national level, the polarization index more than doubled in just five years. 
Second, within the Java-Bali Islands, DI Yogyakarta province had the largest increase in 
polarization at 66%, whereas DKI Jakarta province showed the smallest increase despite its high 
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level of polarization in 2000. Meanwhile, West and East Nusa Tenggara had low levels of 
polarization in 2000, yet these provinces saw a rapid increase in polarization during this period 
(27.33% and 56.63%, respectively). Third, the most resource-rich provinces of Riau, East 
Kalimantan, and Papua had the highest levels of polarization in 2000. However, changes in 
polarization vary across these resource-rich provinces, with Papua experiencing an increase of 
almost 35% in five years. Fourth, on average, provinces in Kalimantan Island experienced the 
lowest increase in polarization during the period. Fifth, several provinces, such as Papua, Banten, 
and DI Yogyakarta, show the highest polarization in either period. Overall, in 2000, many 
provinces in Indonesia had high polarization, and natural resource-rich provinces tended to have 
high polarization. More importantly, from 2000 to 2005, many provinces became increasingly 
more polarized at rapid rates: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2a. Regional Patterns of Foster-Wolfson Polarization Index in 2000 
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Figure 3.2b. Changes in Foster-Wolfson Polarization Index 2000-2005 
 
3.4.3 Provincial Growth and Polarization 
Next, we extend our analysis to the relationship between growth and polarization. 
Provinces with above-average growth are considered high growth, whereas those with below-
average growth are considered low growth. Similarly, provinces with a polarization index above 
average are considered high, whereas those with a polarization index below average are 
considered low. Table 3.2 shows the relationship between polarization and growth. Using a 
nonparametric statistics approach, we test several combinations of different periods of growth 
(four periods: 1995-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010, and 2000-2010) and different periods of 
polarization (three polarization indices: 2000, 2005, and 2010). We summarize and discuss the 
results in this section. Our detailed estimation results are shown in Appendix C.3. 
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Table 3.2. The Relationship between Initial Polarization and Growth, 2000 and 2005 
 
Several key observations are as follows: First, most provinces in Indonesia are in the low 
polarization-high growth category in both periods. Many provinces such as North Sumatera, 
West Sumatera, Jambi, and South Sumatera, all of which are located in Sumatera Island, 
consistently fall within this category in both periods. Nevertheless, some provinces move into 
another category over time, suggesting the dynamic of this relationship. For instance, Lampung 
was in the low polarization-high growth category in 2000, yet it moved to the high polarization 
and high growth category in 2005. Second, there were five provinces that fall into the high 
polarization and low growth category in 2000. Two provinces are located in Java Island, whereas 
the rest are outside Java. In 2005, fewer provinces were in this category, yet all of them were 
located off Java. Papua and East Kalimantan in particular are always in this category. Third, as 
the capital of Indonesia, DKI Jakarta province is characterized as a high polarization and high 
growth province in both periods. Fourth, more provinces in 2005 than in 2000 fell into the high-
Low Polarization High Polarization Low Polarization High Polarization
Aceh Riau Aceh Nusa Tenggara Timur
Jawa Barat DI Yogyakarta Riau Kalimantan Timur
Bali Banten Kepulauan Bangka Belitung Sulawesi Tenggara
Sulawesi Utara Kalimantan Timur Maluku Papua
Maluku Papua
Maluku Utara
Nusa Tenggara Timur
Sumatera Utara DKI Jakarta Sumatera Utara Lampung
Sumatera Barat Kalimantan Barat Sumatera Barat DKI Jakarta
Jambi Sulawesi Tengah Jambi Jawa Barat
Sumatera Selatan Sulawesi Tenggara Sumatera Selatan Jawa Timur
Bengkulu Gorontalo Bengkulu Banten
Lampung Jawa Tengah Bali
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung Nusa Tenggara Barat Sulawesi Utara
Jawa Tengah Kalimantan Barat Sulawesi Selatan
Jawa Timur Kalimantan Tengah DI Yogyakarta
Nusa Tenggara Barat Kalimantan Selatan
Kalimantan Tengah Sulawesi Tengah
Kalimantan Selatan Gorontalo
Sulawesi Selatan Maluku Utara
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polarization and high-growth category. Half are within Java. 
As mentioned, we estimate nonparametric statistics for different periods of growth and 
polarization, and we summarize the results in Table 3.3. Two nonparametric tests are conducted: 
Pearson chi2 and Fisher’s exact test. Both tests determine whether there is a relationship between 
growth and polarization. The tests do not tell us how strong the relationship is and whether the 
relationship is positive or negative. The Pearson chi2 requires each cell to contain at least five 
units, whereas the Fisher’s exact test does not require this. In our case, our null hypothesis is that 
growth is independent of polarization. If the p-value is significant, then we reject the null 
hypothesis, and we can state that there is a relationship between growth and polarization. Our 
test results indicate that there is only one statistically significant relationship, namely, between 
growth in 2000-2005 and polarization in 2005. This result suggests that previous growth 
performance may have been associated with the present level of polarization, but we do not 
know the direction of the relationship. Five provinces fall into the category of high growth and 
high polarization, and 13 provinces fall into the category of high growth and low polarization. 
Due to the limitation of the non-parametric statistics, we further extend our analysis using a 
parametric estimation later in the paper.  
Table 3.3. Non-parametric Statistics: Growth & Polarization 
 
Pearson Chi2 Fisher's Exact
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010
1995-2000 1.09 1995-2000 0.44
2000-2004 0.63 4.43* 2000-2004 0.46 0.06*
2005-2010 0.20 0.64 2005-2010 0.70 0.67
2000-2010 0.71 0.06 2000-2010 0.43 1.00
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
FW Polarization Index
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3.5  Estimation  
  In several studies of growth-inequality, such as that of Barro (2000), the growth and the 
inequality equations are estimated separately. The growth equation is estimated with the usual 
variables, such as initial level of education, institutions, and level of development, whereas 
inequality is often determined by similar explanatory variables or slightly different variables than 
those used in the growth equation. Our approach is to estimate these equations simultaneously 
using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique as in Lundberg and Squire (2003). 
An important reason for estimating these equations simultaneously is that we want to test 
whether growth and polarization are simultaneously determined. In other words, we believe that 
growth and polarization are outcomes of processes occurring at the same time. Therefore, we 
should estimate them simultaneously. The first equation is the growth equation, which estimates 
the effects of certain explanatory variables on economic growth. The second equation is the 
income polarization equation, which accounts for several explanatory variables of income 
polarization. By using the SUR approach, we allow error terms to be correlated across equations. 
Our standard equations are as follows: 
∆ݕ௜௧ ൌ ࡿ′௜௧ࢻ ൅ ࢄ′௜௧ࢼ ൅ ݑ௜௧						ሺ1ሻ 
ܨ ௜ܹ௧ ൌ ࡿ′௜௧ࢽ ൅ ࢆ′௜௧ࢸ ൅ ݁௜௧					ሺ2ሻ 
where ∆ݕ௜௧ is the provincial five-year average per capita GRDP growth between 2000 and 2010. 
ࢄ consists of a vector of growth explanatory variables: initial per capita GRDP (log form), 
employment share in agriculture, employment share in mining, average of years of education, the 
share of investment in the GRDP, institutions, the share of government spending in the GRDP, 
and provincial inflation. In equation (2), the Foster-Wolfson index is the dependent variable, 
whereas ࢆ is a vector of the polarization independent variables. Meanwhile, ࡿ is a vector of 
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variables that are common to both equations. Furthermore, these equations assume that variables 
included in ࢆ are uncorrelated with growth and that variables in ࢄ are also uncorrelated with 
polarization (i.e., orthogonal assumption).  
Following Lundberg and Squire (2003), we drop orthogonal assumptions and allow 
growth to enter the polarization equation and polarization to enter the growth equation: 
∆ݕ௜௧ ൌ ࡿ′௜௧ࢻ ൅ ࢄ′௜௧	ࢼ ൅ ߣܨ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧				ሺ3ሻ 
ܨ ௜ܹ௧ ൌ ࡿ′௜௧ࢽ ൅ ࢆ′௜௧ࢸ ൅ ߦ∆ݕ௜௧ ൅ ݁௜௧					ሺ4ሻ 
With these equations, we can simultaneously test the effect of polarization on growth and of 
growth on polarization. Lundberg and Squire argue that equations (3) and (4) have a 
multicollinearity problem. However, we have checked for this issue and found no evidence of 
multicollinearity in our estimates.  
Before we present our estimation results, it is important to discuss variables included in 
our models. Our measure of polarization is the Foster-Wolfson (FW) index, and we estimate the 
provincial FW index for 2002 and 2008 for our regression analysis. This index falls in the 
category of the income bipolarization measure. As its category name indicates, the FW index 
concerns two income groups in a distribution, namely, those below the median and those above 
the median income. When this index increases in value, it can be interpreted as the disappearance 
of the middle class. Like other income polarization measures, the FW index can be regarded as a 
function of between- and within-group inequality. The between-group inequality has a positive 
relationship with the index. That is, holding within-group inequality constant, we observe that as 
the distance between those above and below the median becomes larger (“increased spread”), 
polarization will increase. On the contrary, holding between-group inequality constant, we 
observe that when inequality within two groups declines or groups become more homogenous in 
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income (“increased bipolarity”), polarization will rise. The formula is as follows: 	
ܨܹ ൌ 2ሾ2ሾ0.5 െ ܮ݋ݎ݁݊ݖሺ݌ ൌ 0.5ሻሿ െ ܩ݅݊݅ሿ μ݉݁݀݅ܽ݊ 
where Lorenz(p=0.5) is the income share of the bottom half of the population: µ is the mean 
income: Gini is the Gini index ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). The 
key advantages of this particular index are as follows: First, it can be calculated from readily 
available statistics such as the mean, the median, and the Gini index. Nonetheless, Wang and 
Tsui (2000) argue that the Foster and Wolfson approach of employing an inequality measure 
(i.e., Gini) to estimate polarization is problematic. Second, the FW index is relatively easy to 
interpret, making this index attractive compared to other complex measures. Third, we can 
decompose the Gini into between- and within-Gini and analyze which component of the FW 
index contributes the most to an increase or decrease in this particular index. Due to these 
advantages, we choose the FW index as our proxy for polarization. In contrast, Ezcurra (2009) 
used the Esteban, Gradin, and Ray polarization index and partitioned income distribution into 
two, three, and four income groups. He shows that the negative relationship between growth and 
polarization does not depend on the number of income groups used to estimate the polarization 
index. As discussed, higher polarization is associated with an increase in social unrest. A highly 
polarized society is likely to experience social unrest. This instability will likely reduce 
investments. In effect, growth may decline. Based on this line of argument, we expect the 
relationship between growth and polarization to be negative. That is, those provinces with high a 
polarization level are likely to experience low subsequent growth. 
 Following previous studies, we choose and combine several independent variables as 
control variables, including initial per capita GRDP (log form), employment share in agriculture, 
employment share in mining, average of years of education, the share of investment in the 
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GRDP, and the share of government spending in the GRDP. Summary statistics and a correlation 
matrix are in Appendix C.4. Because our sample is small, we attempt to keep our model simple. 
That is, we attempt to keep the number of explanatory variables to a minimum for each equation. 
By doing so, we avoid a multicollinearity problem in our model and still have reasonable 
statistical power. Therefore, we carefully select our explanatory variables and ensure that they 
are based on well-grounded theories available in the literature. The following discussion will 
discuss the significance of these variables that are included in the model specification. 
The initial value of per capita GRDP serves as the state of development proxy. It 
specifically tests a β convergence hypothesis, which argues that regions with lower growth will 
grow faster than those that started with higher growth. Studies by Barro (1991, 2000) and 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), for example, support this convergence hypothesis across countries. 
In a study of Indonesia, Hill, Resosudarmo, and Vidyattama (2008) find a statistically highly 
significant convergence of provincial per capita GRDP between 1975 and 2002. However, they 
find that convergence is absent in the non-mining provincial per capita GRDP, whereas there is a 
weak convergence for household expenditures during the period of study. Based on this result, 
we expect to see a convergence in our model as indicated by a negative sign of the coefficient of 
initial per capita GRDP. 
Unlike Ezcurra (2009), who uses initial population shares with secondary and tertiary 
education as indicators of human capital, we use only one variable: average years of education 
for those above 15 years of age. In the growth literature, human capital is considered an 
important factor for explaining growth. The human capital theory suggests that regions with 
larger stocks of human capital will grow faster than those with lower levels of human capital. For 
instance, using a modified (augmented) Solow model that takes into account human capital, 
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Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) find that the relationship between growth and human capital is 
positive and that the inclusion of a human capital variable in the endogenous growth model helps 
to explain variation in growth better than the standard model explains such variation. Therefore, 
we expect a positive sign of the coefficient for this variable. Furthermore, we also include 
education as our explanatory variable in the polarization equation. We expect that more people 
with better education will lead to a decrease in polarization. 
Employment shares in the agricultural and mining sectors are used to estimate regional 
specialization. These variables are indicators of productive structure in different regions. Some 
regions may have agricultural sector employment as a growth engine, whereas other regions may 
have more employment in the mining sector (i.e., specialization). Our sample indicates that the 
average employment share in agriculture is more than 50%. This result suggests that a large 
share of laborers work in this primary sector across Indonesia. Furthermore, the average 
employment share in mining is only 3% across Indonesia, and over time, the employment share 
in this sector has shrunk as ore, coal, minerals, etc., are depleting. Only certain resource-rich 
provinces like Riau and Kepulauan Bangka Belitung still maintain a high employment share in 
mining over time. Note that in this sector, value-added products are very limited; most of the 
time, firms directly export raw mining materials without any value-added process. According to 
our data in Appendix C.3, resource-rich provinces such as Aceh, East Kalimantan, and Papua 
experience low growth despite their high per capita GRDP. More important, there has been a 
significant shift in Indonesia’s structural economy. The shares of the agricultural and mining 
sectors in the GDP have been declining over time, as shown in Figure 3.3. Therefore, we expect 
that employment shares in the agricultural and mining sectors will decline over time and that 
their effect on growth will be negative: 
 155 
 
agri 
17%
mining
12%
manufacturing
27%
electricity
1%
construction
5%
trade
16%
transport
5%
finance
8%
services
9%
2000
agri 
13% mining
8%
manufacturing
25%
electricity
1%
construction
6%
trade
18%
transport
10%
finance
10%
services
9%
2012 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CEIC 
Figure 3.3. Share of Nine Sectors in GDP 2000 and 2012 
The share of investment in the GRDP is the ratio of gross capital formation to total 
GRDP. Investment is expected to have a positive effect on growth. Some studies discuss the 
direction of causation, that is, that growth might affect investment (see Barro, 1996). Provinces 
with high growth are likely to attract more investments. In the case of Indonesia, Vidyatamma 
(2010) finds that investment has no significant effect on growth. He notes that his finding is in 
line with other studies on developing countries such as Brazil and Vietnam.  
The share of government spending in the GRDP is another common variable for 
explaining growth, especially in cross-country studies. Generally, the share of government 
spending in the GRDP is negatively correlated with economic growth. Barro (2000), for 
example, finds that countries with a high share of government spending (in education and 
defense) in their GDP experience lower growth. Lunberg and Squire (2003) find no significant 
relationship between government spending and growth, although the coefficient is negative. At 
the subnational level, Vidyatamma (2010) reports a significantly negative effect of government 
spending on growth in Indonesia. Therefore, we expect to obtain a similar result. 
Inflation is one of our explanatory variables for both growth and polarization. High 
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inflation reduces purchasing power, which in turn negatively affects aggregate demand. As a 
consequence, total output declines. At the same time, despite higher prices, the rich still maintain 
their standard of living and continue to spend. Because our polarization is estimated using per 
capita expenditures, we expect higher polarization in provinces with high inflation. Therefore, 
we expect inflation to negatively affect growth but to positively affect polarization. 
In our polarization equation, the sum of exports and imports over GRDP is a variable not 
in the growth equation. This variable is usually used as a proxy for openness. Barro (2000), for 
example, reports that the degree of openness is positive and statistically significant in explaining 
income inequality across countries between 1960 and 1990. Countries that were more open in 
trade experienced a higher increase in their income inequality after controlling other factors. This 
is probably due to the fact that skilled labor is more beneficial than unskilled labor in the context 
of increasing trade. Thus, based on this, the sign for this variable is expected to be positive.  
An important variable appearing in both equations is an index of institutions based on 
people’s perceptions, mostly from the private sector. A high value of this index means that 
businessman, entrepreneurs, and business managers have a positive view of institutions. In our 
estimation, the institution index that we used comes from 2002 and 2004 surveys. Because this 
index is available at district levels, we estimate a weighted average using per capita GRDP as a 
weight to obtain an institution index at the provincial level. 
Our institution index comes from the KPPOD, an independent organization that monitors 
local autonomy in Indonesia. The KPPOD has conducted the “Doing Business in Indonesia” 
annual survey in more than 200 districts in Indonesia since 2002. The goals of the survey are to 
provide information needed to make investment decisions in regions across Indonesia, to 
encourage healthy competition among regions to attract investments, and to monitor local 
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processes of autonomy.  
The institution index consists of four variables, including legal certainty, apparatus and 
service, local regulation, and local finance. The legal certainty variable emphasizes the 
consistency of rules and law enforcement in the region, whereas the apparatus and service 
variable refers to how well local apparatuses enforce rules and how well they provide services 
related to business, such as business permit handling. The local regulation variable refers to “all 
formal policies or implementing rules that are stipulated and established by local government in 
regulating the activity of business community, and investment” (KPPOD 2003, p7). Finally, the 
local finance variable refers to “all policies, strategies, and techniques applied by local 
government to generate funds, and in allocating the funds to finance its function or duty as local 
government (service delivery, development initiatives, etc.)” (KPPOD 2003, p8).  
We believe that institutions play an important role in determining growth and income 
polarization in a region, especially after the decentralization that occurred in 2000, because 
currently, local governments at the district level have more political power than before. 
According to Azis (2008), many countries experienced slower growth after decentralization 
occurred. Stagnant or deteriorating social indicators often followed lower growth. Taking into 
account a set of institutional factors such as local accountability, people’s participation, and 
poverty-income distribution, he argues that local capture, a situation in which local leaders are 
taken “hostage” by local elites, has an ambiguous effect on the decentralization outcome. The 
type of local leader determines the effect of local capture on the decentralization outcome. A 
higher degree of local capture is not always associated with negative welfare outcomes. In some 
cases, a high level of local capture produces positive outcomes. This finding suggests that the 
system may lead to multiple equilibria. Furthermore, the absence of an incentive system based on 
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a stick-and-carrot approach may also explain why many countries showed a disappointing 
performance after decentralization. We would expect that strong and “good” institutions (as 
indicated with a high value of the index) in a region are associated with high growth and low 
income polarization. Appendix C.6 provides an overview of this index.  
 
3.6.  Empirical Results 
 We present our first estimation in Table 3.4. The growth (1) and polarization (2) 
equations are estimated simultaneously. In the growth equation, the level of development (i.e., 
initial level of per capita GRDP) and the employment shares in agriculture and in mining are 
statistically significant for explaining growth. In contrast, education, government spending and 
investment, and inflation have no significant effect on growth despite their correct signs in this 
model. In addition, the institution index and the year 2005 dummy are insignificant as well.  
The initial GRDP is negative and statistically significant for explaining growth. This 
result indicates that a convergence process occurs in Indonesia. Some provinces that began with 
low initial per capita GRDP are “catching up” and showing high economic growth. In contrast, 
provinces with high initial per capita GRDP experience slower growth over time. These results 
are consistent with those of Hill, Resosudarmo, and Vidyattama (2008), who report a statistically 
highly significant convergence of provincial per capita GRDP between 1975 and 2002. 
Appendix C.3 discusses in more detail the relationship between the initial GRDP and subsequent 
growth and changes in this relationship over time. We categorize provinces into four categories: 
low GRDP-high growth (catching up provinces), low GRDP-low growth (losing provinces), high 
GRDP-high growth (winning provinces), and high GRDP-low growth (falling behind provinces). 
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Table 3.4. SUR Results for Equations 1 and 2 
Growth (1) Polarization (2)
Initial income (per capita GRDP) -0.0561*** Average years of education 0.000654
(0.0122) (0.00438)
Average years of education 0.00437 Inflation 0.00113
(0.00352) (0.00166)
Employment share in agriculture -0.0467** Export plus import/GRDP 0.00342
(0.0191) (0.0120)
Employment share in mining -0.122** Institution -1.245***
(0.0570) (0.203)
Share of Gov.expenditures in GRDP 0.00381 Constant 0.170***
(0.0455) (0.0336)
Share of investment in GRDP -0.000231 Observations 52
(0.0364) Adjusted R-squared 0.458
Inflation -0.00103 Standard errors in parentheses
(0.00122) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Institution 0.0889
(0.236)
Year 2005 dummy 0.00230
(0.00833)
Constant 0.247***
(0.0486)
Observations 52
Adjusted R-squared 0.442  
 As shown in Table 3.4, the employment shares in the agricultural and mining sectors 
show an inverse relationship with growth. This means that provinces specializing in agriculture 
and mining are associated with lower subsequent growth. The negative effects of the 
employment share in mining are much higher than those of the employment share in the 
agricultural sector. These results are as expected. A combination of rapid inflow of inexpensive 
imported agricultural products (mostly from China) and rising land conversion from agricultural 
use to other uses may lead to a decrease in agricultural sector employment, which in effect 
lowers growth. In the mining sector, the rapid depletion of natural resources (especially given 
that currently, local governments at district levels can issue mining permits in its areas) and shifts 
from labor to modern mining technologies are likely to result in lower employment in this sector 
and, hence, lower growth. This is especially true in natural resource-rich provinces such as East 
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Kalimantan. These two variables might indicate that Indonesia has been experiencing a structural 
sectoral change in which sectors such as manufacturing, trade, and services contribute more to 
growth than primary sectors such as agriculture and mining.  
 In the polarization equation (2), we find that the institution index is the only statistically 
significant variable. The index shows a negative relationship with polarization, as expected. 
Those provinces with better institutions are associated with lower polarization. Provinces with 
business-friendly environments tend to attract more businesses, which generates employment 
and creates positive multiplier effects on local economies. It is likely that provinces with better 
institutions employ their tax revenues to provide better public goods and better social assistance 
that potentially lower polarization in the regions.  
 Next, we present the results of equations 3 and 4 in Table 3.5. Recall that we inserted the 
polarization index into the growth equation and the growth variable into the polarization 
equation. Our results show that holding other things constant, we find that higher polarization is 
associated with lower growth. The negative effect of polarization on growth is consistent with 
what Ezcurra (2009) finds. Although he uses a different polarization index, he reports a negative 
effect of polarization on growth in the European Union (EU). Furthermore, initial income, the 
employment share in agriculture, and the employment share in mining continue to be statistically 
significant as in the previous results. As in the previous results, the relationship between growth 
and these three variables is negative. 
  In the polarization equation (4), the results indicate a highly statistically significant 
inverse relationship between polarization and growth. Provinces with high growth are associated 
with low polarization. Conversely, provinces with low growth are associated with high 
polarization. It seems that our results indicate a feedback effect between growth and polarization, 
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suggesting a vicious cycle. Provinces with high polarization tend to experience low growth, 
which in turn exacerbates the level of polarization within these regions. Furthermore, our results 
also indicate that the institution index is negative and statistically significant for explaining 
polarization. It is clear that the coefficient of the institution index is much larger than that of 
growth (-1.309 vs. -0.444), suggesting the importance of institutions in this equation. Combining 
our findings regarding growth and institutions in determining polarization, we may conclude that 
higher growth may lead to lower polarization if there is an improvement in institutions. We will 
discuss institutions in more detail later in the paper: 
Table 3.5. SUR Results for Equations 3 and 4 
Growth (3) Polarization (4)
Polarization -0.339*** Growth -0.444**
(0.0989) (0.173)
Initial income (per capita GRDP) -0.0528*** Average years of education 0.00187
(0.0119) (0.00433)
Average years of education 0.00427 Inflation 0.000393
(0.00339) (0.00165)
Employment share in agriculture -0.0450** Export plus import/GRDP -0.0104
(0.0186) (0.0137)
Employment share in mining -0.120** Institution -1.309***
(0.0558) (0.201)
Share of Gov.expenditures in GRDP 0.00545 Constant 0.197***
(0.0443) (0.0345)
Share of investment in GRDP 0.00104 Observations 52
(0.0353) Adjusted R-squared 0.474
Inflation -0.000776 Standard errors in parentheses
(0.00117) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Institution -0.297
(0.230)
Year 2005 dummy 0.00398
(0.00881)
Constant 0.292***
(0.0482)
Observations 52
Adjusted R-squared 0.458  
 162 
 
Our next step is to check the robustness of the models by adding some independent 
variables to the growth equation. However, we avoid adding too many variables due to our 
limited sample and due to the risk of potentially having a multicollinearity problem in our model. 
Table 3.6 presents the results of our robustness check. 
In the growth equation (5), we add to the growth equation only a dummy variable for 
several provinces located in the eastern part of Indonesia. These provinces include West Nusa 
Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, North Maluku, and Papua.5 An important common 
feature of these provinces is that most have lower growth than the national average. For instance, 
West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara are considered isolated provinces due to their 
disadvantaged geographic location. Poor transportation and poor infrastructure are also main 
features of these provinces. As a consequence, their economies grow more slowly than other 
provinces. However, as shown in Appendix C.3, West Nusa Tenggara grew above the national 
average between 2005 and 2010, whereas growth remained low for East Nusa Tenggara. 
Furthermore, Papua is considered a province with abundant natural resources, and it has high per 
capita GRDP. Nevertheless, the provincial output is largely driven by natural resources, and most 
of Papua’s local inhabitants do not benefit from the natural resource extractions. From 2005 to 
2010, the average growth has been negative. Based on the results of equation (5), we find no 
significant association between those provinces located in the eastern part of Indonesia and 
growth. Despite this result, polarization and some control variables remain statistically 
significant as in previous results. 
  
                                                 
5 We exclude provinces in the Sulawesi Island from the eastern dummy because most of these provinces had 
growth above the national average during the period of study. 
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Table 3.6 Robustness Check Results 
 
Growth (5) (7) (9)
Polarization -0.338*** -0.265** -0.347***
(0.0991) (0.108) (0.101)
Initial income (per capita GRDP) -0.0522*** -0.0445*** -0.0519***
(0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0121)
Average years of education 0.00416 0.00437 0.00455
(0.00356) (0.00332) (0.00346)
Employment share in agriculture -0.0444** -0.0372* -0.0439**
(0.0194) (0.0190) (0.0188)
Employment share in mining -0.120** -0.0908 -0.124**
(0.0559) (0.0583) (0.0565)
Share of Gov.expenditures in GRDP 0.00790 0.00812 0.00984
(0.0501) (0.0435) (0.0456)
Share of investment in GRDP 0.00155 0.00198 -0.00144
(0.0356) (0.0346) (0.0358)
Inflation -0.000824 -0.000345 -0.000845
(0.00125) (0.00118) (0.00118)
Institution -0.298 -0.270 -0.321
(0.230) (0.226) (0.237)
Year 2005 dummy 0.00396 0.00253 0.00357
(0.00881) (0.00868) (0.00885)
Eastern Province dummy -0.000569
(0.00541)
Population Growth -0.00365
(0.00251)
Urban share -5.25e-05
(0.000132)
Constant 0.291*** 0.247*** 0.291***
(0.0505) (0.0562) (0.0481)
Observations 52 52 52
Adjusted R-squared 0.488 0.510 0.490
Polarization (6) (8) (10)
Growth -0.444** -0.438** -0.444**
(0.173) (0.173) (0.173)
Average years of education 0.00188 0.00186 0.00188
(0.00433) (0.00433) (0.00433)
Inflation 0.000392 0.000403 0.000392
(0.00165) (0.00165) (0.00165)
Institution -1.309*** -1.308*** -1.309***
(0.201) (0.201) (0.201)
Export plus import/GRDP -0.0105 -0.0103 -0.0105
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0137)
Constant 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.197***
(0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0345)
Observations 52 52 52
Adjusted R-squared 0.474 0.475 0.474
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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In the next robustness check, we include population growth in the growth equation. 
Given growth of the GRDP, faster population growth intuitively leads to lower growth because 
in this study, we use growth of per capita GRDP, which is a ratio of the GRDP to the total 
population in a province. Our results in equation (7) indicate that there is no significant 
relationship between population growth and economic growth. The negative sign of the 
coefficient is as expected. This finding is not unique to our study. Vidyatamma (2010) also finds 
that the link between the population growth rate and economic growth is insignificant. 
Regardless, our results suggest that our primary variable of interest, polarization, is still 
significant, although the magnitudes of the coefficients are different than those in the earlier 
model. In the polarization equation (8), the results are similar to those in the previous models. 
That is, only growth and the institution index are highly statistically significant.  
In our last robustness check, we include the urban population share in a province in the 
growth equation. Similar to population growth, the urban population share does not show a 
significant relationship with economic growth. Nevertheless, the relationship between growth 
and polarization remains negative and statistically significant after we control for the urban 
population share in the growth equation. In addition, the coefficient of the polarization index in 
the growth equation (9) is slightly larger than that of the polarization index in the growth 
equation (3). In the polarization equation (10), the results are similar to those in the previous 
models. 
In sum, based on our robustness check, our results are quite robust. That is, adding more 
control variables does not change the negative relationship between polarization and growth in 
the growth and polarization equation. In addition, the growth and institution index in the 
polarization equation remains highly significant despite additional variables in the growth 
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equation. 
 Although the determinants of growth and their rationales for explaining growth are 
discussed extensively in the literature, in our view, the discussions of the determinants of income 
polarization are neglected and scarce. Most studies of polarization emphasize the development of 
the polarization index and rarely discuss factors influencing income polarization. In the previous 
polarization equation, we include some covariates to explain polarization based on the 
determinants of income inequality in the literature. In our view, this step is quite reasonable due 
to the scarcity of literature on the determinants of income polarization. Nonetheless, we conduct 
an experiment in which we include similar independent variables in the growth and polarization 
equation. Further research is needed to explore mechanisms that explain how these variables 
affect polarization.  
 As indicated in Table 3.7, our primary hypothesis that polarization negatively affects 
growth is still supported by the results of equation (11). In addition, growth has a negative effect 
on polarization as well. In the growth equation (11), control variables such as initial income and 
the employment shares in the agricultural and mining sectors remain statistically significant, like 
those in previous equations. The magnitudes of these variables are slightly higher than those of 
the variables in previous equations. Based on the polarization equation (12), institution is still 
significant and negative. As previously, the effect of institution on polarization is quite large. 
Furthermore, the employment share in primary sectors shows an inverse relationship with 
polarization. That is, the more people working in these sectors, the less polarization exists. This 
is an interesting finding. As mentioned, nearly half of the total employment is in the agricultural 
sector. It is also well known that most poor people in Indonesia live in rural areas and are 
farmers. Increasing the number of people working in the agricultural and mining sectors could 
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lead to lower polarization, although at the same time, this may hinder the growth prospect. 
Therefore, the tradeoff is evident. 
 The share of local government spending in the GRDP shows a significant and positive 
relationship with polarization. One interpretation is that local governments do not spend their 
budget on activities that raise the incomes of the poor. This finding is consistent with the fact that 
in many regions in Indonesia, almost more than half of the total local budget is spent on salaries, 
benefits, and official trips (or perjalanan dinas) of local civil servants. In addition, recently, 
numerous incumbent local leaders have financed their reelection campaigns with funds allocated 
for social assistance. Therefore, it is most likely that large but unproductive local budgets are 
contributing to rising polarization:  
Table 3.7. SUR Results for Growth and Polarization Equations with Similar Covariates 
Growth (11)   Polarization  (12) 
Polarization -0.402***   Growth -0.673*** 
  (0.0965)     (0.167) 
Initial income ( per capita GRDP) -0.0477***   Average years of education 0.000478 
  (0.0118)     (0.00459) 
Average years of education 0.00380   Employment share in agriculture -0.0505* 
  (0.00340)     (0.0272) 
Employment share in agriculture -0.0510***   Employment share in mining -0.170** 
  (0.0189)     (0.0824) 
Employment share in mining -0.142**   Share of Gov.expenditures in GRDP 0.116** 
  (0.0566)     (0.0547) 
Share of Gov.expenditures in GRDP 0.0281   Share of investment in GRDP -0.00975 
  (0.0445)     (0.0524) 
Share of investment in GRDP -0.00165   Inflation -0.00106 
  (0.0358)     (0.00162) 
Inflation -0.000966   Export plus import/GRDP -0.00213 
  (0.00117)     (0.0141) 
Institution  -0.358   Institution  -1.123*** 
  (0.226)     (0.203) 
Year 2005 dummy 0.00368   Constant 0.234*** 
  (0.00858)     (0.0453) 
Constant 0.291***   Observations 52 
  (0.0479)   Adjusted R-squared 0.522 
Observations 52   Standard errors in parentheses   
Adjusted R-squared 0.469   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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 Previously, we divided the growth period into two periods, 2000 to 2004 and 2005-2010, 
in which polarization is the polarization index in 2002 and 2008, and the control variables are 
their values in the initial periods, 2000 and 2005. Now, we consider only one period of growth, 
2000 to 2010, which can be viewed as long-term growth. Table 3.8 presents our OLS estimation 
of the growth equation for the growth period 2000 to 2010. Unlike previous samples, our current 
samples include only 26 provinces. Holding other things constant, we see that polarization has a 
negative effect on long-term growth. Compared to previous results, the magnitude of the 
coefficient of polarization is substantially lower. We may conclude that polarization has a 
significantly larger negative effect on growth in the short run than in the long run: 
Table 3.8. OLS Results of Growth Equation 
Growth (12)
Polarization -0.152*
(0.0851)
Initial income (per capita GRDP) -0.0627***
(0.00819)
Average years of education 0.00786**
(0.00307)
Employment share in agriculture -0.0267
(0.0379)
Employment share in mining 0.0437
(0.179)
Share of Gov.expenditures in GRDP -0.00782
(0.0658)
Share of investment in GRDP 0.000152
(0.0310)
Inflation 0.000698
(0.00180)
Institution -0.173
(0.206)
Constant 0.249***
(0.0629)
Observations 26
Adjusted R-squared 0.632
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Regarding the control variables in equation (12) in Table 3.8, we see that the convergence 
process across regions is evident in the long run. Interestingly, the role of education in explaining 
growth was previously absent. However, based on equation (12), education has a positive impact 
on long-term growth. In addition, only the initial income and average years of education are 
statistically significant, whereas the rest of the control variables are not.  
Prior to testing the link between income polarization and growth using the provincial 
data, we performed a similar exercise using the district data. Different approaches including OLS 
and fixed-effect estimators are applied to two years of panel data (2000 and 2005). Despite the 
data’s high statistical power (that is, the number of observations is more than 500), certain data 
issues are evident. First, the data source for the sectoral employment shares is the SUSENAS, a 
socioeconomic household survey, given that the SAKERNAS, a specific household survey of the 
labor force, is representative only at the provincial level. This means that employment shares 
estimated from the SUSENAS are not as accurate as those estimated from the SAKERNAS. As a 
result, these variables might be under or over estimated. Second, due to decentralization, there 
are many new districts formed. Because our district sample examines two periods of time (2000-
2004) and (2005-2010), there have been many changes in the number of districts. New districts 
are usually separated from existing districts. If we follow districts over time, the data are likely 
not comparable. For example, the population living in the original district measured in the initial 
period, e.g., in 2000 might be completely different in 2005. However, the difference is mostly 
caused by the formation of new district(s) from the original district. Third, variations across 
districts are very high. Compared to provincial data on, for example, growth, districts’ data on 
growth are less smooth, meaning the data consist of many influential observations that might 
severely bias estimation.  
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 Despite the limitations of district data, we present our results in Appendix C.7. The 
results should be interpreted with caution and may not be accurate due to the above-mentioned 
problems. However, we present the results to contrast them with those obtained from the 
provincial data. In general, from both pooled OLS and fixed-effect models, we find that higher 
initial polarization is associated with higher subsequent growth after controlling sectoral 
employment, education, level of development, and the labor participation rate. Therefore, in 
contrast with our results from the provincial data, the results from the district data show that 
polarization is not harmful for growth at the district level. Further studies are needed to address 
the issues discussed above and to confirm whether the link between polarization and growth is 
negative or positive at the district level. 
 
3.7.  Discussion: Institutions, Polarization, and Growth 
 In the previous section, we revealed key factors that explain provincial growth and 
factors that determine polarization. Our results support our primary hypothesis that income 
polarization is harmful for subsequent growth, and these results are robust to several different 
specifications in the growth equation. The evidence also indicates a feedback effect in which 
growth negatively affects polarization, resulting in a vicious cycle. In essence, provinces with a 
high level of polarization tend to experience low economic growth, which exacerbates 
polarization. This finding suggests that the relationship is indeed complex.  
Furthermore, our results indicate that the relationship between institutions and 
polarization is statistically significant and negative. However, the effect of institutions on growth 
is insignificant. Therefore, there is an indication that institutions do not directly affect growth, 
yet they affect polarization directly. In other words, institutions play an important role in 
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explaining polarization, which negatively affects growth. Next, we discuss further the role of 
institutions in explaining polarization in Indonesia. 
We begin with definitions of institutions. North (1990) defines institutions as “the 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They 
consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) 
and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (p.97). Alternatively, we can think of 
institutions as the “rules of the game.” North (1990) writes that the role of institutions is “to 
create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. Together with the standard constraints of 
economics they define the choice set and therefore determine transaction and production costs 
and hence the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity” (p.97). 
North’s definition of institution fits nicely with our institution index, which consists of 
four variables as a proxy for institutions, particularly regional or local institutions in Indonesia. 
The index includes legal certainty, regional finance, government services, and local regulations. 
These four institutional variables fall into formal constraints according to North’s definition. The 
local business community at the city or district level assesses these variables based on their 
perceptions of doing business in the region. These institutional variables are within the control of 
the local government (i.e., policy variables). Unlike natural endowments and geographic 
locations, these institutional variables are largely influenced by what local governments choose 
to do in terms of attracting domestic and foreign investors. Moreover, we think that this 
institution index is a good proxy for institution because it is based on the local business 
community’s perception of how the rules of the game affect their businesses.  
Of the four variables, local regulation has the highest weight, meaning the local business 
community places more emphasis on this variable than on other indicators. In 2004, a substantial 
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number of business owners (almost one third of total respondents as shown in Figure 3.4) 
reported that local regulations impeded their business activities (KPPOD 2004). Many local 
business participants complained of how local governments excluded them from the processes of 
policy formulation. They were only invited into the socialization of the policy, and their input 
was often disregarded. More important local regulations often resulted in higher taxes, fees, and 
levies, which significantly added to the cost structures of local businesses. Besides legal levies, 
illegal levies were also evident in many regions. The average illegal levies in 2004 were 64.25% 
of the total legal fees for a business permit (KPPOD 2004).  
 
 
 
Source: KPPOD 2004, p.35 
Figure 3.4 Quality of Regional Regulations According to Business Operators 
Many regions still have problematic local regulations that lead to higher transactional, 
operational, and productions costs according to the KPPOD (2011). Most of these problematic 
local regulations regulate commodity trade. For instance, in South and West Kalimantan and 
Sumatera, local regulations impose substantial levies on crude palm oil. In addition, there are 
also levies simply for transporting commodities across regions. This example illustrates how 
Indonesia still faces a problem of a high cost economy in many regions. In effect, firms’ profit 
margins are likely to be squeezed, which might result in lower rates of expansion and less local 
employment, potentially raising income polarization.  
 However, we have to differentiate between small, medium and large firms. Unproductive 
tax and levies may lower small and medium firms’ profits but they may not have significant 
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impacts on large firms’ profitability.  Weak local institutions tend to favor large firms whose 
owners are usually politically and economically powerful. The collusions between local leaders 
and large firms are evident across Indonesia. Local autonomy allows local leaders at the district 
level or Bupati to directly issue, for example, mining and palm oil plantation business permits 
favoring big companies. The issuances of such permits often disregard environmental 
degradation. For example, many large companies obtain permits to use lands in the conservation 
and protected areas across Indonesia. Therefore, weak institutions might not be beneficial for 
local small and medium firms yet they are likely to favor large companies, potentially leading to 
environmental degradation and higher polarization. 
Moreover, despite increasing transfers from the central government to local governments, 
local regulations are often regarded as an easy way to raise local revenues. However, higher local 
revenues do not necessarily translate to more public goods provisions. Instead, higher local 
revenues may indicate a “bigger pie” to be corrupted, leading to a potentially polarized society. 
In sum, local institutional reform is a necessary condition to lower polarization which has a 
positive effect on regional growth. However, without an incentive system based on a stick-and-
carrot approach as suggested in Azis (2008), local institutional reform is far fetch.    
 
3.8.  Conclusion 
 In this paper, we attempt to answer an important question: Why do some regions in 
Indonesia perform more poorly than others? Many factors that might explain differences in 
economic outcomes have been proposed in the literature. Social scientists have attempted to 
endogenize growth and have called the framework “endogenous growth.” Although studies that 
use income inequality as an explanatory variable for growth are abundant, only a few studies 
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examine polarization as a determinant of growth at the sub-national level. Therefore, this study 
contributes to the literature by using regional data to analyze the relationship between 
polarization and economic growth in Indonesia.  
 Controlling the usual factors found in the growth literature, we find that higher 
polarization is associated with lower growth. This study also shows that provinces with high 
polarization tend to have lower growth, which exacerbates polarization in those regions, 
suggesting a persistent vicious cycle. Initial income, the employment share in agriculture, and the 
employment share in mining are statistically significant control variables that explain differences 
in regional growth. In addition, according to the polarization equation, better institutions within 
provinces are associated with lower regional polarization. Comparing the effects of significant 
variables in the polarization equation, we see that the effect of institutions is much larger than 
that of growth on polarization. Combining these findings, we conclude that higher is associated 
with lower polarization if there is a significant improvement in institutions. Furthermore, our 
results are quite robust to different model specifications (i.e., additional control variables).  
 We also develop understanding of the link between institutions and polarization. Our 
discussion focuses on local regulations because local business communities across Indonesia 
consider such regulations the most important institutional variable influencing their businesses. 
One study by the KPPOD suggests that local regulations are often viewed by local governments 
as an easy way to raise regional revenue. This practice has been ongoing until now. From the 
perspective of small-to-medium businesses, higher local taxes, levies, and fees have contributed 
to local firms’ economic burdens, resulting in lower profit margins, less investment, and less 
employment but they may not have significant impacts on large firms’ profitability. From the 
perspective of large firms, weak institutions are likely to benefit them. The collusions between 
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local leaders and large companies often result in environmental degradations and contribute to 
higher polarization.   
 From this study, we have learned that answering the growth question is not an easy task. 
Many factors, mechanisms, and theories have been proposed in the literature to explain 
differences in growth. In the case of Indonesia, we find that a high level of polarization is 
associated with poor performance, which, in turn, may exacerbate polarization, leading to a 
vicious cycle. Institutional factors, or the “rules of the game,” clearly play an important role in 
reducing polarization. The local governments across Indonesia should continuously improve 
their institutional factors, particularly local regulations, to decrease polarization, which will 
improve regional growth performance. This institutional reform requires an incentive system 
based on a stick-and-carrot approach. To the extent that rising polarization could be harmful 
from the perspectives of socio-political and future growth prospect, the importance of countering 
this trend of rising polarization should be seriously considered in efforts to promote growth. 
 The limitations of this study are as follows: First, because the unit of analysis in this 
study is the province, we have limited observations. Our strategy is to pool the data and only 
estimate variations across provinces (i.e., between variations) because we only have two year-
long periods. Second, we use only one type of polarization index. Different polarization indices 
should be tested in the future to check whether our results are robust. Third, our growth variable 
employs an average of five-year GRDP per capita. We think it would be much better if we use 
the GRDP excluding oil and gas per capita growth because variations in growth may not be too 
high as in the regular GRDP. 
  
 175 
 
APPENDIX C 
C.1 Regional Patterns of Growth 
Figure C.1 Indonesia’s Average Per Capita GRDP Growth 2000-2004 
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C.2  Regional Patterns of Polarization 
 
Table C.2 Changes in Polarization by Region 
 
  
FW FW FW
Province 2000 2005  changes (%)
 Aceh 0.107 0.130 21.07
North Sumatera 0.104 0.140 35.18
West Sumatera 0.108 0.137 26.76
 Riau 0.119 0.124 4.70
 Jambi 0.100 0.136 35.48
South Sumatera 0.110 0.134 22.38
 Bengkulu 0.097 0.133 36.79
 Lampung 0.106 0.151 42.54
 Kepulauan Bangka Belitung 0.102 0.140 37.85
Sumatera 0.106 0.136 28.66
 DKI Jakarta 0.135 0.147 9.63
West Java 0.113 0.154 36.19
Central Java 0.096 0.123 27.89
 DI Yogyakarta 0.119 0.197 65.98
East Java 0.106 0.145 36.83
 Banten 0.138 0.169 22.04
 Bali 0.108 0.147 36.90
Java-Bali 0.116 0.155 32.94
West Kalimantan 0.124 0.129 3.65
Central Kalimantan 0.101 0.131 29.17
South Kalimantan 0.111 0.128 15.46
East Kalimantan 0.126 0.153 21.85
Kalimantan 0.115 0.135 17.03
North Sulawesi 0.113 0.155 37.40
Central Sulawesi 0.117 0.135 15.70
South Sulawesi 0.106 0.148 40.07
Southeast Sulawesi 0.116 0.161 38.91
 Gorontalo 0.125 0.143 13.71
Sulawesi 0.115 0.148 28.65
West Nusa Tenggara 0.103 0.131 27.33
East Nusa Tenggara 0.103 0.161 56.63
 Maluku 0.111 0.119 7.14
 Maluku Utara 0.109 0.104 -4.55
 Papua 0.159 0.214 34.83
Eastern Indonesia 0.117 0.146 24.728
Indonesia 0.084 0.176 109.27
 177 
 
C.3 Nonparametric Statistics: Growth and Polarization 
1. a. Polarization 2000 and Growth 2000-2004 in percentages 
 
Pearson chi2(1) =   0.6250   Pr = 0.429 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
Fisher's exact =                 0.461 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
 
b. Polarization 2005 and Growth 2005-2010 in percentage 
 
Pearson chi2(1) =   0.1974   Pr = 0.657 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
Fisher's exact =                 0.698 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
 
2. a. Growth 1995-2000 and Polarization 2000 in percentages 
 
Pearson chi2(1) =   1.0860   Pr = 0.297 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
          Fisher's exact =                 0.440 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
 
 b. Growth 2000-05 and Polarization 2005 in percentages 
 
Pearson chi2(1) =   4.4344   Pr = 0.035 
*Significant, there is a statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
         
Fisher's exact =                 0.061 
*Significant, there is a statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
  
High pol Low pol Total
High growth 27.78 72.22 100
Low growth 41.67 58.33 100
Total 33.33 66.67 100
High pol Low pol Total
High growth 40.91 59.09 100
Low growth 50 50 100
Total 43.33 56.67 100
High pol Low pol Total
High 41.18 58.82 100
Low 23.08 76.92 100
Total 33.33 66.67 100
High pol Low pol Total
High 27.78 72.22 100
Low 66.67 33.33 100
Total 43.33 56.67 100
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High pol Low pol Total
High growth 40.91 59.09 100
Low growth 25 75 100
Total 36.67 63.33 100
High pol Low pol Total
High growth 38.1 61.9 100
Low growth 33.33 66.67 100
Total 36.67 63.33 100
High pol Low pol Total
High growth 28.57 71.43 100
Low growth 44.44 55.56 100
Total 33.33 66.67 100
 
3. a. Growth 2005-2010 & Polarization 2010 
    
 
 
 
 
Pearson chi2(1) =   0.6394   Pr = 0.424 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
          Fisher's exact =                 0.672 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
 
b. Growth 2000-2010 & Polarization 2010    
 
 
 
 
 
Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0615   Pr = 0.804 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
          Fisher's exact =                 1.000 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
 
c. Growth 2000-2010 & Polarization 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
Pearson chi2(1) =   0.7143   Pr = 0.398 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
          Fisher's exact =                 0.431 
*Not significant, no statistically significant relationship between growth and polarization 
 
** As can be seen, the relationship between growth and polarization is significant only for growth 2000-
05 and polarization 2005 
 
 
C.4 Provincial Growth and Initial GRDP per capita 
 In this section, we compare provincial growth and initial GRDP per capita and examine 
their changes. We define high-growth regions as those with growth above national growth and 
high-GRDP per capita regions as those with GRDP per capita above the national GDP per capita. 
Four categories are as follows: First, winning regions are those regions that start with high initial 
GRDP per capita and have high subsequent growth. Second, catching-up regions are those 
regions that have low initial GRDP per capita and have high growth. Third, falling-behind 
regions are those with high initial GRDP per capita and low growth. Finally, losing regions are 
those with low initial GRDP per capita and low growth. We will examine three comparisons: 1. 
GRDP per capita in 2000 and growth from 2000 to 2010; 2. GRDP per capita in 2000 and 
average growth from 2000 to 2005; 3. GRDP per capita in 2005 and average growth from 2005 
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to 2010. 
 Table C.4a shows our first comparison between the GRDP per capita in 2000 and growth 
from 2000 to 2010. Only one province falls into the winning region category, and it is not 
surprising that this winning province is Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. According to this table, 
half of the provinces in Indonesia are losing regions. Many provinces in Sumatera, Java-Bali, 
Kalimantan, and Eastern Indonesia fall into this category. None of the provinces in Sulawesi are 
categorized as losing regions (all of them are catching-up regions). In contrast, all provinces in 
Eastern Indonesia are losing regions. Five of 30 provinces can be categorized as falling-behind 
regions. Most of these provinces are located in Sumatera:  
Table C.4a Initial GRDP per capita 2000 and Growth 2000-2010 
 
 Our second and third comparisons are shown in Table 3.9. Unlike the previous table, this 
table shows a province’s change of status between two periods of time. In this case, growth is 
shown in five-year averages instead of ten-year averages as in the previous table. Table C.4b on 
the left panel is very similar to Table C.4a. That is, half of the provinces are losing regions, and 
30% of the provinces are catching-up regions. The main differences are more winning regions 
and less falling-behind regions in Table C.4b. However, when we compare the left and right 
panels, we clearly see that a significant number of provinces have experienced a change of 
status. The right panel shows that the number of catching-up regions increased from nine to 16 
provinces. This reveals that more than half of the provinces in Indonesia fall into this category. A 
significant decline in the number of losing regions in the second period is evident. In the first 
period (left panel), half of the provinces are considered losing regions, whereas in the second 
period (right panel), only 10% of the provinces are categorized as losing regions. The number of 
winning regions has increased from three to six provinces. However, the number of falling-
behind regions has also slightly increased to five provinces from three provinces in the previous 
period. It is clear from these tables that the status of the provinces is highly dynamic over time. 
Nevertheless, from these tables, we cannot pinpoint which provinces experience a change of 
status and which provinces show consistency in terms of their status.  
Table C.4b. Initial GRDP per capita 2000 and 2005 and Growth 2000-2005 and 2006-2010 
 
 
Table C.4b provides additional information about this change of status by province. 
Focusing on the last two columns, we can see that status changes vary across provinces. Several 
key features of Table C.4c are as follows: First, most provinces in Sulawesi are consistently 
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categorized as catching-up regions in period 1 and period 2. Only North Sulawesi is considered 
as a losing region in period 1, yet it became a catching-up region in period 2. Second, many 
provinces considered as losing regions (i.e., low initial GRDP per capita, low subsequent 
growth) experienced a change of status to catching-up regions in period 2, suggesting 
encouraging developments in these regions. For example, three out of four provinces in 
Kalimantan were losing regions in period 1, yet they transformed into catching-up provinces in 
period 2. This finding suggests that if we only compare GDRP per capita in 2000 and average 
growth between 2000 and 2010, we miss this change of status and generate a misleading 
conclusion. Third, only the Jakarta province was able to maintain its status in period 1 and period 
2. The Riau and Papua provinces were winning regions (i.e., high initial GRDP per capita, high 
growth) in period 1, yet their statutes changed dramatically to falling-behind regions (i.e., high 
initial GRDP per capita, low growth). Fourth, two provinces in Sumatra, namely, Aceh and 
Bangka Belitung, showed no change of status. Both were considered as falling-behind regions in 
both periods.  
Table C.4c. Change of Status by Province 
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C.5 Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Table C.5a Summary Statistics  
 
 
Table C.5b Correlation Matrix 
 
 
C.6  KPPOD Institution Index  
 As mentioned, the total index that measures regional investment attractiveness consists of 
five key factors: 1) Institution; 2) Socio-political conditions; 3) Regional economics; 4) Labor 
and productivity; 5) Physical infrastructure. As the organization estimating this index, the 
KPPOD selects these factors determining regional investment attractiveness based on literature 
surveys and discussions with experts. According to the KPPOD, those five variables can be 
classified into two categories: policy variables (institution and sociopolitical variable) and 
endowment variables (the other three). As shown in Figure C.6a, institution factor has the 
highest weight (31%), suggesting it is the most important factor according to the perceptions of 
businessmen and well-known economists. The weight of factors in the total index is determined 
with the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) based on the perceptions of experts and those in 
the private sector. 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth 0.032 0.023 -0.058 0.064
Polarization 0.137 0.031 0.071 0.220
Initial income ( per capita GRDP) 3.751 0.286 3.248 4.525
Average years of education 7.254 0.934 5.280 9.880
Employment share in agriculture 0.540 0.159 0.006 0.807
Employment share in mining 0.029 0.041 0.001 0.289
Share of Gov.expenditures in GRDP 0.124 0.074 0.025 0.456
Share of investment in GRDP 0.185 0.081 0.028 0.426
Inflation 8.489 2.171 2.510 15.600
Institution 0.041 0.016 0.017 0.084
Eastern Province dummy 0.467 0.503 0.000 1.000
Population Growth 1.535 1.653 -6.289 5.440
Urban share 38.650 16.792 15.460 100.000
grow fw loggdp edu agri mining govpdb invest inflation inst exim popgrowth urban east
grow 1
fw -0.1505 1
loggdp -0.5682 0.1361 1
yearsofedu -0.0356 0.1812 0.4086 1
agriemploy -0.0227 -0.1742 -0.3939 -0.4841 1
miningemploy -0.2222 -0.2408 0.2329 0.2377 -0.3316 1
govpdb 0.3137 0.1573 -0.5376 -0.0139 0.2525 -0.2514 1
investpdb 0.054 0.1206 -0.1333 -0.0152 0.0067 0.0263 0.4087 1
inflation -0.145 0.1839 0.2139 0.2237 -0.0639 -0.1294 0.1878 0.1645 1
inst -0.0305 -0.6707 -0.1126 -0.2142 0.1856 0.2113 -0.0892 -0.1258 -0.1631 1
exim -0.4736 0.1813 0.6865 0.3111 -0.2675 0.2579 -0.4325 -0.2899 0.0672 -0.1877 1
popgrowth -0.5588 0.341 0.5316 0.2301 -0.0805 0.2286 -0.1525 0.043 0.3075 -0.1118 0.412 1
urbanshare 0.023 -0.0588 0.0288 0.1509 0.1239 -0.1548 0.1294 -0.1142 -0.0448 -0.1287 0.2758 0.0213 1
east -0.0869 0.0912 -0.0801 -0.2814 0.3477 -0.1116 0.3618 0.2522 -0.1677 -0.0192 0.0418 0.0544 0.1887 1
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Figure C.6a Weight of Rating Factors 
 
    
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
In this study, we use only the institution index that consists of four variables: 1) Apparatus and 
service; 2) Law certainty; 3) Regional finance; 4) Regional policy or regulation. The first three 
variables consist of several indicators. Figure C.6b shows the weight of each indicator and 
variable. As shown, the law certainty variable has the highest weight (39%), followed by the 
regional policy or regulation variable (25%):   
Figure C.6b Weight of Variable and Indicator  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary and secondary data are used to estimate the total index. Primary data include 
data on the weights and magnitude of the factors, variables, and indicators explaining investment 
attractiveness based on the perceptions of business communities. The weight for each factor, 
variable, and indicator is based on face-to-face interviews using the AHP questionnaire with 
local business respondents in each survey area (20 areas), several national businessmen, and 
some economists from Jakarta. These weights are relatively constant over time so that the index 
is comparable across time. Primary data are collected by visiting several regions (20 regions in 
2002) and by sending out questionnaires to some regions (e.g., 114 regions in 2002) to obtain 
respondents’ perceptions. Using SPPS and Excel, these primary data are ranked to determine the 
intensity of each indicator in the Likert scale of 1 (worst) to 5 (best). Secondary data are also 
ranked by their intensity in the Likert scale. The results are then reviewed, discussed, and judged 
by a panel of experts consisting of regional businessmen and economists. The panel of experts 
makes a final decision on the intensity of each indicator, which is then processed by the “Expert 
Choice” software. Table C.6c summarizes the type and source of data for each indicator in the 
institution index: 
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Table C.6c. Type and source of indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: KPPOD 2002, p.101.
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C.7 Results from District Data 
Table C.7 Results from District Data 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant 0.0224*** 0.126*** 0.129*** 1.542 2.238 0.0135 0.397*** 1.224*** 4.500 1.421
(0.00837) (0.0188) (0.0265) (2.732) (2.550) (0.00894) (0.0827) (0.0935) (3.115) (2.922)
FW pol index 0.181** 0.285*** 0.259*** 0.276*** 0.263*** 0.228*** 0.299*** 0.142*
(0.0791) (0.0795) (0.0807) (0.0828) (0.0838) (0.0838) (0.0839) (0.0810)
Log GRDP per capita -0.00990*** -0.0145*** -0.0126*** -0.0133*** -0.0420*** -0.124*** -0.116*** -0.137***
(0.00223) (0.00273) (0.00271) (0.00284) (0.00978) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.00986)
Population share with primary education -6.76e-05 0.000131 -0.00233*** -0.00170***
(0.000256) (0.000255) (0.000315) (0.000344)
Population share with secondary education 0.000189 0.000306 -0.00219*** -0.00159***
(0.000184) (0.000199) (0.000269) (0.000280)
Employment share in agriculture -0.0145 -0.0216 -0.0372 -0.00263
(0.0273) (0.0255) (0.0310) (0.0292)
Employment share in mining -0.0152 -0.0222 -0.0342 -0.00108
(0.0273) (0.0255) (0.0303) (0.0285)
Employment share in manufacturing -0.0149 -0.0220 -0.0372 -0.00268
(0.0273) (0.0255) (0.0310) (0.0292)
Employment share in nontradable sector -0.0143 -0.0215 -0.0362 -0.00207
(0.0273) (0.0255) (0.0310) (0.0292)
Labor participation rate 0.000403** 0.000465*** 0.00255*** 0.00172***
(0.000175) (0.000165) (0.000280) (0.000287)
Observations 669 669 669 669 669 524 524 524 524 524
R-squared 0.017 0.048 0.097 0.113 0.117 0.016 0.146 0.499 0.475 0.567
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Pooled OLS Fixed Effect
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